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Resumo 
 
Uma ideia-chave das teorias simbólicas é que a compreensão da linguagem 
advém da manipulação de símbolos amodais que descrevem condições perceptivas, 
motoras e emocionais, o que parece estar em contradição com a nossa capacidade de 
interação com o ambiente. Por exemplo, é difícil acreditar que os sistemas sensoriais 
corporais não estejam envolvidos no processamento da linguagem quando alguém 
descreve a sua última ida a um café como o Starbucks ou Tim Hortons através das 
seguintes palavras: aromático, deleitável, suculento, delicioso, fragrante, caloroso, 
acolhedor, confortável, arrebatador, pungente ou sensual. Em contraste com as 
teorias simbólicas, a aplicação da cognição incorporada na compreensão da 
linguagem defende que os símbolos amodais tornam-se significativos apenas através 
da nossa percepção e interação com os objetos e situações que esses objetos 
representam (Glenberg, 2010). Deste modo, o processamento da linguagem envolve 
sistemas corporais e neurais utilizados em experiências perceptivas, de ação e 
emocionais do mundo real. Aplicando esta conceptualização, a compreensão de uma 
frase como “ A empregada parece divertida quando entrega uma chávena de café 
recentemente moído e um scone a um senhor de meia-idade” requere o 
restabelecimento de informação perceptual para simular os objectos e os agentes 
descritos na frase (e.g., café, homem de meia-idade), informação perceptual olfactiva 
para simular o cheiro de um scone quente e de café recentemente moído, informação 
motora para simular como a empregada entrega o café ao senhor e, informação 
emocional para simular a sensação de divertimento da empregada.  
A discussão acerca da importância da activação sensório-motora que ocorre 
durante a compreensão da linguagem inicia-se nesta tese com uma revisão 
bibliográfica sobre estudos empíricos focando o processamento da linguagem através 
da descrição de conceitos concretos e abstratos. Verificou-se que os dados de todos 
esses estudos convergem na conclusão que as representações incorporadas são 
necessárias para a compreensão. Simultaneamente concluiu-se que, na área do 
processamento da linguagem, ainda necessitam de ser abordados vários assuntos 
importantes, tendo-se destacado duas questões essenciais. A primeira é se a 
incorporação afecta a compreensão de eventos linguísticos abrangentes tais como o 
discurso. O interesse por esta questão foi inspirado por discussões prévias acerca da 
escassez de estudos sobre o papel de simulações de modalidade-específica durante a 
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compreensão de discursos (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008), bem como pela importância de 
testar a compreensão da linguagem a um nível mais global de discurso (Graesser et 
al., 1997; Sparks &vi Rapp, 2010). A segunda questão é se as representações 
incorporadas servem para afectar o processamento do discurso “offline”.  
Após a revisão de evidências empíricas e teóricas que suportam a cognição 
incorporada, bem como a discussão acerca da utilidade de simulações de 
modalidade-específica para a compreensão da linguagem, as duas questões 
supramencionadas foram investigadas empiricamente através de cinco experiências. 
As Experiências 1 e 2 examinaram a influência da condição emocional (positiva, 
controlo ou neutra, negativa) nas medidas “online” (tempo de leitura, clareza das 
imagens, facilidade de apreensão e sentimento de presença) e “offline (questões 
textuais e inferenciais) de compreensão de discurso. Os participantes cujas atitudes 
faciais foram manipuladas no sentido de ficarem congruentes com a valência positiva 
do texto (condição compatível “caneta nos dentes”) geralmente revelaram tempos de 
leituras mais rápidos e maior apreensão do que leram relativamente aos participantes 
cujas posturas faciais foram incongruentes (condição incompatível “caneta nos 
lábios”) ou neutras (sem manipulação). As restantes medidas não revelaram um 
efeito da condição emocional. Os resultados obtidos são consistentes com estudos 
anteriores que utilizaram as frases (e.g., Havas et al., 2007) e suportam as teorias de 
cognição incorporada nas quais os símbolos abstratos são apoiados em sistemas 
sensório-motores (Barsalou, 1999a; Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 2004). Provavelmente 
mais importante, os resultados obtidos indicam que uma condição emocional 
compatível parece afetar a compreensão “online” não só ao nível da palavra e da 
frase, mas também ao nível do discurso.  
Enquanto que as Experiências 2 e 3 avaliaram se as simulações de 
modalidade-específica permitem apreender informação explícita conotada à 
linguagem, a Experiência 3 avaliou se as simulações de modalidade-específica 
permitem apreender informação implícita suplementar às palavras mencionadas no 
texto. Os participantes leram narrativas com descrições de cenas que implicitamente 
sugeriam uma determinada posição espacial de uma pessoa ou de uma entidade, 
enquanto o seu corpo estava virado 90 graus para a direita (condição compatível), 90 
graus para a esquerda (condição incompatível) ou numa condição normal sem 
manipulação corporal (condição neutra). A compreensão dos participantes foi 
avaliada através de medidas “online” (tempos de leitura, clareza mental das imagens, 
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clareza mental de imagens específicas e presença espacial) e “offline” 
(sequenciamento de tarefas). Os resultados obtidos revelam que os participantes que 
leram o texto na condição compatível reportaram um maior nível de clareza mental 
de imagens, mas apenas no que diz respeito às passagens que descreviam 
movimentos envolvendo duas pessoas situadas à esquerda. As restantes medidas não 
revelaram um efeito de congruência entre a direção corporal e o processamento do 
discurso. Assim, pode ser concluído que mesmo as caraterísticas implícitas das 
simulações, tais como a dimensão espacial ou localização estão, pelo menos, algo 
envolvidas no processamento de amplos segmentos da linguagem tais como o 
discurso. 
Por ultimo, as Experiências 4 e 5 foram realizadas para demonstrar que a 
participação em ações reais (exercício numa bicicleta fixa) ou meramente a 
preparação do sistema motor para uma ação (leitura do texto com uma perna em 
avanço) afeta o modo como os indivíduos compreendem um discurso com descrições 
de movimentos metafóricos. Os participantes leram um texto com descrições de 
movimentos metafóricos progressivos (e.g., perseguir um futuro melhor) enquanto os 
seus corpos estavam preparados (condição de facilitação) ou não (controlo) para o 
processamento de informação congruente com ação. A compreensão do discurso 
pelos participantes foi avaliada através de medidas “online” (tempos de leitura) e 
“offline” (precisão das respostas, tempo de reconhecimento de palavras do texto, 
tempo de avaliação da veracidade/falsidade de frases). Foi concluído que a simulação 
de ação tem maior efeito na compreensão “offline” implícita do que na “offline” 
explícita e que a compreensão “online” não parece ser consideravelmente afetada. Os 
resultados obtidos são consistentes com a teoria LASS (Barsalou et al., 2008), a qual 
prevê que a simulação afeta mais o processamento de informação baseado na 
dedução e interpretação e, num menor nível, o processamento superficial baseado na 
informação explicitamente fornecida no texto. Estas conclusões permitem avançar 
para além das Experiências 1 a 3 ao demonstrar que as simulações de modalidade-
específica estão envolvidas igualmente na compreensão de discursos que descrevem 
ações metafóricas as quais são fisicamente impossíveis de desempenhar. 
Em resumo, os resultados apresentados suportam a cognição incorporada, 
sugerindo que as condições sensório-motoras e afetivas estão implicadas, ao menos 
parcialmente, no processamento do discurso “online” e “offline”. É manifesto que as 
experiências descritas nesta tese não fornecem evidências de que não existem 
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representações amodais ativadas durante o processamento linguístico, mas 
demonstram que o apoio sensório-motor é necessário para a compreensão de 
segmentos amplos da linguagem como é o discurso. 
 
Palavras-chave: Cognição incorporada, compreensão da linguagem, simulação 
sensório-motora, processamento “online”, processamento “offline” 
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Abstract 
Theories of embodied cognition argue that language processing arises not 
from amodal symbols that redescribe sensorimotor and affective experiences, but 
from partial simulations (reenactments) of modality-specific states. Recent findings 
on processing of words and sentences support such a stance emphasizing that the role 
of the body in the domain of language comprehension should not be overlooked or 
dismissed. The present research was conducted to extend prior work in two important 
ways. First, the role of simulation was tested with connected discourse rather than 
words or sentences presented in isolation. Second, both “online” and “offline” 
measures of discourse comprehension were taken. In Experiments 1 and 2 
participants’ facial postures were manipulated to show that preparing the body for 
processing of emotion-congruent information improves discourse comprehension. In 
Experiment 3 the direction of body posture was manipulated to show that implicit 
properties of simulations, such as spatial dimension or location, are at least 
somewhat involved in processing of large language segments such as discourse. 
Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5 participants’ body movement and body posture were 
manipulated to show that even understanding of language describing metaphorical 
actions physically impossible to perform involves constructing a sensorimotor 
simulation of the described event. The major result was that compatibility between 
embodiment and language strongly modulated performance effectiveness in 
experiments on simulation of emotion and metaphorical action. The effect of 
simulation on comprehension of discourse implying spatial dimension was fragile. 
These findings support an embodied simulation account of cognition suggesting that 
sensorimotor and affective states are at least partially implicated in “online” and 
“offline” discourse comprehension.  
 
Keywords: Embodied cogntion, language comprehension, sensory-motor simulation, 
“online” processing, “offline” processing 
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Introduction 
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Abstract 
 
This chapter provides a rationale for Ph.D. research. It establishes the importance of 
the present research within the current knowledge in the domain of embodied 
cognition and language comprehension and defines a problem under investigation. 
Likewise, this part explains the theoretical background, hypotheses to be tested, 
limitations of the dissertation, and research methods. Finally, Chapter 1 culminates 
in an outline of thesis organization and definition of some key terms and concepts 
that are typically used together, sometimes (mistakenly) interchangeably and 
synonymously in the domain of embodied cognition. 
  
24 
 
1.1. Theoretical background 
 
Consider the following new experimental findings about language 
comprehension: 
1. The processing of language triggers activity in sensory and motor areas of 
the brain associated with sensory- and action-related experiences (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, 
Wilson, Rizolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006; Boulenger, Roy, Paulignan, Déprez, Jeannerod, 
& Nazir, 2006; Buccino, Riggio, Melli, Binkofski, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2005; 
Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; 
Isenberg et al., 1999; Martin & Chao, 2001; Oliveri, Finocchiaro, Shapiro, 
Gangitano, Caramazza, & Pascual-Leone, 2004; Pulvermüller, 1999, 2002; 
Tettamanti et al., 2005). 
2. Sentence comprehension is facilitated when the literal body movement is 
consistent with that implied by the sentence. Conversely, sentence comprehension is 
impaired when the literal body movement is not consistent with that implied by the 
sentence (e.g., Bergen & Wheeler, 2005; Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak & Borregine, 2008; Taylor & Zwaan, 2006; Taylor, Lev Ari 
& Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan, Taylor, & de Boer, 2010). 
3. Comprehension of emotional sentences is induced when the suggested 
mood of the sentence is congruent with the concurrent mood of the comprehender. 
Conversely, comprehension of emotional sentences is impaired when the suggested 
mood of the sentence is incongruent with the concurrent mood of the comprehender 
(e.g., Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007; Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & 
Davidson, 2010). Moreover, comprehension of sentences describing emotionally 
laden events primes particular actions. More specifically, reading of angry sentences 
leads to faster movements away from the body and reading of sad sentences leads to 
faster movements towards the body (Mouliso, Glenberg, Havas, & Lindeman, 2007). 
4. Perceptual information such as orientation, shape, motion, color, and 
visibility is implicated in processing of sentences (e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; 
Zwaan, Stanfield, &Yaxley, 2002; Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004; 
Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007; Richter & Zwaan, 2009). 
Recent research on embodiment offers a framework for coherently integrating 
all these findings (Damasio, 1989, 1994; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
The basic idea of embodied theories is that sensorimotor processing is important for 
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language understanding. According to Barsalou (2008a), this idea is well-supported 
by the claim that if humans evolved from creatures whose bodily systems relied on 
perceptual, motoric, and emotional processing, then sensorimotor and introspective 
processes should be also involved in language processing. Therefore, embodied 
theories of cognition reject traditional amodal views that understanding of language 
comes from manipulation of abstract, arbitrary, amodal symbols which have no 
reference to modality-specific systems of perception, action, and introspection (see  
Collins & Loftus, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1976; Landauer & Dumais, 1997, for more 
details regarding amodal language processing). Instead, embodied theories suggest 
that (a) language comprehension is a process of simulation (reenactment) of events 
acquired during original experience of the world (Barsalou, 1999a), and the 
simulation relies on sensory, motor, and introspective states; (b) language 
comprehension is affected by the unique structure of human body (Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000); and that (c) language comprehension is simulated in the context of 
possible actions, agents, background situations, and interoceptive sensations from the 
body (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003). 
 
1.2. Research problem and objectives 
 
Each of the empirical findings presented at the beginning of the previous 
section is consistent with the embodied account of cognition suggesting that 
language processing arises from partial simulations of original sensory, motor, and 
introspective states. However, two issues call for attention.  
The first issue is that none of these studies tested whether embodied 
representations get activated on the level of comprehension higher than sentence. 
This is an important limitation of the above-mentioned investigations as it makes it 
difficult to predict whether embodiment effects in sentence comprehension fully 
generalize to larger language segments such as discourse. Thus, although empirical 
work on embodied sentence comprehension presents a compelling argument on the 
role of bodily feedback in general language comprehension, there is still a distinct 
possibility that modality-specific simulations might not affect language processing 
above the level of sentence, considering that discourse is not an arbitrary 
combination of individual sentences. To further develop the importance of this issue 
for the current literature, consider the three fundamental differences between the 
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discourse level processing and other levels of language processing suggested by 
Graesser, Millis, and Zwaan (1997). The first argument posed by the researchers is 
that most of the oral and written communication in human life proceeds in the form 
of discourse rather than sentence (e.g., dialogue, letter, story, article, etc.). The 
second argument is that people rarely process sentences without supporting context 
from discourse. Finally, the third argument is that discourse comprehension is closely 
tied with other important higher-level cognitive processes such as memory, 
reasoning, problem solving, etc. Similar arguments supporting the importance of 
discourse-level studies for the area of language comprehension can be found in other 
equally fruitful contributions (e.g., Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Sparks & 
Rapp, 2010; Zwaan & Radvanksy, 1998; Zwaan & Rapp, 2006).  
The second issue concerns the fact that most research on language processing 
has so far tested embodiment effects using “online” measures of comprehension 
(e.g., reading times, gaze durations) rather than “offline” measures of comprehension 
(e.g., response times at test, questionnaire). Clearly, in studies on lexical access or 
sentence processing it is very often impossible to capture such important aspects of 
“offline” comprehension as, for instance, recall, summarization, argumentation, or 
inferencing due to the small size of language segments. However, discourse research 
offers just such an opportunity. More specifically, discourse represents an extended 
expression of thought on a particular subject, and thus allows the comprehender to 
construct the meaning of the message throughout the text, form his attitude towards 
the events described in the text, and, as a result, build an immediate and long-term 
memory representation of the events from discourse. Furthermore, discourse captures 
situational information that is so central for an embodied account of language 
processing: experiences and events mirrored in the real world that include people 
perceiving background situations, performing goal-oriented actions, and emotionally 
reacting to certain types of information (see Graesser et al., 1997, for discussion). 
Finally, the most recent research revealed that details of sensorimotor simulations are 
retained over longer periods in sentence processing (Pecher, Dantzig, Zwaan, & 
Zeelenberg, 2009) and that embodied interventions help children answer inference 
questions and better remember parts of texts (Glenberg, 2011, for discussion; 
Glenberg, Goldberg, & Zhu, 2011), suggesting that there are good reasons to think 
that embodied representations, which are constructed “online”, may affect “offline” 
processing of discourse. In brief, discourse-level studies provide an experimenter 
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with powerful tools of testing “online” and, most importantly, “offline” processing of 
the events from discourse, given that such studies investigate how individuals build 
meaningful mental representations from extended linguistic events (e.g., textbooks, 
novels, stories, dialogues, articles, conversations) that correspond to naturalistic 
communication (Sparks & Rapp, 2010). 
In sum, the current state of affairs in discourse and cognitive psychology 
literatures demonstrates the necessity to test embodied effects on comprehension on 
larger language segments than word or sentence using both “online” and “offline” 
measures of language comprehension. Therefore, the primary two objectives of this 
Ph.D. research are (a) to provide evidence suggesting that embodied representations 
get activated during discourse processing and (b) investigate whether the details of 
sensorimotor and introspective simulations affect both “online” and “offline” 
discourse comprehension. 
 
1.3. Scope and methods of research 
 
The experiments presented in Chapters Three, Four, and Five of this thesis 
aim to investigate whether sensory-motor grounding affects “online” and “offline” 
discourse processing. To more succinctly address the role of embodied 
representations in comprehension of discourse, the research in this thesis will be 
limited to processing of written language only (specifically, reading comprehension). 
Doing so narrows the scope of investigation and allows comparing whether the 
results of the present research are consistent with the previous literature on embodied 
reading comprehension at the level of sentences.  
It is important to note that the evidence for activation of embodied 
representations during language comprehension has been collected using various 
experimental procedures across literature. Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2008) reviewed 
such experimental procedures and concluded that in most embodied experiments the 
evidence for the role of sensory-motor grounding in language processing comes from 
either linguistic and nonlinguistic stimuli used in combination, such as judging 
sensibility of sentences following pictorial information or judging sensibility of 
sentences while responding in either toward or away direction (Boroditsky, 2000; 
Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Matlock & Richardson, 
2004; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), or linguistic stimuli only, such as semantic 
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judgments, sensibility ratings, and memory load (Borghi, 2004; Fincher-Kiefer, 
2001; Spivey & Geng, 2001; Wu & Barsalou, 2004). The experiments presented in 
subsequent chapters of this Ph.D. thesis included both linguistic and non-linguistic 
stimuli and were designed to demonstrate the following embodied effect: a 
compatibility of embodiment and cognition facilitates discourse comprehension. 
More broadly, according to embodiment theory processing of language requires 
simulation of certain perceptual, action, and introspective states. Consequently, 
putting the body of the comprehender, for example, into a congruent happy state 
while he is reading a text describing pleasant events (e.g., about happy relationship) 
should help him faster understand the text, and thus facilitate comprehension. 
Similarly, putting the body of the comprehender into an incongruent sad state while 
he is reading a text describing pleasant events should impair his processing of text, 
considering that an incongruent sad state should interfere with understanding of 
discourse describing pleasant events. Thus, in each experiment of this research the 
body was shifted into such states (either prior to reading process or during the 
reading process) to test whether embodied representations get activated and, as a 
result, help better comprehension of discourse. The means of shifting the body into 
appropriate states differed across experiments, given that different body states were 
manipulated (e.g., emotional, action, etc.), and these means of manipulating the body 
will be discussed in more detail at the onset of each respective empirical chapter.  
The methods of assessing discourse comprehension are quite diverse, given 
that reading comprehension is a covert process that cannot be directly observed. 
Across literature, it is possible to find the following standardized measures of reading 
comprehension used by experimental psychologists and linguists: collection of 
reading times for paragraphs as readers passively read the text, collection of reading 
times for individuals words or sentences (interrupted comprehension) in the text 
(Graesser et al., 1997; Pachella, 1974), recording gaze durations (Spivey & Geng, 
2001), asking multiple-choice (Kehoe, 1995), open-ended (Carlisle & Rice, 2004) 
types of questions, and asking to identify sequence of events (Gambrell, Pfeiffer, & 
Wilson, 1985) in the story (see also Fletcher, 2006; Haberlandt, 1994, for complete 
reviews). Considering that the main objective of the present research was to study the 
effect of sensorimotor grounding on both “online” and “offline” language processing, 
multiple reading assessments were used.  
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1.3.1. Methods of assessing “online” discourse comprehension 
 
Online reading comprehension was measured by collecting reading times as 
comprehenders were normally reading the text (experiments one to five) as well as 
by assessing the vividness of mental imagery (experiments one, two and three), 
spatial presence (experiments one, two, and three), and the ease of reading 
(experiments one and two). The decision to measure the degree of mental imagery 
and spatial presence was guided by previous research on ocolumotor mechanisms 
activated by imagery (Spivey & Geng, 2001; Spivey, Tyler, Richardson, &Young, 
2000). For instance, Spivey and Geng (2001) showed that when individuals were 
reading short stories describing upward, downward, leftward, and rightward events 
their eyes “followed” the visuospatial description implied by the texts, suggesting 
that people imagined perceiving objects and performing actions in the described 
scene as if they were actually there in the middle of the situation. Finally, Barsalou 
(2008b) noted that mental imagery is an integral part of mechanisms that underlie 
simulation, but whereas mental imagery is usually a result of deliberate attempts to 
construct conscious mental representations in working memory (Kosslyn, 1980, 
1994), modality-specific simulations usually get activated unconsciously and outside 
of working memory. In brief, the rationale for inclusion of these measures is as 
follows: if bodily states for perception, action, and introspection are involved in 
language comprehension, then simulating these bodily states should affect perception 
and imagery and, accordingly, discourse comprehension (see also Barsalou, 
Solomon, & Wu, 1999, for empirical evidence). Clearly, these measures (i.e., 
vividness of imagery, feeling of presence, and ease of reading) are not direct 
comprehension measures as they involve the participants’ metacognitive judgments 
on their own comprehension processes after the proper comprehension task. At the 
same time, such measures might shed some light on unrevealed effects in “direct” 
measures (reading times) of “online” discourse comprehension, and thus are 
theoretically interesting. 
 
1.3.2. Methods of assessing “offline” discourse comprehension  
 
“Offline” explicit reading comprehension was measured by open-ended 
questions (experiments one and two), a sequencing task which refers to the process 
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of putting narrative events in the chronological order in which they occurred 
(experiment three), and a recognition task which involved measuring accuracy and 
the amount of time it took participants to recognize certain words from the target text 
(experiments four and five).  
Offline implicit comprehension was measured with a Likert Scale from 1 to 7 
with 1 being “completely disagree” and 7 being “completely agree”, which required 
from participants to indicate their level of agreement (based on implicit guessing) on 
statements referring to events from the target text (experiments one and two). 
Finally, in Experiments Four and Five “offline” implicit comprehension was 
measured by assessing participants’ accuracy and the amount of time it took 
participants to judge sentences as correct or incorrect with respect to the content of 
the text.  
An appropriate justification for why different methods of data collection were 
used in some experiments will be provided in the “Method” section of each empirical 
chapter.  
 
1.4. Hypotheses 
 
 A strong embodiment stance suggests that language comprehension arises 
from simulating the situation by using bodily systems employed in control of 
perception, action, and introspection (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998; Kaschak & 
Glenberg, 2000; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2011; Zwaan, 2004). Based on embodiment 
theory, two major hypotheses can be formulated with regard to the influence of 
modality-specific simulations on discourse comprehension. A first hypothesis is that 
shifting the body into a congruent state with language meaning (e.g., emotional, 
action, etc.) should facilitate “online” discourse comprehension. Conversely, shifting 
the body into an incongruent state with language meaning should interfere with 
(impair) “online” discourse comprehension. For instance, if we are reading a story 
about someone escaping from a police station after being arrested on suspicion of a 
serious offence, we should be faster to process discourse when our bodily systems 
are prepared (e.g., by previously engaging in body movements associated with 
movements implied by discourse) for processing of language describing actions 
rather than unprepared or prevented from action-congruent processing. A second 
hypothesis is that modality-specific simulations also play important roles in “offline” 
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comprehension of discourse. More concretely, if “offline” discourse comprehension 
indeed requires simulations, then participants whose bodily systems are prepared for 
processing of language describing congruent movements should demonstrate better 
performance on “offline: comprehension measures (i.e., open-ended and inference 
questions, accuracy, response times) compared to participants whose bodily systems 
are not prepared for such processing. 
 
1.5. Overview of thesis organization 
 
 To test the above-mentioned hypotheses, five experiments were conducted 
on the role of modality-specific simulations in discourse comprehension. The 
research overview section presented next will briefly describe each of these 
experiments. However, for the reasons of clarity and consistency, the overview will 
commence with a theoretical chapter that provides a background for this research and 
will end with the presentation of empirical chapters. 
In Chapter 2 amodal and embodied accounts of language comprehension are 
reviewed in more detail and their basic assumptions are compared. Then, empirical 
findings (from research on processing of concrete and abstract language) in support 
of embodied view of cognition are discussed as well as strong and moderate 
embodied theories that fully or partially account for these findings. Finally, the 
arguments that argue largely in favor of embodiment stance are discussed. The 
chapter concludes in an outline of research questions that were investigated in the 
subsequent empirical chapters of the thesis. 
 In Chapter 3 the role of emotion simulation in “online” and “offline” 
discourse comprehension is investigated through manipulation of facial posture. In 
the first experiment participants read a text describing positive events while having a 
pen between their teeth (muscular activation of the smile being facilitated) or in a 
normal condition without a pen (muscular activation of the smile being possible, but 
not facilitated). In the second experiment participants read a text describing positive 
events while having a pen between their lips (muscular activation of the smile being 
prevented) or in a normal condition without a pen (muscular activation of the smile 
being possible, but not facilitated). Participants’ comprehension was assessed by 
collecting reading times, asking to indicate their ease of reading, vividness of 
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imagery, spatial presence (measures of “online” comprehension), and respond to 
explicit and inference questions (measures of offline” comprehension of discourse). 
In Chapter 4 the role of implied spatial dimension in “online” and “offline” 
processing of discourse is investigated through manipulation of sitting body posture. 
In a single experiment participants were recruited to read a text implying left 
movements and locations and randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: 
matching (participants read the text while their body was turned 90 degrees to the 
right with the left shoulder advanced to the computer), mismatching (participants 
read the text while their body was body turned 90 degrees to the left with the right 
shoulder advanced to the computer), and neutral (no manipulation), and their 
comprehension was assessed by collecting reading times and asking to fill in a 
posteriori questionnaire that included the following tasks: vividness of general 
mental imagery, vividness of mental imagery regarding specific events from the 
target text, spatial presence (“online” comprehension measures), and a sequencing 
comprehension task (“offline” comprehension measure). 
In Chapter 5 the role of action simulation in comprehension of discourse 
describing metaphorical actions is investigated through manipulation of body action 
systems. In two experiments (similar yet distinct studies) participants read a text 
describing metaphorical forward movements while their bodily systems were either 
prepared (facilitation condition) or not prepared (control) for processing of action-
congruent information. Discourse comprehension was assessed by collecting reading 
times and analyzing accuracy and response times at test (recognition task, judgment 
task). 
In Chapter 6 a summary of data base is presented and the reported results 
across the different studies are compared. Then, the limitations of research are 
discussed. Finally, the paper concludes with an outlook on future investigations that 
could help resolve some of the fundamental issued that fuel much of the discussion 
in the “embodiment” literature. 
 
1.6. Definition of key terms and concepts 
 
De Vega, Glenberg, and Graesser (2008) have noted that the use of key terms 
associated with amodal and embodied accounts of language comprehension is 
somewhat arbitrary in the current literature. Acknowledging the importance of this 
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issue, key definitions will be introduced at the outset of this Ph.D. thesis to avoid 
confusion and ambiguity in the use of the various terms in the present research.  
1.6.1. Amodal cognition 
As in Louwerse (2011), present research considers the term “amodal” as a 
synonym for such other related terms as “symbolic” and “linguistic”. The basic 
assumption of amodal (symbolic) linguistic type of processing is that human 
cognition is very similar to computerized processing of information, where major 
operations are performed by central processing unit that is encapsulated from the 
input and output subsystems. Put different, such an approach suggests that sensory 
and motor systems play peripheral roles in processing of language, given that their 
only function comes down to delivering of information to a central processing unit 
(i.e., brain) via sensory systems and executing commands of this unit via action 
systems. Thus, amodal theories of cognition propose that processing of language can 
be explained solely in terms of relations among amodal symbols, pointing to the 
conclusion that amodal symbols are autonomous symbolic representations (Landauer 
& Dumais 1997; Kintsch 1998). 
1.6.2. Embodied cognition 
Pezzulo, Barsalou, Cangelosi, Fischer, McRae, and Spivey (2011) have noted 
that many terms, such as “grounded” or “situated” are used interchangeably with the 
term “embodied” in the current literatures, and that such arbitrary use of the above-
mentioned terms may produce the mistaken assumption that all research in the area 
of embodied cognition focuses exclusively on the role of actual bodily states in 
representation of knowledge (see also Wilson, 2002, for a discussion of different 
forms of embodiment). However, this assumption appears to be incorrect, given that 
there is now a great deal of evidence demonstrating that such accounts of embodied 
cognition as situated action and simulation are as important for language processing 
as actual bodily states (Barsalou, 2008b, for further discussion). To more succinctly 
address the use of the phrases “grounded cognition”, “embodiment”, and “situated 
cognition” in the various collections of literatures, in the remainder of this part major 
accounts and terms of embodied cognition will be outlined. For each of the accounts, 
relevant empirical research will be introduced as appropriate. 
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1.6.2.1. Grounded cognition 
 
A central claim of theories of embodied cognition is that linguistic symbols 
(e.g., words) derive meaning, at least partially, from non-linguistic perceptual, action, 
and affective experiences. That is, symbols are meaningful only when they are 
grounded in non-linguistic experiences. An already classical demonstration of such 
claim is provided in Harnad’s (1990) merry-go-around argument, where the author 
asks to imagine being in a foreign country (e.g., Ukraine) and trying to understand 
the meaning of the message on a sign (in Ukrainian language) with the help of a 
dictionary written solely in that language. As you do not speak the local language, 
you look up the first word on the sign, but the definition of the word in the dictionary 
is comprised of more words that you also do not understand. Clearly, no matter how 
many words in the definition you look up, you will never be able to at least guess the 
meaning of the message on the sign, given that words are grounded in other linguistic 
symbols, but not non-linguistic experiences. Furthermore, there are now many 
empirical demonstrations confirming that meaning cannot arise solely from relations 
amongst abstract amodal symbols. For example, in the experiment of Glenberg and 
Mehta (2008) participants were instructed to memorize different types of relations 
between objects and features. Importantly, the names of the relations were revealed 
to the participants, but not the name of the domain, the names of the objects, and the 
names of the features. The results revealed that participants could not induce the 
meaning of objects and features, providing support for the conclusion that linguistic 
symbols only become meaningful when they are mapped to embodied 
representations of experiences conveyed by such symbols.  
Summing up, grounding refers to a methodological approach of studying 
human cognition, where the environment, situations, the body, and modality-specific 
simulations are regarded the most important representations in cognition (Barsalou, 
2010). Whereas the term “embodiment” suggests that major cognitive 
representations are shaped by sensorimotor and introspective bodily states, the term 
“grounding” or “grounding cognition” reflects a wider assumption – cognition is 
grounded in multiple ways, including environment, social interaction, bodily states, 
situated action, and simulations (Barsalou, 2008b).  
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1.6.2.2. Embodiment and simulation 
 
A major claim of embodiment theories is that all cognitive representations 
rely on the brain’s modality-specific systems and on actual bodily states (Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005, Barsalou, 2008b; Wilson, 
2002). Earlier embodiment theories primarily focused on the role of actual bodily 
states, aimed to demonstrate that bodily states play casual roles in affecting cognitive 
states (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Piaget, 1972; Smith, 2005, Zajonc & Markus; 
1984). For instance, consider some popular research in the area of social psychology 
that focused on the role of the body for cognition. Riskind and Gotay (1982) put 
participants into an upright or slumped posture and later (after resuming normal 
posture) asked to solve different puzzles. The results revealed that participants in the 
upright posture dedicated more time and effort to solve the puzzles than participants 
in the slumped posture. In another experiment, Cacioppo, Priester, and Bernston 
(1993) instructed participants to push downward on the table (avoidance behavior) or 
upward on the table (approach behavior) and later rate Chinese ideographs. The 
major finding was that participants who pushed upward on the table provided higher 
ratings for the ideographs than participants who pushed downward on the table. 
Clearly, these findings are clear and consistent: bodily states of the individuals had 
an impact on their affective cognitive states. 
In recent years, however, most contemporary theories of embodiment directed 
their attention from the effect of actual bodily states on cognitive processing to the 
effect of modality-specific simulations on cognition. In a variety of literatures, 
simulation is defined as reenactment of perceptual, motor, and emotional states 
acquired during original experience with the world (Barsalou, 1999a, 2008b; 
Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 2004). More concretely, during original experience the brain 
captures sensory states underlying perception of the situation, motor states 
underlying action, and affective states underlying emotion, and integrates these states 
into memory. Later, upon experiencing a similar situation, the brain’s modality 
specific systems activate these original experiences to simulate the situation. Thus, 
listening to someone say “I smile when I remember my brother cooking in the 
kitchen” requires the activation of perceptual information (kitchen), action 
information (cooking) and emotional information (smile) to simulate sensorimotor 
and affective states that are a prerequisite for a full understanding of the message. 
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To sum up, the use of the term embodiment in its literal sense is restrictive as 
it primarily refers to the role of actual bodily states and simulations in cognitive 
processing. At the same time, grounding may be regarded as a synonym for 
embodiment with respect to the following assumption: cognition is grounded 
(embodied) in sensorimotor and affective bodily states (Pezzulo et al., 2011).  
 
1.6.2.3. Situated cognition 
 
 A related topic in the domain of embodied cognition is that knowledge is 
situated in the context of likely background situations (Barsalou, et al., 2008). For 
example, knowledge of cigarettes is context dependent (e.g., settings, actions, 
introspections, etc.). That is, information about cigarettes might be simulated in the 
context of your friend smiling while smoking in the morning or, alternatively, your 
mother being angry with a man smoking nearby. In other words, embodied 
representations are context-specific and can be modified over time. Glenberg and his 
associates suggested that such situational knowledge is essential in preparing agents 
for action and effective immersion of agents into the environment of the presentation 
(e.g., Glenberg & Robertson, 1999, 2000; Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000). For example, 
imagine the following situation. You cannot swim and you are in the boat that is 
sinking. You can see a shore ahead and understand that the boat will sink unless you 
bail out. So you begin to bail out the water furiously with your hands, but it does not 
help. You look around and suddenly an idea comes into your mind. You take off 
your boot and start bailing out the water with that. You notice as the edge of the boat 
raises about 15 inches above the water and you realize that you are saved. What is so 
remarkable about this story? The answer is that a protagonist saved his life with an 
object that is not used by others to bail out water in everyday life. However, this 
situation describes just what situatedness is all about – cognition coordinates 
effective action in the context of current background situations (Glenberg, 1997). 
Thus, a boot in this particular case is simulated in the context of bailing out water 
rather than walking, suggesting that knowledge is situated. The idea of situated 
action is all the more noteworthy as it presents a challenge for computational amodal 
accounts that face problems making similar predictions regarding novel situations 
(see Glenberg & Robertson, 2000, for empirical evidence). Thus, it can be concluded 
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that the term “situated cognition” can be regarded as a synonym to embodied 
cognition and grounded cognition only when one is aware of its restrictive meaning. 
 To conclude, the terms “grounded cognition”, “embodied cognition”, and 
“situated cognition” assume that knowledge is not separate from modality-specific 
systems of perception, action, and emotion. Although grounded cognition represents 
a wider assumption relative to other terms, a wide range of literature uses the terms 
“amodal”, “symbolic”, and “linguistic” as antonyms for “grounded”, “embodied”, 
and “situated”, suggesting that many of the terms in the domain of amodal and 
embodied cognition are used metonymically (De Vega et al., 2008; Louwerse, 2011). 
While this use is justifiable when the reference is made to the role of simulations in 
language processing, one should be aware of the restrictive use of each of these terms 
when referring, for example, to the above-described studies from social psychology 
literatures (i.e., it would be incorrect to consider “situated” as a synonym to 
“embodied” when referring to studies addressing how actual bodily states affect 
cognitive states). 
In this Ph.D. research the term “embodied” is used as a synonym for 
“grounded” or “situated”, but the explicit focus of the thesis is on how language 
comprehension is grounded in perceptual, action, and emotional bodily states rather 
than in other agents, such as environment or social interaction. Moreover, like most 
current accounts of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999a; Decety & Grezes, 2006), 
this research will focus on the roles of simulation (reenactment of perceptual, motor, 
and affective states) in language comprehension rather than on the role of actual 
bodily states. Finally, it is possible that Barsalou and associates (Barsalou, 2008b, 
2010; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008) are right: grounding may one 
day become such a widely accepted assumption that there will be no need to specify 
what is meant by language as grounded, embodied, or simulated as empirical 
demonstrations in the domain of embodied cognition continue to grow. The current 
status of the literature on the subject, however, suggests that one should be aware of 
the restrictive usage of such key terms and provide a reader with clear guidelines of 
what each term denotes in a particular research project.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
An Embodied Language Comprehension: A Review of Empirical Findings and 
Theories 
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Abstract 
 
Recent findings in psychology, psycholinguistics, and neuroscience present a 
challenge to current amodal theories by suggesting that cognitive states are not 
disembodied in language comprehension. To assess this claim, a brief discussion on 
how amodal theories explain language processing is provided. Accumulating 
behavioral evidence supporting an embodied view is then reviewed from research on 
processing of language describing concrete and abstract concepts. Finally, the 
extant embodied theories that support either a strong (Perceptual Symbol Theory, 
Indexical Hypothesis, Immersed Experiencer Framework, Action-based Language 
Theory) or a moderate embodied view (Language and Situated Simulation Theory, 
Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis) are discussed, as are the arguments supporting 
the importance of embodiment for comprehension, and the following conclusions are 
reached. The results of a growing body of empirical research suggest that modality-
specific simulations are important for language comprehension, and therefore the 
role of embodiment in processing of language can hardly be viewed as peripheral. At 
the same time, a revision of embodied language theories shows that there is no 
common agreement among scientists as to whether one (i.e., either amodal or 
embodied) or multiple systems (i.e., embodied and amodal) represent knowledge as 
well as under what circumstances embodied and symbolic representations get 
activated. This suggests that the supporters of embodied view of cognition are still 
far from a general unified approach to language processing. The chapter concludes 
with an outline of five research questions that will be investigated in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
An amodal system theory that emerged from the Cognitive Revolution in the 
1950s remained dominant for over five decades in the area of language 
comprehension. According to this theory, processing of language is based on 
abstract, amodal symbols that are arbitrarily related to their referents. From this 
perspective, the mind is an abstract information processor and sensory-motor systems 
are not relevant to understanding of higher-level cognitive processes (Fodor, 1975; 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1984). The idea that relations among symbols 
may lead to successful language processing was corroborated by several symbolic 
models describing how human memory is organized semantically and schematically 
(e.g., Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Charniak, 1978; Norman, 1975; Quillian, 1969; 
Rumelhart, 1975; Shank & Abelson, 1975) as well as computational 
implementations, such as Knowledge Representation Language (Bobrow & 
Winograd, 1977), CYC (Lenat & Guha, 1989), Hyperspace Analog to Language 
(Lund & Burgess, 1966), Topic Model (Griffiths & Steyvers, 2004), and Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA) of Landauer & Dumais (1997). Furthermore, the 
demonstrations of the most popular model, such as LSA, in picking out synonyms, 
measuring coherence of texts (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), and even scoring 
students’ essays (Landauer, Laham, Rehder, & Schreiner, 1997) led some scholars to 
support the potential of this model to account for human meaning (e.g., Landauer, 
2002; Louwerse & Ventura, 2005).  
Nonetheless, about 10 years ago the dominance of amodal theory was 
challenged and ultimately declined by the appearance of a new embodied account of 
cognition. This new account is based on the idea that language processing should be 
viewed in the context of relationship between the mind and the body. Neuroscientific 
research provided substantial support for this idea by demonstrating that the same 
sensory-motor regions of the brain get activated when individuals process the words 
and their referents (e.g., Eskenazi, Grosjean, Humphreys, & Knoblich, 2009; Gallese, 
2008; Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 2003; Martin, 2001, 
2007; Pulvermüller, 2008; Thompson-Schill, 2003). Similarly, research in cognitive 
psychology and cognitive linguistics showed that language comprehension arises at 
least partially from simulations of sensory, motor, and affective states (Borghi, 
Ferdinando, & Parasi, 2011; Foroni & Semin, 2009; Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg, 1997; 
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Kaschak & Borregine, 2008; Knoblich & Flach, 2001; Zwaan, 2004). Therefore, 
embodied theories of cognition rejected amodal views that symbols can become 
meaningful on the sole basis of other symbols and suggested instead that symbols 
need to be grounded to their referents in the environment.  
In the past years research on embodied language comprehension has grown 
exponentially. In neuroscience, researchers found that comprehension of action 
words in patients diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease (Boulenger, Mechtouff, 
Thobois, Brousolle, Jeannerod, & Nazir, 2008) and apraxia (Buxbaum & Saffran, 
2002) was selectively impaired, suggesting that sensory-motor simulations can 
hardly be viewed as by-products of language processing. In cognitive psychology, 
researchers such as Borghi (2004), Bub and Masson (2010), de Vega (2008), 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003), and Zwaan 
and Taylor (2006), found that modality-specific simulations can affect various 
language tasks in psycholinguistic embodiment experiments. What is all the more 
noteworthy, many other researchers, including Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 
(2005), Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002), Casasanto and Lozano (2006), Langston 
(2002), Pecher and Boot (2011), Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, and McRae (2003), 
Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez, and Funes (2007), and Sell and Kaschak (2011, 2012) 
showed that comprehension of certain abstract concepts and sentences requires the 
involvement of sensory-motor simulations to the same extent as comprehension of 
concrete concepts and sentences. Finally, evidence for embodied representations 
formed the origin of language models, including Perceptual Symbols Theory of 
Barsalou (1999a), Indexical Hypothesis of Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000), 
Immersed Experiencer Framework of Zwaan (2004), and Action-based Language 
Theory of Glenberg and Gallese (2012). In brief, recent years in science have been 
marked by accumulation of empirical and theoretical evidence to support a claim that 
bodily states and modality-specific simulations play important roles in processing of 
language. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a systematic review of how sensory-
motor and affective processes contribute to sentence and discourse comprehension as 
well as to assess the commonalities and differences among the various findings and 
theories that currently drive discussions in the field. The Section 2.2 of this chapter 
provides a discussion on how amodal theories explain language comprehension. The 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 review empirical evidence on processing of language describing 
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concrete and abstract concepts that is consistent with an embodied view. The Section 
2.5 discusses and explicitly contrasts a variety of old and new theoretical approaches 
that support either a strong embodied view (approach acknowledging the 
contribution of simulation) or a moderate embodied view (mixed approach 
acknowledging the contribution of both language and simulation systems). Finally, 
the Section 2.6 presents five arguments that suggest an important role to sensory-
motor grounding in comprehension. 
One caveat is important. The goal of this chapter is not to be exhaustive. 
Clearly, an advanced review of the importance of sensorimotor and introspective 
states to language comprehension could comprise several chapters of material, 
including evidence from studies on word comprehension (Hauk, et al., 2004; Martin 
& Chao, 2001; Tucker & Ellis, 2004), conceptual processing (Barsalou, 2003; 
Borghi, 2004; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003), syntactic analysis (Chambers, 
Tanenhaus, & Magnuson, 2004), phonological processing (Fadiga, Craighero, 
Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002), and spatial representations (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 
2002; Matlock, Ramscar, & Boroditsky, 2005; Richardson et al. 2003). Thus, this 
review has the following limitations. First, it focuses on sentence and discourse 
processing rather than single-word processing. Second, it discusses mainly 
behavioral data, but not neuroscientific and kinematic evidence. Doing so appears 
reasonable taking into account that the primary goal of this Ph.D. is to investigate the 
role of sensorimotor grounding on extended language segments such as discourse 
using the methods of data collection (e.g., reading times, questionnaire) characteristic 
of behavioral studies.  
 
2.2. Language comprehension in symbolic and embodied cognition 
 
2.2.1. Assumptions of symbolic cognition and overview of theories 
 
The historically prevalent symbolic model of cognition suggests that language 
comprehension is amodal because it functions separately from sense modalities (e.g., 
Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1984). Under this account, comprehension arises from 
forming associative relations between networks of propositions, feature lists, or 
statistical vectors that identify objects in the world. For example, the fact that a 
pencil can be inside a pencil case could give rise to the proposition “inside a pencil 
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case”, the fact that a pencil case can be on the desk could give rise to the proposition 
“on the desk”, and the fact that a desk can be in the classroom could give rise to the 
proposition “in the classroom”. Figure 2.1 further illustrates this assumption 
indicating that sensory and cognitive representations, rather than sharing a common 
system, instead represent two distinct systems that work differently (also see 
Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003, for further discussion). More broadly, 
while sensory-motor system is involved in conscious experience of the outside 
world, amodal symbol system transduces sensorimotor experience to the mind in the 
form of frozen representations of the world. Thus, each time we experience 
something or get into contact with someone, our brain transforms original bodily 
states into a meaningful schema of amodal symbols that refer to these states. In brief, 
comprehension is achieved via redescription. 
 
Figure 2.1. Language comprehension via an amodal symbols system. 
 
 Clearly, by adopting such an approach to language comprehension, it seems 
fairly easy to grasp the idea how the words are processed. But this really just begs the 
question: how to define linguistic units in the context of larger language segments 
such as sentence or text? To advance on this question, let’s look into the inner 
structure of the most common propositional type of symbolic representations by 
adopting the framework of Graesser, Gernsbacher, and Goldman (1997) who in 
much of their work review this structure (see Kintsch, 1974; 1998, for a more 
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detailed description and explanation of representation of meaning via propositions in 
memory). In particular, the researchers note that a proposition is a theoretical unit 
that consists of a predicate (e.g., verb, adjective) and one or few arguments (e.g., 
nouns, embedded propositions) with each argument having a particular functional 
role (e.g., agent, patient, object, location). Propositions may refer to a state, an event, 
or an action.  
 To illustrate how meaning is extracted from the propositional representation, 
let’s consider building a propositional segmentation for the sentence “Christopher 
found a fluffy puppy on the street and brought it home to feed”. A propositional 
segmentation for the given sentence is presented in Table 2.1. First, the sentence has 
six propositions. Second, the predicates in these propositions are verbs (found, 
brought, feed), an adjective (fluffy), and connectives (to, and). Third, the arguments 
include a patient (puppy), an agent (Christopher), and embedded propositions 
(propositions 3 and 4 are embedded in proposition 5; propositions 1 and 3 are 
embedded in proposition 6). Finally, the arguments have the following roles: agent, 
patient, and location. Thus, a meaning for the given sentence is extracted from a 
predicate that denotes the nature of relation between the arguments in the given 
propositional structure. 
 
Table 2.1 
Propositional Representation for the Sentence “Christopher found a fluffy puppy on 
the street and brought it home to feed” 
PROPOSITION 1 found (AGENT = Christopher, PATIENT = puppy; 
LOCATION = on the street) 
PROPOSITION 2 fluffy (PATIENT = puppy) 
PROPOSITION 3 brought (Agent = Christopher; PATIENT = puppy; 
LOCATION = home) 
PROPOSITION 4 feed (PATIENT = puppy) 
PROPOSITION 5 [in order] to (PROPOSITIONS 4 and 5) 
PROPOSITION 6 and (PROPOSITIONS 1 and 3) 
 
 Whereas theories of propositional representation were formulated to suggest 
how language becomes meaningful via propositional framework, other symbolic 
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theories were formulated to demonstrate how human memory is organized 
semantically and schematically and how such an organization affects processing of 
language. As an example of one of such models that focused on semantic processing, 
it is worth mentioning Quillian’s theory (1962, 1967, 1969) of semantic memory 
search and semantic preparation. According to this model, a meaning of a concept is 
derived from a cofiguration of pointers to other words in the memory. To explain 
why a configuration of pointers represents meaning, Quillian uses an example of a 
machine. In particular, the researcher notes that when asked to tell all they know 
about machines, humans would first generate the most important properties (e.g., as 
machines are man-made, machines have moving parts, etc.), but then would describe 
the less important ones or almost irrelevant (a printer is a type of machine, quality of 
print depends upon the type of paper used in printing, etc.), suggesting that the 
amount of information that can be generated for any concept is unlimeted and that 
the information about different concepts is structured hierarchically. Figure 2.2. 
illustrates the structure of such semantic memory. For instance, a stored information 
from a sentence, “Compared to other animal groups, mammals such as dolphins have 
blowholes” has two pointers to category names “mammals” and “animals” and a 
pointer to such property as “have blowholes”. In brief, such an organization suggests 
that detailed information about “dolphins” is not stored only with the memory node 
for each separate kind of mammal, but is instead stored with both the memory node 
for the separate kind of mammal and a higher-level category (e.g., mammal, animal). 
That is, the information stored in memory will not represent a concept such as 
“dolphin” listing all possible properties, but rather listing those properties that best 
describe only dolphins (e.g., has blowholes, loves humans, etc.).  
 The theory of semantic processing was tested empirically by Collins and 
Quillian (1969) who made a hypothesis that if information about concepts is 
dispersed along the network structered hierarchically, then participants would take 
more time to retrieve information from statements that describe properties dispersed 
along various levels (i.e., dolphin→mammal→animal) rather than from the same 
level (i.e., properties of dolphins only). Thus, the researchers expected that 
participants would retrieve information from a statement “Dolphins have blowholes” 
faster than from a statement “Dolphins can swim” as they do not need to move along 
the various levels to build a meaningful representation of a concept. To test this 
hypothesis, response times were collected as participants were judging if the 
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statements such as “Canary is a canary”, “Canary is a bird”, and “Canary is an 
animal” were true. Remarkably, the reported results confirmed that participants took 
more time to judge if a sentence was true if information contained in the statement 
was dispersed along various levels of configuration. The graphical representation of 
the data is presented in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. A schematic representation of how concepts are stored in memory 
according to semantic processing theory 
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Figure 2.3. Average reaction times for different types of sentences in a study 
“Retrieval Time from Semantic Memory” by A. M. Collins and M. R. Quillian, 
1969, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 8. 
 
 There is a great body of other related research on problems concerned with 
semantic and structural organization of memory and aspects of language processing. 
Although this research differs on a number of important issues, it reveals a 
substantial convergence of opinion on essential aspects of cognitive processing (i.e., 
knowledge is amodal and represented in a network of interrelations). Consider, for 
instance, Rumelhart & Ortony’s (1977) schemata account of knowledge 
representation. According to this theory, concepts are represented in human memory 
via schematas – network of interrelations between constituencies of a concept. The 
authors of the model compare internal structure of the schema to the script of the 
play. Just as in the play each actor is assigned his particular role and possesses 
certain characteristics (age, sex, appearance, etc.), so schematas have variables 
(characteristics) that may be shaped by the environment, social norms, contextual 
and situational factors. For instance, a schema for “CONGRATULATE” could have 
three variables: a guest, a present, and a receiver. That is, human interaction in the 
social world suggests that “congratulate” is associated with someone giving a present 
to someone else. In brief, schematas encode the possible network of interrelations 
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about the concept in question. A similar organization of knowledge was offered by 
Minsky (1975) who suggested that information in memory is stored in frames – data 
structures to represent stereotyped information. Just like schematas, frames have 
variables that associate with the environment or situation. For instance, a frame for 
“CONGRATULATION” can be associated with a present, a cake, balloons, friends, 
family, etc. Importantly, frames can be adapted to fit reality by changing details as 
necessary even though most basic characteristics would usually remain constant. 
Similar arguments about cognitive processing can be found in the works of Bobrow 
and Norman (1975), Norman (1975), Charniak (1978), Rumelhart (1975), Shank and 
Abelson (1975), and Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974).  
 The above-mentioned theories describing the organization of information in 
memory led to implementation of various computational models of language 
processing. Frame Representation Language (Bobrow & Winograd, 1977), 
Knowledge Representation Language (Fikes & Kehler, 1985), and CYC (Lenat & 
Guha, 1989) are only some of the examples of such models. In recent years three 
computational models heat the debate in the areas of psychology, psycholinguistics, 
and computational linguistics: Hyperspace Analogue to Language (Lund & Burgess, 
1996), Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), and Topics Model 
(Griffiths & Steyvers, 2004). Because of space limitations, only first two models 
shall be described in more detail. 
 In HAL (Hyperspace Analog to Language) model word meaning is derived 
from the frequency of word co-occurrences. The corpus that is used in the model 
consists of approximately 300 million words from Usenet newsgroups to produce a 
matrix of 70.000 rows and columns. The idea of word-by-word matrix is to 
determine the strength of association between the words in the rows and in the 
columns. The rows represent the values for words which precede the word 
corresponding to the row label and columns represent the values for words that 
follow the word corresponding to the column label. The total co-occurrence vector is 
calculated both from rows and columns. Thus, in a large corpus one could expect to 
meet the words with the similar meaning, such as computer, laptop, netbook, or 
Portugal, Azores, Madeira, to appear close to each other. To calculate word co-
occurrences, one has to count the number of times the word “X” occurs closely to the 
word “Y”. If the word “X” is adjacent to the word “Y”, it receives a maximum value 
of 10. If the word “X” is separated from the word “Y” by one word, it receives the 
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value of 9. If separated by 2 words – the value of 8 and so on. Having assigned 
values to all the words, the co-occurrence of words can be checked by looking at the 
rows. Words that tend to co-occur would usually have very similar values in the rows 
(see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 
Co-occurrence Square Matrix in a Window of Six Words with the Maximum Co-
occurrence Value of 5. 
  
 computer laptop netbook Portugal Azores Madeira 
computer 0 3 4 0 0 0 
laptop 3 0 5 0 0 0 
netbook 4 5 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 4 3 
Azores 0 0 0 4 0 5 
Madeira 0 0 0 3 5 0 
 
Note: The values in the table merely serve to demonstrate how a typical co-
occurrence matrix would look like if words in the corpus occurred closely. These 
values were not calculated using HAL’s model. 
 
 Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) is another computational model that is most 
widely used in the research these days. It was described in various publications and 
the explanation of the method that follows uses Landauer, Foltz, and Laham (1998) 
as the main reference. The major idea of LSA is to find out related terms and phrases 
in the context of one or more documents. The first step in the analysis is to represent 
a text as a matrix, where rows refer to target words and columns – to a text passage 
in which such words are used. Each cell contains the frequency of word co-
occurrence in the given context. Next, each cell frequency is transformed (a 
computation from matrix algebra is too complicated to account with simple 
explanation, and thus is not included) to determine the word’s importance within the 
context of a given passage and discourse in general. The second step in LSA is to 
apply a singular value decomposition (SVD), which is similar in effect to factor 
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analysis, to the matrix. The result of such decomposition is a creation of three 
matrices that capture associations between words and phrases. To cut a long story 
short, all major equations in LSA rely on the context in which any target word is 
used.  
 The capabilities of the model were evaluated in several different tests. One of 
the most popular types of tests where the model was assessed is a TOEFL (Test of 
English as a Foreign Language) standard vocabulary test (Landauer & Dumais, 
1997). The TOEFL vocabulary test requires from the test taker to choose one of four 
alternative answers (single words) that is most similar in meaning to the target test 
word. To perform this test, LSA was trained by running SVD analysis on 4.6 million 
words of text form Grolier’s Academic American Encyclopedia (Grolier 
Incorporated, 1998) with 30.473 articles (equivalent to the amount of read material 
by a pupil of eighth grade). The major result was that a model got 64.4 % on a 
vocabulary test comparing to the 64.5 % score of an average non-native English 
speaker who takes the Test of English as a Foreign Language.  
 In fact, the impressive demonstrations of LSA in picking out synonyms, 
measuring coherence of texts (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), or scoring students’ 
essays (Landauer et al., 1997) led some scholars to support LSA’s potential to 
account for human meaning. However, as it will be discussed in more detail later, 
LSA was criticized on its inability to define the meaning of implicit messages where 
meaning goes considerably beyond words mentioned in the text. Its mechanism of 
comprehension is downplayed by the fact that LSA is a disembodied machine that 
defines meaning of abstract symbols solely in terms of relations between other 
undefined abstract symbols (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000).  
 In sum, the following general conclusions about symbolic view of cognition 
can be made. First, knowledge is generated via amodal symbols (e.g., statistical 
vectors, network of propositions, feature lists, etc.). Second, knowledge is not linked 
to sensory, motor, and introspective systems of human body. Third, knowledge is a 
redescription rather than a simulation (reactivation) of an originally experienced 
event. These assumptions about the human mind made many scientists compare 
traditional amodal approach to the work of a contractor who puts together bricks to 
build structures. Like in construction, in amodal language comprehension initial 
experiences with the world are redescribed into mental bricks commonly referred to 
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as propositions. As a result, language processing proceeds by adding up these bricks 
together (Zwaan and Madden, 2005). 
 
2.2.2. Symbolic cognition and discourse models 
 
The idea of amodal redescription in human mind was widely exploited among 
the researchers who worked on a medium known as discourse. These researchers, 
whose major work aligned with traditional amodal theory of knowledge 
representation, suggested some new challenging and innovative insights into the 
study of language. First, they started looking into the ways people understand large 
language segments such as, for example, texts (in written communication) and 
conversations (in oral communication). Second, they started questioning what 
exactly happens in the brain when comprehenders combine elements of such large 
language segments. Third, they initiated a discussion about the segregation of 
comprehension into various levels. Finally, and most importantly, they set a 
challenge to investigate how propositions are combined in the brain to achieve the 
coherence of language stream. In the remainder of this section, influential models of 
traditional discourse comprehension shall be described that have come to lay the 
foundations for past and current debates in the field of language processing. 
One of the most influential models of discourse processing was put forward 
by Kintsch and van Dijk (1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) who suggested that 
discourse processing proceeds via three distinct levels. The first level, which is 
relatively short-lived, is called surface representation, and it consists of text’s literal 
wording. At this level readers remember the form rather than the content of the 
material. The second level, textbase or propositional, consists of deriving meaning 
from propositions or network of prepositions sharing a common feature (e.g., pencil 
– in the pencil case – on the table – in class). At this level readers build mental 
representations of meaning that is explicitly expressed in the text. The third level, 
situational, consists of combining explicit information of the text with reader’s 
general knowledge held in long-term memory. At this level readers make inferences 
about information not literally given in the text.  
In several prominent works it was shown that the three levels of 
comprehension (surface, textbase, and situational) are indeed present in mental 
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representation of discourse (e.g., Fletcher and Chrysler, 1990; Kintsch, Welsch, 
Schmalhofer, & Zimny, 1990). At the same time, the model of Kintsch and van Dijk 
(1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) was criticized on the grounds of its inability to 
show the integration of textbase representation into situational representation. As a 
result, research efforts were directed at developing the models of discourse 
comprehension that could help understand how the readers construct situational 
representations. The construction theory (Graesser et al., 1994), the construction-
integration model (Kintsch, 1998, 1990), the structure building framework 
(Gernsbacher, 1990, 1997), and the memory focus model (Sanford and Garrod, 1994) 
are only some of the models that attempted to explain how knowledge is situated in 
processing of discourse.  
It is beyond the scope of this research to provide a thorough review of each of 
the models. However, the objective is set to show the underlying principle and speak 
about the mechanisms that constitute discourse comprehension according to these 
models. For instance, in a revised model, Kintsch (1998) attempted to solve the 
problem of “situational representation” by proposing that comprehension is achieved 
via the two-step process: acontextual construction and context-guided integration. 
During the first step of construction, explicit meanings of the words are formulated 
through combinations of propositions without regards to the discourse context. The 
construction of propositions is formed via an unstable network of associations, which 
occurs in cycles corresponding to phrases or sentences. With each cycle to follow, a 
network of associations is constructed by combining information from the current 
and previous cycles. Once the association process is finished and its results are stored 
in a long-term memory, discourse context comes into play and integration process 
takes place. Finally, meaning arises from choosing between those elements that are 
appropriate for the discourse context, as a result of which a stable network of 
associations is formed. Thus, comprehension is achieved by (a) constructing 
propositions; (b) forming associations; and (c) choosing between meaningful and 
meaningless associations. 
A similar two-step process to account for situational representation can be 
found in other models. For instance, according to Memory Focus Model of Sanford 
and Garrod (1981, 1994) comprehension is also realized via two steps. During the 
first phase memory stores information expressed explicitly in the text and during the 
second phase memory draws inferences from the previously stored information by 
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assigning to it general knowledge of the described event. As a result of these 
processes, an implicit framework is constructed and the brain no longer experiences 
problems in knowing which propositions to build. In brief, traditional discourse 
theories clearly show that comprehension proceeds in an incremental fashion, 
whereby the ultimate goal of discourse processing is construction of a situation 
model. Such a model is constructed by combining the network of propositional 
associations with the discourse context. 
Traditional theories, though widely used and recognized by scientific 
community, have recently undergone a wave of criticism on the following grounds. 
First, no answer has so far been provided how relevant contextual information is 
extracted from discourse content. Second, it is still not very clear how such 
contextual information is combined with a propositional network established at the 
textbase level. More basically, if traditional discourse theories share the view that 
language has evolved in the service of perception and action (e.g., Kintsch, 2008), 
then they still fail to disprove the possibility that knowledge is represented in the 
form of corresponding sensorimotor simulations rather than amodal symbols. Finally, 
as it will be discussed shortly, empirical findings challenge the assumptions and 
mechanisms regarding language comprehension offered by traditional discourse 
models by suggesting that language processing is directly grounded in systems of 
perception, action, and introspection. 
 
2.2.3. Criticisms of symbolic cognition and assumptions of embodied cognition 
 
Nonetheless, although many of the propositions are indeed direct 
representations of corresponding ideas (e.g., “bucket” is “bucket”) and most of the 
meaning representations come from a semantic network of relations between the 
target word and other words in the sentence (e.g., buckets are associated with water, 
mops, etc.), the amodal view is still not viewed by many scientists as a full-fledged 
theory of language comprehension. There are at least three reasons for this. First, a 
list of propositions (features) cannot always account for the correct combination of 
relations in language (Barsalou, 1999a). For example, “a painting on the wall” is not 
the same as “a painting on the floor”. Second, a semantic network cannot derive 
meaning from sentences in which words are not related semantically (Glenberg, 
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Robertson, Jansen, & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999). For example, the sentence “My 
thoughts are not in this room right now” does not mean that thoughts are able to 
travel. Third, words differ in meaning depending on the goals of people (Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000). For example, the meaning of the word “table” would differ 
depending on whether you plan to use it for studying or changing a light bulb. All of 
the reasons mentioned so far illustrate the interpretation problems associated with an 
amodal theory of language processing. These difficulties in interpretation are 
examples of what is known as the symbol grounding problem (Searle, 1980). The 
major idea behind this problem is that because meanings are not grounded in 
sensorimotor systems, comprehension is tantamount to seeking definition for the 
foreign word in a language that is unfamiliar to you (Harnad, 1990).  
Recently amodal architecture was widely criticized on other grounds. First, it 
was noted that no empirical evidence exists to support the claim that comprehension 
proceeds via redescription process or that amodal symbols are present in the brain 
(Niedenthal, et al., 2005). Second, increasing evidence in support of simulation 
account of knowledge representation was demonstrated that cast serious doubt on 
previous research and theory suggesting that knowledge is entirely amodal (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008a; Boroditsky & Prinz, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003). As a result 
of these criticisms, an alternative account of cognition was proposed that gave rise to 
the idea of knowledge as “embodied” or grounded in bodily states and brain’s 
modality-specific systems. The major claim of this approach is that because people 
live in a physical world, comprehension cannot be entirely symbolic. Instead it 
should rely on sensory, motor, and affective states (e.g., Barsalou, 2002; Damasio, 
1989; Gallese, 2003; Lakoff, 1987). It is suggested that such view of language 
comprehension is natural as it not only allows to account for primary meanings of 
concepts, but as well to simulate the various meanings of these concepts in the 
context of relevant actions, events, settings, and introspections (Barsalou, et al., 
2008). Thus, under this account, understanding a sentence “I stroke a cat with a wide 
smile on the face” will require the retrieval of perceptual information to simulate 
entities described in the sentence (cat), the retrieval of motoric information to 
simulate the “stroking” action, and the retrieval of emotional “happy” state (Figure 
2.4).  
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Figure 2.4. Comprehension of the sentence “I stroke a cat with a wide smile on the 
face” according to an embodied view of cognition. [Photo credit: 
http://www.clipartclipart.com]. 
 
An embodied approach to language comprehension is supported by a strong 
body of empirical evidence. In subsequent part such evidence is reviewed, suggesting 
that modality-specific simulations are necessary for language processing. 
 
2.3. A review of evidence on processing of language describing concrete concepts 
 
The purpose of the following section is to review extant empirical research 
demonstrating the impact of embodied simulations on processing of concrete 
language. Given the abundance of evidence, the purpose in this literature review is 
not to be comprehensive but, instead, to establish the common principles that are 
found in the various findings. Doing so will help to identify how researchers discuss 
the importance of embodied factor in concrete language processing with so many 
findings to choose from.  
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2.3.1. Perceptual simulation 
 
The idea that perceptual knowledge is implicated in cognition is not new. 
Previous studies on spatial representations (e.g., Black, Turner, & Bower, 1979; 
Bower & Morrow, 1990; Gernsbacher, Varner, & Faust, 1990; Potter, Kroll, 
Yachzel, Carpenter, & Sherman, 1986) suggested that visual and verbal components 
of comprehension are interconnected. Similarly, neuroscientific evidence (e.g., 
Boulenger et al., 2006; Goldberg et al., 2006; Hauk et al., 2004; Martin, 2007; 
Oliveri et al., 2004) demonstrated that perception of objects that index auditory, 
gustatory, tactile, and visual knowledge triggers activity in sensory-motor areas of 
the brain. This section reviews six major lines of research which demonstrate that 
perceptual simulation is necessary for language processing. 
 
2.3.1.1. The effects of implied perceptual features on immediate sentence 
comprehension 
 
 In this line of research, participants were presented with sentences describing 
objects or animals in various visuospatial configurations. After reading (listening) the 
sentence, participants were presented with a picture of the object or animal that the 
sentence described. The task consisted in judging whether the object (animal) was 
mentioned in the sentence. For example, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) tested the 
hypothesis that people mentally represent the orientation of an object implied by the 
sentence. They asked participants to view a series of sentences (e.g., “John pounded 
the nail into the wall”; “John pounded the nail into the floor”), each followed by a 
picture in either vertical or horizontal orientation. During the experiment picture 
orientation either matched or mismatched the orientation implied by the sentence. 
The participants’ task was to indicate whether the object was mentioned in the 
sentence by pressing a key labeled “Yes” or a key labeled “No” on a computer. The 
major result was that participants were faster to respond to picture stimuli that 
matched orientation implied by the sentence rather than mismatched. In another 
experiment Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) tested the prediction that people 
also mentally represent the shape of an object described in the sentence. Participants 
were instructed to read sentences that described animals or objects in a different 
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location, implying a different shape (e.g., “The ranger saw the eagle in the sky”; 
“The ranger saw the eagle in its nest”). After each sentence, participants were 
presented with the picture of an animal or an object that varied in shape (e.g., eagle 
with outstretched wings; eagle with folded wings) and their task was to decide 
whether the picture represented a word implied by the sentence. The results 
demonstrated faster responses for picture stimuli that matched property of shape with 
the sentence rather than mismatched. A similar Match advantage was found in the 
related studies of Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and Aveyard (2004) on simulation of 
motion (e.g., “The shortstop hurled the softball at you”; “You hurled the softball at 
the shortstop”) and Yaxley and Zwaan (2007) on simulation of visibility (e.g., 
“Through the fogged goggles, the skier could hardly identify the moose”; “Through 
the clean goggles, the skier could easily identify the moose”). Finally, in the most 
recent studies Zwaan and Pecher (2012) replicated and Engelen, Bouwmeester, de 
Bruin, and Zwaan (2011) extended Stanfield and Zwaan’s (2001) and Zwaan et al.’s 
(2002) findings regarding simulation of orientation and shape. More concretely, in a 
study of Englelen et al. (2011) researchers asked participants (children of 7-13 years 
of age) to listen to (Experiment 1) or read a sentence (Experiment 2) describing an 
entity and then perform a picture verification task. The results indicated that 
responses were faster (in both experiments) when the shape or orientation of the 
depicted object matched the shape or orientation of an entity described in the 
sentence. What is all the more noteworthy, the same pattern of responding was 
observed both in children with high reading ability and children with low reading 
ability, suggesting that the effect of simulation is strong. Apparently, all these 
findings are consistent with the predictions derived from the embodiment claim: 
people mentally represent the perceptual features implied by a sentence. This in turn 
indicates that understanding a sentence suggesting a particular perceptual feature for 
an object calls on the same neural and bodily states involved in real perception of an 
object. 
 
2.3.1.2. The effects of implied perceptual features on long-term sentence 
comprehension 
 
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) and Zwaan et al. (2002) in their experiments 
demonstrated that sentence comprehension proceeded better when the picture that 
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immediately followed the sentence matched the orientation and shape of the object 
that was conveyed by the sentence. With an idea to demonstrate that details of 
sensorimotor simulations are retained over longer periods, Pecher et al. (2009) asked 
participants to first read the complete list of sentences and then perform speeded 
judgment tasks on the pictures that tested memory for the sentences by pressing a 
key “Z” with their left index finger for a no-response (does not correspond to the 
sentence) or a key “M” with their right index finger for a yes-response (corresponds 
to the sentence). Importantly, one group of participants engaged in a memory-
decision-response task right after reading the sentences and the other group only in 
45 minutes after sentence presentation. The results showed that recognition memory 
for pictures in both groups was better if the picture matched the implied shape or 
orientation of the object in an earlier presented sentence. The major contribution of 
this finding was that simulation affected sentence processing even when sentence 
reading and picture recognition were separated in time (45-min delay), suggesting 
that perceptual simulations affect both immediate and long-term comprehension 
processes.  
 
2.3.1.3. The effects of spatial iconicity on language processing 
 
Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) investigated whether spatial iconicity affects 
semantic-relatedness judgments. More concretely, in this research participants were 
presented with words pairs, such as attic-basement, in the middle of a computer 
screen with one word appearing below the other (e.g., basement above attic or attic 
above basement) and had to decide whether these pairs of words were semantically 
related. Importantly, positions of the words either matched or mismatched the 
corresponding positions of their referents in the real world (i.e., attic is generally 
situated above the basement in a house and basement – below the attic). It was found 
that response times were faster when the word pair matched the visuospatial 
configuration of the referents in the real world than when the word pair mismatched 
such configuration. Additionally, to ascertain that the effect was not due to the order 
in which the words were processed, the same pairs of words were presented 
horizontally. However, no significant effects were found. The researchers interpreted 
this finding in light of embodiment theory. That is, participants perceptually 
simulated the meaning of word pairs to make semantic judgments.  
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2.3.1.4. The effects of perspective on language processing 
 
In recent years a great body of evidence has emerged to support a conclusion 
that situatedness of cognition plays important roles in conceptual processing. For 
instance, Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) demonstrated that in processing of 
sentences individuals not only simulate the objects or states described by the 
sentence, but as well the surrounding space. More precisely, it was reported that 
participants were faster to attribute an object (denoted by a noun) to a certain 
location when the noun that referred to an object was available in the participant’s 
perspective implied by a preceding sentence. That is, participants were faster to 
verify a noun “sign” when it was preceded by a sentence “You are waiting outside a 
restaurant” than a sentence “You are eating in a restaurant”. This finding suggests 
that cognition is situated and that in perception of the target event humans continue 
to pay attention to background situation that provides the context for such event. Put 
different, while thinking of a sign or processing information about a sign we do not 
only rely on perceptual simulation of sign as a physical object, but as well on the 
surrounding space, including perspective. 
 
2.3.1.5. Specificity of the processing mechanisms required to construct simulations 
 
In this line of research, the investigators explored the relationship between 
processing mechanisms required to construct a simulation and language 
comprehension. For instance, Kaschak et al. (2005) instructed participants to view 
dynamic black-and-white stimuli (in the direction towards or away from the person) 
and simultaneously listen to sentences that described motion in either the same or 
different direction as the motion of the stimuli (e.g., “The car approached you”; “The 
horse ran away from you”). The task consisted in pressing a key labeled “Y” if the 
sentence made sense, and a key labeled “N” if the sentence did not make sense. The 
major result was that responses were faster for sentences presented with a visual 
stimulus depicting motion in the opposite direction as compared to the action 
described in the sentence. A mismatch advantage was also found in a similar study of 
Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard, and Yaxley (2006) when participants read sentences that 
stressed auditory aspects (e.g., “The surfer heard the next wave crashing toward 
him”; “The victims screamed as the rising water swept them away down the river”). 
60 
 
In particular, the task consisted in making sensibility judgments on the sentences (by 
pressing keys labeled “Y” or “N” on the keyboard) conveying motion toward, away, 
upward, and downward relative to the listener. The auditory stimuli were bands of 
white noise that created an impression of motion to the participants. The results of 
these two studies are particularly valuable in terms of identifying boundary 
conditions that specify how simulations are constructed. Kaschak and collaborators 
concluded that two factors weighed heavily in favor of a Match or Mismatch 
advantage: temporal overlap (timing of the stimulus and sentence to be processed) 
and integratability (the extent to which the stimuli can be integrated into the 
simulation). More broadly, the researchers suggested that when participants 
simultaneously view a visual stimulus and listen to a sentence (Kaschak et al., 2005), 
a Match advantage occurs when the sentence and the stimulus are integratible (e.g., 
when one sees an image of an eagle in the sky while reading and processing the 
sentence “I see an eagle in the sky”), and a Mismatch advantage occurs when the 
sentence and the stimulus are not easily integratible (e.g., when one sees an image of 
a black dot in the upper part of the computer screen while reading and processing the 
sentence “I see an eagle in the sky”). At the same time, when participants 
simultaneously view sentences that stress auditory aspects and listen to a stimulus 
(Kaschak et al., 2006), a Mismatch effect occurs due to competition for processing 
resources in the auditory perception system (i.e., perception of auditory stimulus 
requires the resources of perceptual auditory system, making them less available for 
a simulation of a sentence stressing auditory aspects). Finally, when a stimulus and a 
sentence are presented sequentially, a Match advantage arises under the condition 
that the percept and the sentence are integratible.  
 
2.3.1.6. Interference between visuospatial memory load and comprehension.  
 
In this line of research, Fincher-Kiefer (2001) and Fincher-Kiefer and 
D'Agostino (2004) instructed participants to read narratives in either high-imagery or 
low-imagery conditions by manipulating memory load. More broadly, participants 
read sentences about scenes while maintaining either interfering visual information 
or noninterfering verbal information in their working memory and later were asked 
to recall all memory load sentences. The major result was that the recall of described 
scenes was impaired when memory contained irrelevant visual information, but not 
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when it contained neutral verbal information. This pattern of results was taken as a 
support to the claim that situation models generated from text comprehension include 
perceptual processing and simulations. These studies are important for 
psycholinguistic embodiment research as they are among the first to indicate that 
perceptual simulations may affect processing above the level of sentence (also see 
Spivey & Geng, 2001, for discussion of eye movements during processing of texts 
describing spatial scenes).  
 
2.3.2. Action simulation 
 
The importance of the motor system has been recurrently stressed in studies 
addressing the role of action for memory (Glenberg, 1997), categorization (Ross, 
1996), cognition (Johnson, 1987), and evolution (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). In recent 
times, however, research from psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive linguistics 
has also demonstrated the importance of the motor system for language 
comprehension (see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2007; Gibbs, 2006; 
Pulvermüller, 2002, for reviews). This part presents four major lines of research in 
which the case of action is presented. 
 
2.3.2.1. The effects of congruency between motor action and the action described in 
the sentence on sentence comprehension 
 
In this line of research, participants were asked to perform different motor 
actions while reading sentences to test whether compatibility between motor action 
and the action described in the sentence facilitates sentence processing. For example, 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) asked participants to view series of sensible sentences 
that either described transfer toward the reader (e.g., “Open the drawer”) or away 
from reader (e.g., “Close the drawer”) as well as series of nonsense sentences (e.g., 
“Boil the air”) that did not imply any transfer. The task was to judge if sentences 
made sense by pressing one of the vertical keys on a three-button box that required a 
movement either toward or away from the body. The researchers found that 
responses were faster when the motion implied by the sentence matched the actual 
hand motion. This matching advantage was called the action sentence compatibility 
effect (ACE). The results of this study are clear and consistent: understanding the 
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meaning of the sentence calls on experience with real motor action. The modulation 
of the motor system by sentence comprehension was further investigated in a study 
of Scorolli and Borghi (2009). Participants were presented with 24 pairs of nouns 
and verbs that described hand and mouth actions (e.g., to unwrap vs. to suck the 
sweet) and 24 pairs of nouns and verbs that described hand and foot actions (e.g., to 
throw vs. to kick the ball) and had to decide whether the combinations were sensible 
or not by saying “yes” loudly into a microphone or pressing a pedal. The results 
revealed that sentences implying mouth actions were processed significantly faster 
than sentences describing hand actions when participants were responding with the 
pedal. Similarly, sentences describing foot actions were processed faster when 
response was made with a pedal rather than a microphone. Apparently, this finding 
stands in stark contrast with amodal theories that claim language symbols become 
meaningful on the sole base of other language symbols. ACE effect was also 
reported in experiments of Borreggine, and Kaschak (2006), Taylor, Lev Ari, and 
Zwaan (2008), and Zwaan and Taylor (2006). For example, in the latter study 
participants read sentences implying rotation movement (e.g., “Because the music 
was too loud, he turned down the volume”) while actually rotating a knob. The 
direction in which the knob was rotated either matched or mismatched rotation 
movement described in the sentence. The results confirmed the matching effect 
between motor action and sentence meaning reported by Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2002). At the same time, the reported match advantage turned out to be quite 
specific: an activation of compatible motor responses was localized on the verb 
region of the sentence (e.g., “turn down”), but not on the preverb-, postverb-, and 
sentence-final regions. This pattern of results allowed researchers to hypothesize that 
maintaining focus on the action by following the verb with an adverb implying action 
might cause motor resonance to affect both the verb and the adverb that follows it. 
This prediction was tested in subsequent studies that fall within the second line of 
research addressing the role of linguistic focus in simulation of action during 
processing of language. 
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2.3.2.2. The role of linguistic focus in action simulation during language 
comprehension 
 
This line of research aims to investigate whether linguistic focus helps to 
identify the dynamics of action simulation within a sentence. For instance, Taylor 
and Zwaan (2008), using the same experimental paradigm as in Zwaan and Taylor 
(2006), asked participants to read sentences in which the verbs were followed by 
adverbs that either kept focus on the action (e.g., “When he saw a gas station, he 
exited slowly”) or on the agent (e.g., “When he saw a gas station, he exited eagerly”). 
The principal finding was that motor resonance affected both the verb and the adverb 
that followed it, but only when the postverbal adverb maintained focus on a matching 
action. In another recent study Masson, Bub, and Lavelle (in press) investigated 
whether shifting the focus from proximal goals of the agent to distal goals of the 
agent affects the dynamics of motor resonance in sentence comprehension. More 
broadly, researchers asked participants to perform a cued reach and grasp response 
while listening to sentences that described a functional motion (executed to use an 
object for its intended purpose, and thus corresponding to a reach response) and a 
volumetric motion (executed to pick up an object, and thus corresponding to a grasp 
response). The major result was that duration of motor resonance was evanescent 
when sentences described the proximal intention first (e.g., “John lifted the pencil to 
clear the desk”) and persistent when sentences described the distal intention first 
(e.g., (e.g., “To clear the desk, John lifted the pencil”). Masson et al. (in press) 
interpreted this finding as evidence of hierarchy between the two types of actions, 
suggesting that the focus of volumetric movements is limited to a word denoting an 
object and the focus of functional movements extends to other regions of the 
sentence (also see Bub & Masson, 2012, for discussion of similar evidence using 
word stimuli).  
 
2.3.2.3. The role of grammar in action simulation during language comprehension 
 
There is now a growing literature showing that grammar may also affect the 
prevalence of simulation in sentence and discourse processing. For instance, Zwaan, 
Taylor, and de Boer (2010), using a similar paradigm as in Zwaan and Taylor (2006), 
incorporated manual rotation sentences into stories about bank robbery. Three types 
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of target sentences were used: the sentences describing actions performed in the past, 
the sentences describing actions being performed, and the sentences describing 
actions intended to be performed. The major result was that motor resonance 
occurred only for the sentences implying past and present actions. The researchers 
concluded that no significant activation of compatible motor responses occurred for 
the sentences describing future actions due to the fact that these sentences focused on 
preparation rather than execution of action. The role of grammar was further 
specified in other related studies. For instance, Ditman, Brunye, Mahoney, and 
Taylor (2010) showed that memory was better for sentences preceded by pronoun 
“you” rather than by pronouns “he” or “I”. In another interesting research, de Vega, 
Robertson, Glenberg, and Rinck (2004) and Santana and de Vega (in press) 
demonstrated that comprehension of participants who read sentences describing 
simultaneous actions by means of the temporal adjective “while” was impaired 
relative to comprehension of participants who read sentences implying successive 
actions by means of the temporal adjective “after “. 
 
2.3.2.4. The effects of gesture representations on sentence comprehension 
 
Kaschak and Glenberg (2002), Zwaan and Taylor, and many others (e.g., 
Boreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Kaschak & Borregine, 2008) showed that compatibility 
between literal direction of hand motion and that implied by the sentence facilitates 
sentence processing. Researchers such as Masson, Bub, and Warren (2008) and Bub, 
Masson, and Cree (2008) extended these findings by demonstrating that more 
specific action representations based on the type of action associated with a referent 
in a physical world are evoked during sentence processing. For example, Masson, 
Bub, and Warren (2008) developed a procedure to measure the dynamic 
representation of functional and volumetric hand actions implied by the sentence. 
They constructed a response apparatus that consisted of shapes associated with 
certain hand actions (e.g., horizontal grasp, horizontal pinch, vertical grasp, vertical 
pinch) and trained participants to produce hand actions that corresponded to those 
depicted in the picture (each picture depicting a hand action signaled a particular 
action on the apparatus). After the training session, participants listened to sentences, 
each referring to a certain object (the verbs used in these sentences denoted either 
attention/movement toward an object as in “A lawyer kicked a calculator”, or a non-
65 
 
manual interaction with it as in “A lawyer looked at a calculator”), and immediately 
after made speeded responses to the pictures that appeared on the screen by lifting 
the hand from a button box and manually carrying out the corresponding action on 
the apparatus. The results showed that functional and volumetric actions were 
activated during comprehension of sentences that stressed interaction with objects 
(e.g., kick a calculator). Moreover, motor resonance occurred (functional motion was 
activated) even during comprehension of sentences that referred to non-manual 
interaction with objects (e.g., look at a calculator). The researchers interpreted their 
findings as suggesting that the relationship between a constructed sensory-motor 
simulation and the meaning of the sentence can be quite specific. That is, sentence 
processing may arise not from a literal meaning of the sentence, but from prior 
experience that best captures the functional and volumetric properties of the object 
(i.e., moving a calculator by hand rather than kicking it by foot). 
 
2.3.3. Summary 
 
From what was reviewed so far, it is evident that the case of perceptual and 
action simulations is strong in the area of concrete language processing. The 
researchers approach the importance of embodiment by either amplifying evidence 
for the activation of embodied representations in language comprehension, or 
establishing boundary conditions that define the prevalence of simulation in 
understanding of language. As discussed previously, such boundary conditions can 
be temporal overlap and integratability in the domain of perception, and linguistic 
focus and grammar in the domain of action. Finally, as this part of literature review 
has shown, several researchers made replications of original studies (e.g., Pecher & 
Zwaan, 2012; Santana & de Vega, in press) to build stronger theoretical conclusions. 
Indeed, replication studies are important for the current research as they help remove 
biases that can be inherent in a single experiment. The “embodiment” literature is 
quite large in the domain of concrete language processing and increasing 
generalisability of findings is an essential next step in this kind of research.  
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2.4. A review of evidence on processing of language describing abstract concepts 
 
There is little question that sensory-motor simulations play important roles in 
the process of concrete language comprehension. However, an increasing number of 
researchers begins to challenge the adequacy of embodiment theory by asking how 
humans understand abstract concepts that by definition have no physical referents 
and are not easily imageable (e.g., Dove, 2009; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Pezullo 
& Castelfranchi, 2007). Indeed, the number of studies addressing the role of 
embodiment in concrete language processing outweighs the number of studies 
addressing the role of embodiment in abstract language processing. On balance, is 
also fair to say that the supporters of embodied account of cognition have already 
provided enough empirical support suggesting that sensory-motor simulations are at 
least somewhat involved in processing of abstract language as well as identified the 
theoretical approaches that explain how abstract language is grounded (see Pecher, 
Boot, & van Dantzig, 2011, for a review). Acknowledging the importance of this 
topic, this section reviews how several recent papers tackle the problem of 
abstraction with respect to processing of emotion, time, quantity, transfer, and 
metaphorical action.  
 
2.4.1. Emotion 
 
 An increasing amount of research has been conducted to test whether 
reenactment of a congruent (or incongruent) emotional state affects language 
comprehension. For example, Havas et al. (2007) asked participants to read 
sentences describing emotional or non-emotional events while being in a matching or 
mismatching emotional state. The major result was that sentences describing pleasant 
events were processed faster when participants were smiling. Conversely, unpleasant 
sentences were processed faster when participants were prevented from smile. These 
results are in harmony with embodiment theory as they suggest that sentence 
comprehension is facilitated when the suggested mood of the sentence is congruent 
with the concurrent mood of the comprehender. In a different study, Havas et al. 
(2010) provided further evidence in support of emotion simulation. The participants 
were injected a botulinum toxin-A (BTX) to temporarily paralyze a facial muscle 
responsible for frowning. Later, they were instructed to read sad and angry sentences. 
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The researchers found that reading of sad and angry sentences was slowed after 
Botox injections. Again, this finding is consistent with embodiment theory which 
predicts that being prevented from frown makes it more difficult to simulate sadness 
and anger. Finally, Foroni and Semin (2009), using EMG measurement of the 
zygomatic major and cirrugator supercilii muscle regions, found that motor 
resonance was induced when participants processed adjectives describing emotion 
(e.g., happy, sad), but to a lesser extent than when participants processed action 
emotional verbs (e.g., to smile, to frown). Thus, it can be concluded that the effect of 
sensory-motor simulation is stronger for concrete emotional words than for abstract 
emotional words.  
 
2.4.2. Time 
 
The idea that time can be understood through front-back spatial 
representation (i.e., future is front; past is back) was extensively discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Genter, Imai, & 
Boroditsky, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupianez, 2006). 
In recent years, however, several studies presented a few additional novel findings 
that warrant discussion. For instance, Sell and Kaschak (2011) investigated whether 
time shifts are represented spatially in comprehension of texts describing past and 
future events. The participants read short texts sentence-by-sentence and after 
reading each sentence made sensibility judgments by either moving their hand from 
the start button to the response button (Experiment 1) or pressing the start and 
response buttons without moving the hand (Experiment 2). The major results were as 
follows. First, responses for sentences describing future events were faster when 
participants responded away from their body. Conversely, responses for sentences 
describing past events were faster when participants responded toward their body. 
Second, a spatial compatibility effect occurred only when participants moved their 
hand to produce a response (Experiment 1). Third, a spatial compatibility effect 
occurred only when the texts described a large time shift (a month), but not a small 
time shift (a day). As another example of how time can be understood through spatial 
representation, Santiago et al. (2007) presented participants with words located either 
to the left or to the right from the fixation point and then asked to judge if words 
referred to past or future events. The major finding was that participants were faster 
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in their responses when words referring to the past or future events were presented 
on the left side or the right side of the screen, respectively. Finally, Lakens, Semin, 
and Garrido (2011) extended Santiago et al.’s (2007) findings by asking participants 
to indicate if words presented over headphones were louder on the left or right 
channel (note that words were presented equally loud binaurally). Consistent with the 
prediction, participants judged past words to be louder on the left channel and future 
words on the right channel. Thus, the researchers concluded that both auditory and 
visual (as in Santiago et al., 2007) judgments show a similar spatial bias. In brief, 
these findings suggest that the abstract concept of time is understood by way of 
analogy to representation of embodied experiences of space either along the front-
back or left-right axis. 
 
2.4.3. Quantity 
 
There is mounting evidence that the concept of quantity can also be grounded 
in spatial representations. For instance, Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux (1993) asked 
participants to indicate whether numbers presented on a monitor were odd or even 
with a left or right hand. The researchers found that participants were faster to 
respond to odd or even low digits (e.g., 1 or 2) when responding with a left button 
press, and faster to respond to odd or even high digits (e.g., 8 or 9) when responding 
with a right button press. This effect was coined the Spatial Numerical Association 
of Response Codes (SNARC). Dehaene et al. (1993) interpreted their finding as 
evidence that the concept of quantity is understood as a mental number line along the 
left-right axis. SNARC effect was also observed for phoneme detection of digits’ 
names (Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & d’Ydewalle, 1996), digit magnitude 
classification (Bächtold, Baumüller, & Brugger, 1998), and even for ordinal stimuli 
such as days of the week, and months of the year (Gevers, Reynvoet, & Fias, 2003, 
2004). In a most recent study, Sell and Kaschak (2012) advanced our understanding 
of this effect in two important ways. First, they investigated the usefulness of spatial 
representations in the comprehension of the concept of quantity on a more global text 
level. Second, whereas previous work provided evidence that the concept of quantity 
is represented along the left-right axis, their research explored whether quantity is 
understood along the metaphor-based up-down axis (i.e., more is up, less is down). 
To assess these questions, the researchers asked participants to read (Experiment 1) 
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or listen to (Experiment 2) short stories sentence-by-sentence (e.g., “Much/Less runs 
were being scored this game”). Participants indicated that they finished reading 
(listening to) the sentence by either releasing their hand from the button used to 
display the sentence and moving it to the response button aligned on the up-down or 
the right-left axis, or pressing the button used to display the sentence and positioning 
the other hand over the response button to terminate reading the sentence. The major 
finding was that reading times for sentences describing increases in quantity were 
faster when the response was made away from the body. Conversely, reading times 
for sentences describing decreases in quantity were faster when the response was 
made toward the body. Furthermore, responding was significant both when a 
participant moved and did not move to respond. No compatibility effects were 
observed along the non-metaphor-based left-right axis. Thus, this finding is 
consistent with the embodied account of cognition which predicts action-space (e.g., 
Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002) and action-sentence compatibility effects (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002) suggesting that language processing is grounded in bodily 
mechanisms of perception and action. 
 
2.4.4. Transfer 
 
In subsection 1.2.1 the evidence provided by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) 
was reviewed indicating that comprehension of sentences describing transfer of 
objects influenced the motor event that followed. In the same study, as well as a 
more recent study of Glenberg, Sato, Cattaneo, Riggio, Palumbo, and Buccino 
(2008), it was demonstrated that the ACE effect also occurs during comprehension of 
sentences describing abstract transfer. More concretely, Glenberg et al. (2008) asked 
participants to read abstract sentences describing abstract toward (e.g., “Anna 
delegates the responsibilities to you”) and away transfer (e.g., e.g., “You delegate the 
responsibilities to Anna”) and judge the sensibility of sentences by responding in the 
direction that either matched or mismatched the direction implied by the sentence. 
The major finding was that judgments were faster when response direction and 
sentence direction matched rather than mismatched. Thus, it can be concluded that 
comprehension of sentences describing abstract transfer events requires the resources 
of simulation system to the same extent as comprehension of sentences describing 
transfer of objects. 
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2.4.5. Metaphorical action 
 
A few studies demonstrated that compatibility between literal body action and 
metaphorical action improves language processing. For example, in one line of 
research Santana and de Vega (2011) investigated whether processing of sentences 
describing metaphorical actions modulates action systems. Participants read 
metaphors (e.g., “His talent for politics made him rise to victory”) and abstract 
sentences similar in meaning to the metaphors (e.g., “His working capability made 
him succeed as a professional”), and then performed a hand motion (while reading 
the sentence verb) that either matched or mismatched the direction connoted by the 
sentence. The results revealed that responding was faster when there was a match 
between the direction of literal movement and that implied by the sentence. In a 
different line of research, Wilson and Gibbs (2007) tested whether previous real and 
imagined body movement enhances comprehension of metaphorical phrases. 
Participants learned to make different body movements or imagined making a 
particular body movement and then were presented with metaphorical phrases (e.g., 
grasp a concept) that either matched or mismatched a previous body movement (e.g., 
grasping movement). The researchers found that phrase reading times were faster 
when the previous literal or imagined body movement was congruent with the action 
implied by the sentence. In another experiment, Gibbs, Gould, and Andric (2006) 
revealed that even watching someone make a congruent body movement induced 
comprehension of metaphorical phrases (e.g., watching someone make a stretching 
motion while processing the phrase “stretch for understanding”).  For a more detailed 
discussion of these and similar findings see Gibbs (2006), and Gibbs and Perlman 
(2010).  
 
2.4.6. Summary 
 
In the light of the studies reviewed above, it can be argued that the proponents 
of embodied view of cognition have partially tackled the problem of abstraction. The 
researchers approach the abstractness problem in the following ways. The first 
approach is based on conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 
1987). The basic idea is that abstract concepts are understood metaphorically through 
reference to a more concrete embodied experience. Here, the evidence has been 
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provided how metaphorical use of space is used to represent such concepts as time 
and quantity. It is also worth noting that many other equally fruitful contributions 
(which were not discussed due to space limitations) demonstrated how social 
relations may be understood in terms of temperature (Ijzerman & Semin, 2010; 
Williams & Bargh, 2008), social status in terms of a vertical spatial axis (Schubert, 
2005), morality in terms of cleanliness (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008), 
importance in terms of weight (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009), distance in 
terms of similarity (Boot & Pecher, 2010), categories in terms of containers (Boot & 
Pecher, 2011), and political attitudes in terms of a horizontal spatial axis 
(Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Farias, Garrido, & Semin, 2013). In brief, the case of 
conceptual metaphor theory in explaining abstract concepts is strong. The second 
well-established approach focuses on the importance of motor processes in 
comprehension. The primary evidence for this approach is the ACE effect first 
reported by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002). Here, the evidence has been reviewed on 
how transfer events, metaphorical actions, and emotions (see Glenberg, Webster, 
Mouliso, Havas, & Lindeman, 2009, for a detailed discussion on how emotion 
prepares the body for appropriate actions) can be understood through action schemas. 
The third approach (not reviewed here due to paucity of behavioral evidence), which 
has received little scientific attention compared to the other two approaches, suggests 
that people come to represent and reason about abstract concepts with the help of 
aspects of experience, including objects, agents, settings, and introspections, in 
which such concepts are grounded.  As an illustration for this claim, Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings (2005) in a feature generation experiment found that participants 
tended to associate abstract concepts with social aspects of experience and concrete 
aspects with physical entities, suggesting that comprehension of abstract concepts 
relies at least partially on situated simulations. For a discussion of recent evidence 
from neuroscience supporting this approach see Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, 
Simmons, and Barsalou (2011) and Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, and 
Barsalou (in press). 
To conclude, empirical evidence demonstrates that comprehension of abstract 
and concrete language requires the resources of simulation system. Thus, as 
Niedenthal notes (2007), embodied comprehension can be compared to the 
experience of reliving the past event in some of its sensory, motor, and affective 
modalities. Annex A gives a brief overview of influential experimental studies that 
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have come to drive discussions and debates in the field of embodied language 
comprehension. The table indicates independent and dependent variables of research, 
methods of data collection, and the main results. Because of space limitations, only 
studies on perceptual, action, and emotion simulation were included, and thus many 
other interesting findings are not listed in the table.  
 
2.5. Embodied theories of language comprehension 
 
In the previous section a large body of empirical findings was reviewed 
suggesting that embodiment representations get activated when individuals process 
the language describing concrete and abstract concepts. At the same time, many 
researchers have argued that a purely embodied approach to comprehension is not 
very promising, given that it overlooks alternative explanations complementary to 
mental simulation (e.g., Louwerse, 2007, 2011) and provides only a partial solution 
to the problem of abstraction (e.g., Dove, 2011). As a result of these criticisms, 
researchers such as Andrews, Vigliocco, and Vinson (2009), Barsalou et al. (2008), 
Dove (2011), and Louwerse (2007) put forward the theories suggesting that language 
processing arises both from sensory-motor grounding and relations between symbols. 
To assess the commonalities and differences between the various theories that have 
been proposed, a variety of old and new theoretical approaches are reviewed that 
support either a strong embodied or a moderate embodied view. Additionally, the 
empirical evidence that supports the claims of each theory shall be provided.  
 
2.5.1. Theories that support a strong embodied view 
 
Embodied theories supporting a strong embodied view argue that human 
cognition is completely grounded in sensory-motor systems. Four strong embodied 
theories currently drive discussions and debates in the field (listed in ascending order 
of the year published): Perceptual Symbol Theory of Barsalou (1999); Indexical 
Hypothesis of Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000); Immersed Experiencer 
Framework of Zwaan (2004), and Action-based theory (ABL) of Glenberg and 
Gallese (2012). 
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2.5.1.1. Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS)  
 
According to PSS theory of Barsalou (1999a), cognitive processes 
responsible for language comprehension use partial reactivations of sensory, motor, 
and affective systems to form meaningful mental representations. More broadly, 
during original experience of event, modality-specific areas of the brain capture 
patterns of activation from sensorimotor and introspective systems. Later, while 
thinking or remembering about the event, these modality-specific areas partially 
reactivate original perceptual representations (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & 
Wilson, 2003). 
This theory suggests that knowledge about the world is not developed in a 
holistic way. Instead it develops categorically when attentional system focuses on 
components of experience in the context of possible interactions with the world. The 
continuous experience with the world, in turn, leads to gradual integration of 
perceptual symbols into a distributed multi-modal system that represents the category 
as a whole – a simulator (see Barsalou, 2009, for further discussion). This way we 
develop various kinds of perceptual simulators (visual, motor, emotional, etc.) that 
later get integrated with simulators for the words they refer to. With such an 
approach to knowledge representation it is fairly easy, for example, to distinguish 
between orientation of a book on a shelf and orientation of a book on a table, and to 
discriminate between a sound of a voice in a cave and a sound of a voice in a living 
room during language comprehension. In brief, the possibility for interaction 
between language, body, and environment allows humans to make inferences about 
information that is not explicitly contained in language.  
This theory has been corroborated by numerous experimental demonstrations. 
Here, just a smattering of evidence adduced to support this theory is provided. For 
example, Wu and Barsalou (2009) showed that participants reported higher 
accessibility to such internal properties as “seeds” or “red” while being asked to list 
characteristics of “half watermelon” than “watermelon”, suggesting that participants 
constructed perceptual simulations to generate properties of nouns and noun phrases. 
The importance of environment in constructing perceptual simulation was reported 
by Borghi et al. (2004). More concretely, the researchers found that participants were 
faster to attribute an object (denoted by a noun) to a certain location when the noun 
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that referred to an object was available in the participant’s perspective implied by a 
preceding sentence. That is, participants were faster to verify a noun “sign” when it 
was preceded by a sentence “You are waiting outside a restaurant” than a sentence 
“You are eating in a restaurant”. Clearly, this finding suggests that cognition is 
situated and that people not only simulate the physical entities described in the 
sentence, but as well the environment around them. In another study, Pecher et al. 
(2003) showed that conceptual system is not amodal by asking participants to verify 
different-modality properties. More concretely, participants were first instructed to 
verify a property in one of the six modalities such as vision, audition, taste, smell, 
touch, and action (e.g., property “cool” for “marble” from touch modality). Second, 
everyone verified a property from a different concept that belonged to either the 
same or different modality (e.g., “sticky” for “peanut butter” vs. “squeaking” for 
“bed springs”). The task consisted in judging if the concept-property item was true of 
false. The results revealed that participants verified the second property presented on 
the screen faster if it followed the first property from the same modality. These 
results suggest that conceptual system is not amodal and that meaning is extracted 
from multimodal experience of the event or situation. Finally, the evidence on 
perceptual simulation reviewed in the Section 2.3 is also consistent with the PSS 
Theory.  
 
2.5.1.2. Indexical Hypothesis (IH) 
 
IH theory of Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000) is another theory of 
language processing that further develops Barsalou’s (1999a) model by specifying 
those components of perceptual symbols that are related to action, and, in particular, 
to the function of action in comprehension of language. It was largely inspired by 
Glenberg’s (1997) claim that a situation becomes meaningful depending on the set of 
actions available to a particular individual in a particular situation. For example, 
consider the sentence, “John sweeps the floor with a toothbrush.” According to IH, 
first words and phrases in the sentence are indexed to analog objects, pictures, or 
perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999a) in the physical world. Second, possible 
combinations of interactions (affordances) with the objects are established. Because 
of affordances, we know that our sentence is sensible, given that it is physically 
possible to sweep the floor with a toothbrush even if this situation suggests that 
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someone’s day went very wrong. Third, language comprehension is coordinated by 
syntax that provides the reader with syntactic cues as to whether the objects and 
activities implied by the sentence can be successfully meshed.  
Action-based specifications on language processing are all the more 
noteworthy as they demonstrate that one of the main functions of comprehension is 
preparing for situated action. Glenberg and Robertson (2000) developed the 
importance of situated action for language processing by presenting a challenge for 
computational models like LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) in accounting for novel 
situations. More concretely, the researchers presented participants with a situation 
describing a problem (e.g., “Mike was freezing while walking up State Street into a 
brisk wind. He knew that he has to get his face covered pretty soon or he would get a 
frostbite. Unfortunately, he didn’t have enough money to buy a scarf”) and three 
sentences describing how a protagonist solved the problem: afforded (e.g., Being 
clever, he walked into a store and bought a newspaper to cover his face), non-
afforded (e.g., Being clever, he walked into a store and bought a matchbook to cover 
his face), and related (e.g., Being clever, he walked into a store and bought a ski-
mask to cover his face). The participants’ task was to judge the sensibility of 
sentences. The major finding was that participants could easily distinguish between 
the three types of sentences, but not a symbolic machine like LSA that failed to 
distinguish between afforded and non-afforded sentences. This pattern of results led 
authors to conclude that meaning cannot emerge solely from interdependencies 
between the words as symbolic theories propose, given that concepts are often not 
semantically related. 
 
2.5.1.3. Immersed Experienced Framework (IEF)  
 
IEF theory of Zwaan (2004) is another theory of language processing the 
basic premise of which is that language is a set of cues people use to construct 
sensorimotor simulation of the situation. Under this account, language understanding 
is similar to dynamic immersion of the comprehender into the described situation by 
means of activating experiential representation of language symbols (lexical, 
grammatical, etc.) and associated experiential representations that refer to these 
symbols (perceptual, motor, emotional). This theory assumes that there are three 
major processes of language comprehension: activation, construal, and integration. 
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During activation, target words activate functional webs that are used during the 
original experience with the referent. By functional web is meant various experiences 
with referents in different visuospatial configurations such as orientation, shape, etc. 
(e.g., a bird in the sky with its wings outstretched and a bird in the nest with its wings 
drawn in). During construal functional webs are integrated in simulation of the event 
implied by language. Finally, integration refers to experientially-based transitions 
from one construal to another. These transitions can be, for instance, visual (e.g., 
scanning of the environment) in visual scenes or emotional (e.g., anger towards the 
protagonist) in static or dynamic scenes. Among the factors that influence successful 
integration are concordance with human experience, amount of overlap (refers to 
how much of current mental simulation has the same components of construal as the 
previous simulation), predictability (anticipation of next event), and linguistic cues 
(tense, word order, etc.). In sum, comprehension in Immersed Experienced 
Framework is based on the following three principles: (a) simulation of visuospatial 
characteristics of the objects implied by language; (b) integration of this simulation 
in the context of a specific event; and (c) meshing of different simulations based on 
personal experience, learning history, combinability, predictability, and grammatical 
markers.  
The evidence for this theory was extensively reviewed in the Section 2.3 of 
this chapter regarding simulation of orientation, shape, visibility, and linguistic 
focus, and thus is not discussed here. 
 
2.5.1.4. Action-based Language (ABL)  
 
ABL theory of Glenberg and Gallese (2012) is a model of language 
processing that offers a new action-based account of language comprehension by 
making use of neurophysiologic findings on mirror (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, 
Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010) and canonical (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001) neurons, and 
by adopting controller and predictor models from theories of motor control 
responsible for computing goal-oriented motor commands and predicting 
sensorimotor effects of these commands (Grush, 2004; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 
2003). According to this theory, language comprehension is tantamount to predicting 
sensorimotor and affective effects of the performed action. For example, upon 
hearing the word “walk”, a person’s speech mirror neurons activate an associated 
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action controller responsible for generating motor commands necessary for 
interaction. Later, the predictor (sensory, motor, or emotional) of the target word 
establishes possible consequences of the action to be performed. In other words, 
under this account the same hierarchical mechanisms that are utilized in controlling 
action (i.e., control and predictor) are then used for generating grammatical 
sequences in language processing. Importantly, Glenberg and Gallese (2012) make 
two explicit assumptions about their model. First, it is suggested that the model is not 
only limited to explanation of verbal instructions, but instead covers all parts of 
speech. Second, it is stressed that the motor system, though the most important 
contributor, acts in a well-coordinated manner with other bodily systems (e.g., 
perceptual system).  
Given that ABL theory is a new theoretical account, empirical evidence in 
support of it is admittedly quite thin. However, the available evidence that at least 
partially supports the claims of Glenberg and Gallese’s theory (2012) leads to 
conclude that this approach is promising. Consider, for instance, the work of Masson 
et al. (2008), which was described in subsection 2.3.2.4 of this article, and the work 
of Masson, Bub, and Newton-Taylor (2008). The researchers hypothesized that 
comprehension of sentences like “John looked at a calculator” or “John forgot the 
calculator” would evoke the physical forces required to use the described object. In 
line with the prediction, functional actions (referring to a situation when an object is 
used for its intended purpose) were primed when participants were processing these 
sentences. What makes this finding stand out is that motor resonance occurred during 
comprehension of sentences describing concepts that have no action associations and 
ABL is the only embodied theory that explicitly acknowledged the role of action in 
comprehension of language that does not describe any form of physical interaction. 
 
2.5.2. Summary  
 
Contrary to amodal view that often places human cognition on the same 
footing as computer intelligence (Niedenthal et al., 2005), outlined embodied 
theories of language comprehension suggest that the environment, situations, the 
body, and simulations in the brain’s modality-specific systems ground core cognitive 
representations. The major claim that stays at the heart of these theories is that 
language comprehension cannot be a product of redescription or translation of 
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amodal symbols. Apparently, strong embodied theories are mutually reinforcing 
accounts of language processing. For example, Perceptual Symbol System of 
Barsalou (1999a) shows similarities with Indexical Hypothesis of Glenberg and 
Robertson (1999, 2000) in that both accounts suggest that language comprehension 
operates on perceptual simulators. While Barsalou (1999) explains why perceptual 
simulators stay in the core of human conceptual system, Glenberg and Robertson 
(1999, 2000) replace the discussion by looking into action-based mechanisms that 
ensure proper operation of such perceptual simulators. Similarly, Zwaan’s (2004) 
Immersed Experienced Framework has much in common with Indexical Hypothesis, 
given that both models view comprehension in an incremental fashion. For instance, 
while Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000) suggest that sentences are understood 
through indexing, deriving affordances, and meshing, Zwaan (2004) proposes that 
sentence comprehension is achieved by activation, construal, and integration. The 
question could therefore be raised whether indexing is similar to activation, deriving 
affordances – to construal, and meshing – to integration. Though this question 
remains unanswered for now, it is noteworthy that the basic processes behind these 
three steps have a lot in common in both theories. Finally, Glenberg and Gallese’s 
(2012) Action-based Language (ABL) model on the face of it seems to have little in 
common with other embodied models. At the same time, though providing an 
original and intriguing perspective, the basic idea behind this theory is in fact quite 
similar to common assertions of other theories – knowledge is simulated in the 
context of relevant actions.  
 
2.5.3. Theories that support a moderate embodied view 
 
An increasing number of researchers have proposed that language processing 
arises both from sensory-motor simulations and interdependencies between the 
words. Here, Language and Situated Simulation Theory of Barsalou et al. (2008) and 
Symbols Interdependency System of Louwerse (2007) that support such a view are 
reviewed. 
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2.5.3.1. Language and Situated Simulation (LASS)  
 
LASS theory of Barsalou et al. (2008) suggests that multiple systems are 
involved in language processing: symbolic systems, simulation systems, and 
statistical representations that are involved in the processing of both language and 
simulation. In their work, the authors offer an account of language processing 
postulating that simulation system represents deeper conceptual processing 
comparing to the linguistic system. In particular, it is proposed that at the onset of 
language comprehension both systems (linguistic and simulation) get activated, but 
the linguistic system peaks first. At this stage, words are being recognized and 
associated linguistic forms are produced (e.g., “tree” is associated with “trunk”, 
“branches”, etc), which allows an individual to support shallow processing of 
information. Next, the word’s representation activates simulations in the modality-
specific systems, which allows an individual to represent the word in different 
situations, and thus engage in a deeper conceptual processing, compared to the 
purely linguistic processing. Therefore, when simulation is more dominant in reading 
comprehension tasks, people deeply process the text and form a wide number of 
inferences. On the contrary, when linguistic processing dominates, comprehenders 
appear to form shallow meaningful representations and tend to extensively rely on 
information explicitly given in the text. Importantly, Barsalou et al. (2008) assume 
that linguistic processing dominates under the conditions when people do not have to 
comprehend the text deeply. In contrast, simulation system dominates when 
linguistic system is not capable of supporting adequate performance alone. Finally, 
one of the most important assumptions of LASS theory is that linguistic system does 
not have enough power to implement symbolic operations without involvement of 
simulation system because it (linguistic system) manipulates linguistic forms rather 
than linguistic meanings.  
The claims of LASS theory were tested in the recent studies of Santos, 
Chaigneau, Simmons, and Barsalou, (2011) and Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, 
and Barsalou (2008) which confirmed the prediction that comprehension originates 
in two systems – linguistic and simulation. For instance, in a study of Santos et al. 
(2011) participants were asked to generate properties for cue words that belonged to 
different conceptual domains. The major finding was that the properties describing 
highly associated concepts (e.g., a tree, a trunk, etc.) were produced earlier, 
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compared to the other less associated properties describing situations and objects. 
This pattern of results suggests that the linguistic system peaked first and activated 
the associated linguistic forms. Then, the simulation system came into play and its 
activation was more slowly than the activation of the linguistic forms. Notably, these 
results are fully consistent with the predictions of LASS theory. 
 
2.5.3.2. Symbol Interdependency System (SIS) 
 
SIS theory of Louwerse (2007) is a quite similar account of language 
comprehension to Barsalou et al’s. (2008) LASS theory in that it also addresses to 
what extent language comprehension is symbolic and embodied. Under this 
integrative account, language developed as a communicative short-cut for people to 
exchange knowledge (Louwerse, 2011). With this in mind, this theory suggests that 
in everyday language comprehension not all language symbols have to be grounded 
as much of the meaning comes from the relations between linguistic symbols. 
However, in some cases grounding is necessary to derive meaning. This is 
particularly the case when people have to process the information about spatial 
orientation or visual rotation that cues deep cognitive processing (see Louwerse & 
Jeuniaux, 2008, 2010, for discussion). 
The claims of this theory were tested in a study of Louwerse (2008) as well as 
others (e.g., Louwerse & Jeaniaux, 2010; Louwerse and Connell, 2011). For 
instance, Louwerse (2008), using a computational disembodied machine like LSA, 
replicated Zwaan and Yaxley’s findings (2003) regarding perceptual simulation in 
comprehension of spatial position and argued that perceptual relations are already 
encoded in language and are used by the comprehenders to derive meaningful 
representations. More broadly, using statistical linguistic frequencies obtained from 
the Web 1T 5-gram corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006), consisting of 1 trillion words 
(13,588,391 types) from 95,119,665,584 sentences, the author demonstrated that the 
frequency of higher objects preceding lower objects was significantly higher than 
lower objects preceding higher objects. Louwerse (2008) concluded that these results 
are not surprising, given that individuals typically do not say “down and up” or “toe 
and head”, but rather use these phrases in reverse word order, pointing to the 
conclusion that frequency of word order is an important factor in language 
comprehension that cannot be dismissed. Additionally, in the second experiment of 
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the same study, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that one concept 
appeared above the other (ratings were made on a scale of 1–6, with 1 being 
extremely unlikely and 6 being extremely likely) and it was revealed that average 
participants’ ratings correlated significantly with the word pair frequencies from the 
first experiment. Thus, Louwerse (2008) concluded that the comprehenders also use 
the interrelations between symbols to process language rather than only simulations.  
Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) and Louwerse and Connell (2011) extended 
the findings of Louwerse (2008) by investigating the conditions under which 
embodiment and linguistic factors determine performance. For instance, in the study 
of Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) participants were requested to make speeded 
judgments with regard to whether word pairs or pictures were semantically or 
iconically related. The embodied factor was tested by manipulating the relative 
position of words (e.g., attic presented above the basement) and the linguistic factor 
was tested by analyzing the frequency of the stimulus pairs in language. Among 
other findings, the researchers found that the embodiment factor was stronger in 
iconicity judgments for pictures and the linguistic factor – in semantic judgments for 
words, suggesting that the prevalence of one system over the other depends on the 
nature of the task and stimuli. At the same time, the authors noted that both factors 
predicted response time for semantic and iconicity judgments, pointing to the 
conclusion that both systems, embodied and linguistic, contributed to processing of 
words pairs.  
 
2.5.4. Summary 
 
In sum, moderate embodied theories are quite alike in that they propose that 
language comprehension is both symbolic and embodied. Both Language and 
Situated Simulation Theory (LASS) of Barsalou et al. (2008) and Symbol 
Interdependency System of Louwerse (2007) suggest that linguistic system 
dominates in the tasks that do not require deep processing of information (shallow 
comprehension) and simulation system dominates in the tasks where linguistic 
system is not capable of deriving meaning alone (deep comprehension). At the same 
time, whereas LASS theory assumes that symbolic mechanisms always utilize 
resources of simulation system to derive meaning (Santos et al., 2011), Symbol 
Interdependency hypothesis proposes that symbolic system alone can successfully 
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cope with most of general comprehension tasks. See Annex B for a more detailed 
comparison. 
 
2.6. The usefulness of embodiment for language processing 
 
Despite considerable empirical and theoretical evidence in support of 
embodiment account, many scientists still suggest that sensorimotor simulations are 
insufficient to model meaning because their role in language comprehension is 
epiphenomenal (Landauer, et al., 1998). Similarly, many other researchers argue that 
sensorimotor experiences are already encoded in language, and thus do not need to 
be grounded (Kintsch, 2008; Louwerse, 2007). Acknowledging the seriousness of 
this question, in the remainder of this section five arguments will be laid out to 
suggest the importance of embodiment in language comprehension. 
 
2.6.1. Evidence on processing of concrete concepts 
 
As reviewed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, much empirical evidence have illustrated 
how sensorimotor and emotion simulations can implement language comprehension. 
In particular, it was shown that experimental manipulation with the bodily systems 
leads to a better language processing (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002). However, 
if the role of the body was indeed epiphenomenal, should we observe any significant 
effects in behavioral performance by experimentally manipulating it? The brief 
answer is that we should not. Likewise, the reviewed behavioral studies have 
indicated that not only explicit properties of objects described by the sentence are 
part of the simulation process, but as well implicit properties such as shape or size 
(e.g., Zwan et al., 2002). However, if meaning merely arose from interdependencies 
between the words as amodal theory suggests, how would individuals process the 
situation that is expressed implicitly beyond words mentioned in the text? 
Unfortunately, this question also remains unanswered by now. For further related 
evidence not included in the review of present research, see Connell (2007) on 
perceptual information of object color, Glover and Dixon (2002) on simulation of 
size, and Alloway, Corley and Ramscar (2006) on the role of spatial environment.  
An explicit focus of this chapter on behavioral findings might leave an 
impression with a reader that behavioral findings are not corroborated by the findings 
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from neuroscience or other related disciplines. However, as it will be described next 
this impression appears to be incorrect. For example, in a rather interesting kinematic 
study, Gentilucci and Gangitano (1998) investigated the influence of automatic word 
reading on processes of visuo-motor transformation. More precisely, in this study 
participants were requested to reach and grasp a rod (position of the rod and size 
varied during the experiment) on the visible face of which the adjectives “long” and 
“short” were printed. Importantly, word reading was not explicitly required. Four 
markers were used to study the reaching and grasping components. The first marker 
was placed on the wrist to study the reaching component and the second and third 
markers were positioned on the nails to study the grasping component. The fourth 
marker was placed 8 cm away from participants’ sagittal plane and used as a 
reference point. See Figure 3.1 for a photographic presentation of the stimuli. 
According to embodiment theory, the meaning of language is related to human 
action, and thus high-level cognitive processes responsible for understanding of 
adjectives denoting distance should affect motor systems of the body.  
Remarkably, that is just what was reported: adjectives denoting size had an 
impact on the reaching component of grasping movements by activating a motor 
program for a farther or nearer position of target object. That is, participants 
associated the word meaning with the distance to be covered. No effect of the 
adjectives on the grasp component was detected. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Photographic presentation of the stimuli used in the work “Influence of 
automatic word reading on motor control” by M. Gentilucci and M. Gangitano, 1998, 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 10. 
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Finally, behavioral and kinematic evidence on presence of embodied 
representations in language understanding is well-supported by neuroscientific 
findings. For example, if the role of the body was not central, should performance in 
a lexical decision task on words denoting arm or leg movements be facilitated when 
arm or leg areas in the left hemisphere receive transcranial magnetic stimulation? 
The brief answer is that it should not. However, recent evidence indicates the 
contrary (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikolin, & Illmoniemi, 2005). Similarly, should 
sensorimotor cortex get activated when people process the language describing 
movements in the absence of real body movements? Again, the answer is that it 
should not. But the evidence from brain-imaging studies demonstrates such an 
activation (e.g., Decety et al., 1994). Finally, the most recent studies showed that the 
activation of motor systems occurs immediately after the presentation of stimuli 
(Pulvermuller, 2008), ruling out the hypothesis that motor effects are the products of 
motor imagery after the comprehension process is completed.  
In summary, embodied theories have a strong behavioral, kinematic, and 
neuroscientific support for the presence of modality-specific symbols in cognition 
relative to amodal theories that provide little direct empirical evidence on the 
presence of amodal symbols in the brain (see Semin & Smith, 2008, for discussion). 
This strong empirical case from multiple disciplines allows concluding that 
embodiment is necessary for concrete language processing. 
 
2.6.2. Evidence on processing of abstract concepts 
 
The most persistent objection to theories of embodiment is that they are not 
capable of explaining how all abstract concepts are processed. While this objection 
has merit considering that evidence on abstract concepts is still scarce and limited to 
specific domains, it is worth acknowledging that the supporters of embodied account 
of cognition has made a significant advance in the treatment of this problem by 
suggesting several approaches how abstract concepts can be grounded. In subsection 
2.4.6 these approaches were mentioned, but not with the depth which could be 
convincing. Therefore, in the remainder of this section each of the approaches is 
explained in more detail. 
The first approach is represented by work on metaphor (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; 
Gibbs & Steen, 1999; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Turner, 1996). For instance, 
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Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that a concrete concept like “food” may represent 
an abstract concept like “idea” (e.g., “That’s food for thought”), a concrete concept 
like “spark” may represent an abstract concept like “love” (e.g., “There’s a spark 
between them”), and an abstract concept like “gold-digger” may represent an abstract 
concept like “wealth” (e.g., “She’s a gold-digger”). In other words, abstract concepts 
are understood through metaphorical mappings. Similarly, Lakoff (1987) proposed 
that metaphors reveal how literal actions of people lead to invention of abstract 
concepts, suggesting that our body language is quite often consistent with our 
internal mental feelings. Indeed, we drum fingers when feel impatient, scratch out 
nose when feel uncertain, wink to express intimacy, or cross our arms to protect 
ourselves.  
Research in social psychology has adduced a tremendous amount of evidence 
that at least partially supports the major claim of the conceptual metaphor theory: 
abstract concepts are understood by way of analogy to more concrete experiences. 
Consider just a smattering of some of the most interesting findings on attitude 
formation. Wells and Petty (1980) found that participants’ attitude toward a 
persuasive message was more positive when they had previously nodded the head, 
than when they shook the head or made no head movements. Thus, a head movement 
may be associated with either positive or negative attitude. In a similar study of Tom, 
Pettersen, Lau, Burton, and Cooke (1991) participants were instructed to nod or 
shake their heads while listening to music. While they listened to music, a pen lay on 
the table in front of them. Upon exit, when offered to take a pen, participants who 
were nodding the head preferred the original pen and participants who were shaking 
the head – the new pen. Thus, head movements may increase a person’s intuition 
about the correct choice. Oppenheimer and Trail (2010) asked participants 
(American citizens) to indicate their political views while having them sit in a chair 
that was purposely slanted (either to the left or right). The researchers found that 
spatial orientation influenced participants’ political attitudes. More concretely, 
participants who were oriented to their right gave preference to conservative political 
attitudes and participants who were oriented to their left – to liberal political 
attitudes.  Thus, a concept like political affiliation may well be implemented by 
spatial orientation of the body. In a study of Chen and Bargh (1999) upon receiving 
positively or negatively valenced words, participants responded faster to positive 
words when pulling the lever toward them (a sign on affiliation) as well as to 
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negative words when pushing the lever away (a sign of alienation). Thus, a concept 
negative can be associated with a literal movement of pushing something away from 
the body, and a concept positive with pulling something toward the body. In another 
related study of Förster (2004) participants provided higher ratings for positively 
valenced products when they flexed their arms during evaluation and lower ratings 
for negatively valenced products when they extended their arms during evaluation. 
Thus, an abstract concept better may be associated with a movement required to flex 
an arm and an abstract concept “worse” – with a movement required to outstretch an 
arm.  
Among other interesting social psychology findings that relate to abstract 
concepts, it is worth mentioning the following studies. Wiesfeld and Baresford 
(1982) demonstrated how an abstract concept such as proud may be developed in the 
context of educational experience. In particular, it was demonstrated that upon 
receiving good grades, high school students adopted a more erect posture than upon 
receiving bad grades. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) revealed how an elderly 
abstract concept may be developed in the context of experience with other objects. In 
this experiment participants were asked to form sentences with such words as 
“wrinkle”, “Florida”, “knits” related to a category of words describing old people. 
Next, upon finishing the task, participants were asked to walk from laboratory to the 
elevator. It was found that participants who were primed with words describing 
elderly stereotype took more time to walk than participants in the control condition.  
Finally, the work on spatial representations revealed that people make 
congruent gestures when speaking about time (Casasanto & Lozano, 2006), change 
thinking about time when are primed with different spatial perspectives (Boroditsky, 
2000; Borositsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008) and take more 
time to make simple hand movements inconsistent with the meaning of abstract 
concepts (Casasanto & Lozano, 2007). For complete reviews of these and similar 
findings see Briñol and Petty (2008) and Niedenthal et al. (2005). 
The second approach is associated with the work of Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2002), suggesting that processing of both concrete (“You give Art the pencil” and 
“Art gives you a pencil”) and abstract (“You delegate the responsibilities to Anna” 
and “Anna delegates the responsibilities to you”) language requires the simulation of 
action. More concretely, in this experiment participants were faster to judge a 
sentence as sensible when the direction of response matched the direction implied by 
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sentence. A similar finding on abstract sentences was found in Glenberg et al. 
(2008). Put differently, this approach suggests that concrete transfer provides 
sensory-motor grounding for abstract concepts (Pecher et al., 2011).  
The third approach is represented by Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbol 
System. According to this theory, abstract concepts are understood in the context of 
situation in which they are used. Just like concrete concepts, abstract concepts 
consist of components of neural activity in multimodal systems (e.g., auditory, touch, 
motor, etc.). Consider, for instance, how Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, and 
Barsalou (in press) describe the representation of emotional abstract concepts in 
conceptual processing: 
 
We further assume that a speciﬁc emotion concept contains a large set of 
situated conceptualizations that produce emotion in many different kinds of 
situations, with each situated conceptualization producing a different form of 
the emotion. Consider one possible situated conceptualization associated with 
fear, where a runner becomes lost on a wooded trail at dusk. In this situated 
conceptualization, concepts for forest, night, animals, thirst, confusion, and 
many others become integrated meaningfully to represent fear, including the 
associated internal experience and potential actions. Consider another 
possible situated conceptualization associated with fear, where someone is 
unprepared to give an important presentation at work. In this situated 
conceptualization, a different set of concepts represents the situation, 
including presentation, speaking, audience, supervisor, and many others. 
Again, the integrated representation of diverse concepts into a situated 
conceptualization constitutes an instance of fear, including associated internal 
experience and action. 
From this perspective, fear cannot be understood independently of an 
agent conceptualizing his- or herself in a particular situation… Fear can look 
and feel quite differently in different instances. When you fear a ﬂying 
cockroach, you might grab a magazine and swat it; when you fear 
disappointing a love one, you might think of other ways to make them feel 
good about you; when you fear a mysterious noise late at night, you might 
freeze and listen; when you fear giving a presentation, you might ruminate 
about audience reactions or over-prepare; when you fear getting a ﬂu shot, 
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you might cringe anticipating the pain; when you fear hurting a friend’s 
feelings, you might tell a white lie. Sometimes you will approach in fear, and 
sometimes you will avoid. Sometimes your heart rate will go up, and 
sometimes it will go down. Whatever the situation demands (Wilson et al., in 
press). 
 
Generally, this approach suggests that people come to represent and reason 
about abstract concepts with the help of aspects of experience, including objects, 
agents, settings, and introspections, in which such concepts are grounded. For 
instance, analyzing data using multiple regression or hierarchical linear modeling can 
lead someone to believe that statistics is really difficult. Similarly, increased heart 
beating, sweating palms, mirroring verbal and non-verbal patterns may suggest that 
someone is in love. Moreover, this approach suggests that there cannot be a stable 
image of any abstract concept, considering that any other abstract concept may mean 
different things to different people (e.g., some may consider sex a synonym to love 
and others consider sex merely as a rush of hormones).  
 In summary, it is true that we are still far from a unified embodied approach 
to comprehension of abstract concepts. However, the existing empirical evidence in 
support of embodied abstract language processing should not be overlooked or 
dismissed, and thus warrants discussion and future investigation. 
 
2.6.3. Predictive power of simulations 
 
Frequently in the literature it is possible to find the reasons why amodal 
account of cognition remains the dominant theory of knowledge representation. For 
example, along different lines, Niedenthal et al. (2005) mentioned possible 
explanations for the power of amodal symbols in ability to account for important 
functions of knowledge (e.g., categorization, language, thought, etc.), in ability to 
allow computers to implement knowledge (e.g., programming language), and in 
ability to be applied in intelligent systems in industry, education, and medicine. The 
authors also offered an explanation for the wide acceptance of amodal symbols by 
cognitive science based on absence of any alternative theory until recently. In brief, 
amodal theories provide experimenters with powerful tools to explain many 
psychological processes. 
89 
 
Nonetheless, while amodal system theory successfully explains many 
findings in cognitive science, embodiment theory both predicts and explains 
evidence for modality-specific simulations in cognition. Consider research reviewed 
in the previous chapter of this thesis suggesting that sensorimotor and emotion 
simulations imply such predictive power. For example, in a study of Zwaan et al. 
(2002) participants read sentences that described animals or objects implying 
different shape (e.g., “The ranger saw the eagle in the sky”; “The ranger saw the 
eagle in its nest”). After each sentence, participants saw a picture of animal or object 
that differed in shape (e.g., eagle with outstretched wings; eagle with folded wings) 
and had to decide whether the picture represented a word implied by the sentence. 
The results showed faster responses for picture stimuli that matched property of 
shape with the sentence. The point is: a match advantage between a visual stimuli 
and spatial property implied by the sentence indicates that participants simulated the 
shape of the eagle during processing of language in order to predict the correct 
meaningful representation of the sentence.  
Similarly, research in the domain of action demonstrates that participants 
used simulations to predict meaning. For instance, in a study of Glenberg and 
Kaschak (2002) language processing was facilitated when the action implied by the 
phrase (e.g., close the drawer) was consistent with the hand movement to make a 
response (movement toward the body). This means that participants simulated the 
appropriate action to predict the meaning of the phrase that describes bodily 
movement. 
Finally, in the domain of emotion simulation the case of prediction is also 
strong. For instance, Havas et al. (2007) found that processing of sentences 
describing emotionally laden events (e.g., “You and your lover embrace after a long 
separation”) was facilitated when bodily states were prepared for processing of 
congruent emotions. That is, participants simulated positive emotion in order to 
predict the meaning of the sentence.  
In summary, whereas amodal processing explains how meaning is produced, 
embodied processing both predicts and explains how meaning is coded and 
communicated by the comprehender. 
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2.6.4. Embodiment and predictions for novel situations 
 
According to symbolic view of cognition language comprehension arises 
from interdependencies between abstract symbols. For example, it was already 
discussed in Section 2.2 that computational symbolic models like LSA rely on word 
co-occurrences and dimensional analysis of words in context. But this really just 
begs the question. If meaning in symbolic systems relies on what has already been 
experienced and described, then how do we derive meaning from new experiences? 
Imagine that you have just bought a new 5th Generation Apple iPod touch and you 
read a review of this device to a 50-year-old woman who still has a rotary phone in 
her house and is not keen on modern technologies: 
 
The latest iPod touch 5th Generation takes the best features of the iPhone 5, 
like the taller 640x1136 pixel, 4-inch screen and the iOS 6 software update 
with Siri, and adds a few little quirks of its own, like a choice of coloured 
backs (black, grey, pink, yellow, blue and a sixth Product Red) and a new 
strap called an 'iPod touch loop'. 
Along the way the camera has been upgraded to an iSight camera with 
a built-in flash that's capable of 1080p video recording and the processor has 
been upped to a duel-core A5 chip, giving it twice the processing power of 
the previous single-core A4 chip. Both the screen size and the faster processor 
are important for gaming, but more of that later. 
Memory configurations have been simplified. The new 5th gen is 
available only in 32GB and 64GB flavours. 
Finally, the new iPod touch runs iOS 6, the latest version of Apple's 
mobile operating system in all its glory, which means that both Panorama – a 
new mode for taking panoramic photos, and Siri, Apple's intelligent voice-
activated personal assistant, are available here. 
Note: neither of these two features work on a iPod touch 4th 
Generation running iOS 6 (Barlow, 2012).  
 
It is reasonable to predict that no matter how many new features of the new 
device you list, a woman who has never used a similar device in her life would have 
problems figuring out the meaning of such terms as, for instance, “pixel”, “1080p 
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video”, or “duel-core A5 chip processor”. Similarly, she would have problems 
imagining how such a new device looks like in general. The list of features about 
IPod touch that symbolic systems can generate might include things like IPod touch 
is a music and video player, is ultrathin, small in size, etc. At a glimpse, it may seem 
that this sort of feature lists is enough to derive a meaningful representation of the 
device. However, how would a woman know how exactly different this video player 
is from a tape video player she has at home? Similarly, if such player is small in size, 
then how would she understand that it functions in a different way from her old tape 
video player? To solve this problem, every feature of the device should be grounded 
in perceptual and action systems. That is, linguistic symbols should be indexed to 
perceived objects or previous experiences (Barsalou, 1999a; Harnad, 1990). Clearly, 
demonstrating the function of each feature to the same woman while she holds an 
IPod touch in her hands would considerably facilitate understanding of the 
information about the new device. After all, all user guides how to use a new device 
come with certain pictorial information on controls, features, accessories, etc. 
A skeptic might argue, however, that the role of embodiment might be 
important, but only in cases when people experience a completely novel situation as 
the one described above. In other words, it can still be argued that if people 
experience a new situation that is similar to a previous related experience, a list of 
amodal symbols may provide enough contextual information to understand another 
novel situation. More concretely, a person who previously worked with an iPhone or 
iPod (these devices share some similar features with iPod touch) would have no 
problems figuring out what the new iPod touch has to offer and how it looks like. 
While this conclusion is theoretically possible, a few questions can still be raised. 
Isn’t the information about such properties as, for instance, color or shape, encoded 
in memory in the form of perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999a) rather than amodal 
symbols? Is it really so easy to describe in amodal symbols such perceptual 
information of iPod touch as raw brushed aluminum color? Similarly, what about 
information regarding the curved edges of the device (i.e., property of shape)? More 
basically, even if all Apple devices were similar in size and shape, what evidence do 
we have to support a conclusion that contextual information from previous 
experiences is represented only in the form of amodal symbols? That is, assuming 
that a feature list captures some basic perceptual information, is it possible to 
conclusively state that it captures all the perceptual information we originally 
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experience? The answer to this question remains unanswered by now, but the 
empirical evidence in the domain of perception strongly argues in favor of 
embodiment stance (see Section 2.3 for a revision of relevant findings). 
Finally, Glenberg and Robertson (2000) and Kaschak and Glenberg (2000) 
explained how simulation accounts for comprehension of novel situations by putting 
forward a theory called “Indexical Hypothesis” (described in more detail in    
Chapter 2). According to this theory, comprehension proceeds in three cycles. 
During the first cycle, words and phrases are indexed to perceptual referents that are 
stored in memory as perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999a). During the second cycle, 
possible interactions with objects (affordances) are derived. During the third cycle, 
affordances are integrated according to syntax. For example, Glenberg and 
Robertson (2000) presented a challenge for computational symbolic systems like 
LSA in accounting for novel situations by presenting participants with the sentences 
presented in Table 3.1. 
The task of participants consisted in making sensibility and envisioning 
judgments of each of the sentences in the scenario (i.e., afforded, nonafforded, 
related) on a scale of 1 (virtual nonsense) to 7 (completely sensible). The results 
revealed that participants could easily distinguish between the three types of 
sentences. Upon collection of data from participants, the researchers examined 
whether a symbolic machine like LSA would as easily predict the differences 
between afforded, nonafforded, and related types of sentences. Interestingly, LSA 
did not manage to predict the sensibility ratings, and thus was not able to distinguish 
between afforded and nonafforded sentences. This pattern of results led authors to 
conclude that meaning cannot emerge solely from interdependencies between the 
words as symbolic theories propose, given that concepts are often not semantically 
related and are not easily associated in everyday experience. Instead, Glenberg and 
Robertson (2000) argued that a sentence becomes meaningful when one indexes 
words to perceptual symbols and meshes affordances taking into account one’s 
learning history and goals.  
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Table 2.3 
Examples of Sentences Used in the Study of Glenberg and Robertson (2000) to 
Support Indexical Hypothesis in Predicting the Meaning of Novel Situations 
 
 
Example 1 
Setting: Marissa forgot to bring her pillow on her camping trip. 
Afforded: As a substitute for her pillow, she filled up an old sweater with leaves. 
Nonafforded: As a substitute for her pillow, she filled up an old sweater with water. 
Related: As a substitute for her pillow, she filled up an old sweater with leaves. 
 
Example 2 
Setting: Mike was freezing while walking up State Street into a brisk wind. He knew 
that he has to get his face covered pretty soon or he would get a frostbite. 
Unfortunately, he didn’t have enough money to buy a scarf. 
 
Afforded: Being clever, he walked into a store and bought a newspaper to cover 
his face. 
Nonafforded: Being clever, he walked into a store and bought a matchbook to 
cover his face. 
Related: Being clever, he walked into a store and bought a ski-mask to cover his 
face. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that the above mentioned examples of sentences 
from Glenberg and Robertson’s (2000) study demonstrate a strong case why 
cognition is situated. If one experiences a novel situation like finding a substitute for 
a pillow, he needs to be creative to find the way out of the situation. A leaf-stuffed 
sweater as a pillow is an example of such human creativity during the new 
experience. Being creative is perhaps one of the best examples what makes humans 
different from machines that are programmed.  
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2.6.5. Practical application of simulation theory 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the cornerstones of literature on 
embodiment is the argument that language processing can be used to guide effective 
action. This function of comprehension was used by the proponents of embodied 
cognition to suggest practical implications of simulation theory for reading 
instruction to children. For instance, Glenberg, Gutierrez, Levin, Japuntich, and 
Kaschak (2004) implemented a new technique for teaching reading comprehension 
to children called “Moved by Reading”. The purpose of this technique was to teach 
children how to map words and phrases to experiences and events in the outside 
world. In particular, this new kind of technique taught simulation in two stages: 
physical manipulation with the toys and imaginative manipulation with the toys. 
During the physical manipulation, children were asked to read a small text about 
certain situations (e.g., house) that was divided into a set of critical sentences. After 
reading each of such critical sentences, children were asked to act out the meaning of 
the sentence with the toys that were in front of them (e.g., chair, bed, wardrobe, etc.). 
Thus, reading the sentence “Bob sits on the chair beside the bed” required from the 
child to connect objects to words that referred to them, considering visuospatial 
configurations implied by sentence. The results of this technique speak for 
themselves. For instance, in Glenberg et al.’s (2004) study children who physically 
manipulated the objects while reading (were taught to simulate) recalled 62 % of the 
content of the story and children in the control condition recalled only 29 % of the 
content of the story. The advantage of condition when children were physically 
manipulating the toys was also found in the ability of comprehenders to correctly 
answer text-related inference questions. This advantage demonstrated a large effect 
size, Cohen’s d = .81. 
During the imaginative manipulation, children were requested to merely 
imagine manipulating the toys. Remarkably, at this stage children performed 
comprehension-related tasks just as good as in the stage of physical manipulation. 
More specifically, children who engaged in physical and imaginative manipulations 
performed the comprehension task almost two standard deviations better than 
children who reread the same sentences from text and did not engage in any 
manipulation with the toys. 
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Similar results were found in other related studies of Glenberg, Goldberg, and 
Zhu (2009), and Glenberg, Willford, Gibson, Goldberg, and Zhu (2011) when 
“Moved by Reading” was used a web-based system. Interestingly, although haptic 
information associated with toys was no longer accessible to children in the web-
based “Moved by Reading” system, the results revealed that acting out the meaning 
of sentences with the help of toys on a computer screen facilitated comprehension to 
the same extent as when a child was physically manipulating the toys. Moreover, the 
results of these two studies (Glenberg et al., 2009; Glenberg et al., 2011) advanced 
our understanding of the strength of “Moved by Reading” technique by 
demonstrating that computer-based manipulation with toys influenced language 
processing both immediately after reading the story and when story reading and 
comprehension task were separated in time (one week). The reported findings led 
experimenters to conclude that the use of text-relevant images in teaching children to 
read might potentially become a very successful educational technique. 
Finally, the same technique proved to be effective for teaching listening 
comprehension to learning-disabled Native American children (see Marley, Levin, 
and Glenberg, 2007, for details). More precisely, in this study seventh-grade students 
with academic learning difficulties were asked to listen to four narratives in one of 
the three conditions: manipulate, visual, and control. In the manipulative condition 
students moved the toys to act out the meaning of sentences from the text. In the 
visual condition students observed how an experimenter manipulated the toys to 
represent the text’s content. In the control condition students thought about the 
content of sentences from the stories. The obtained results were consistent with 
previous findings of Glenberg et al. (2004). That is, students in the manipulative and 
visual conditions performed better on comprehension and memory tasks relative to 
students in the control condition. In brief, outlined research demonstrated that 
successful reading or listening comprehension arises not from reproducing what was 
read or listened, but rather from performing situated activity related to the content of 
what the reading (listening) passage is about.  
 In sum, there is a good deal of evidence that simulation is necessary for 
language processing. This evidence has been found (a) in empirical work 
demonstrating that manipulation with the body affects underlying performance, (b) in 
predictive power of embodiment indicating that simulations help to predict the 
meaning of the message, (c) in the power of embodiment to explain novel situations, 
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and (c) in the applicability of embodied theories to education. Clearly, as a new 
scientific paradigm embodiment theory of language comprehension requires further 
theoretical and empirical consideration, and thus it is not surprising that it has not yet 
been fully accepted by cognitive scientists. At the same time, given an emerging 
focus on interactions between bodily states and language processing, it is very likely 
that this new kind of approach could shed some light on the phenomena that have 
been traditionally difficult to explain using amodal theories of cognition.  
 
2.7. Summary  
 
This chapter began with a review of principles that lie at the heart of symbolic 
and embodied approaches to language comprehension. It was noted that an amodal 
account of cognition, which suggests that language processing comes from a 
manipulation of abstract symbols, does not always manage to derive meaningful 
mental representations. In contrast, an embodied account of cognition offers a 
solution to this problem by proposing that language processing is not amodal, but is 
instead grounded in the perceptual, action, and introspective systems. In this way, 
comprehension involves sensorimotor and introspective simulations to represent 
knowledge that is situated in the context of relevant environments, goals, 
experiences, and background situations. To assess such an account of cognition, 
major embodied empirical findings and theories were reviewed as well as the 
arguments supporting the importance of sensory-motor grounding for language 
processing. The most general conclusion that can be drawn is that sensorimotor 
activation is necessary for language processing. At the same time, in the light of 
reviewed findings and theories it is fair to say that the supporters of embodied view 
of cognition are still far from an agreement whether simulation is the most important 
contributor to language comprehension or not. 
 
2.8. Research questions 
 
This broad overview of the relevant literature on embodied language 
comprehension provides a jumping-off point for the four research questions that 
follow.  
97 
 
First, as demonstrated by this review, most empirical evidence on the role of 
bodily feedback in language processing has been supported by the experiments 
conducted at the level of word or sentence. In contrast, the case for sensorimotor and 
introspective simulations at discourse level has received little scientific attention. 
This poses a serious challenge for the current investigations in the field as in real-life 
settings most of the comprehension proceeds in the form of discourse that is not 
isolated from a situation (Sparks & Rapp, 2010). It is fair to say that a modest 
amount of research in the field of reading comprehension has demonstrated that 
embodied representations can influence discourse processing. For example, studies 
focusing on neural substrates of narrative comprehension showed that modality-
specific areas of the brain involved in imagining and manipulating hand movements 
increased in activation when participants read about character’s interactions with 
objects (Speer, Zacks, Reynolds, & Hedden, 2005). Similarly, in eye-tracking studies 
(Spivey & Geng, 2001) it was demonstrated that eye movements of the readers 
“followed” the description of the events implied by discourse. However, it is also fair 
to say that the evidence for activation of embodied representations at discourse level 
is still scarce and far from being conclusive. Therefore, a key question that has 
motivated all the experiments in the following chapters is as follows: Does 
embodiment affect language processing on a more global discourse level? This 
question was investigated in the experiments one to five by collecting reading times 
as readers normally read the text while their bodily states were manipulated and 
asking participants to fill in the posteriori questionnaire. 
Second, as the review of the literature has shown, major research on 
embodiment effects in sentence processing mostly tested the role of modality-
specific simulations using “online” measures of comprehension such as collecting 
reading times or recording gaze durations. However, as discussed previously, such 
“online” measures do not take into account important “offline” mental 
representations that are established after the reading process is completed (Graesser, 
et al., 1997). Therefore, another question that warranted research is whether or not 
sensorimotor grounding facilitates “offline” understanding of discourse. This 
question was investigated by using open and inference questions (experiments one 
and two), asking participants to arrange events from the text in the correct order 
(experiment three) and collecting response times at test (experiments four and five). 
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Third, a few empirical studies have demonstrated that not only explicit 
properties of objects are simulated during language processing, but as well implicit 
properties. As discussed previously, Zwaan et al. (2002) presented participants with 
the sentences describing an animal whose implied shape changed as a function of its 
location (e.g., a bird in the sky; a bird in the nest). After reading the sentence, 
participants were presented with a picture of an animal in question. The researchers 
found that responses were faster when the animal’s shape (i.e., a bird with 
outstretched wings vs. a bird with folded wings) matched the implied shape in the 
sentence. Therefore, apart from investigating whether participants simulate actions, 
states and entities mentioned explicitly in the text (experiments one, two, four, and 
five), this thesis also explored a question whether the comprehenders simulate 
properties mentioned implicitly. More specifically, this question was investigated in 
the experiment three in which participants read a text describing an implied left 
spatial dimension (e.g., driving a car, getting out of a car) and locations (e.g., a heart, 
a wedding ring). 
Fourth, whereas experiments 1 to 3 were aimed at investigating whether 
simulations capture explicit and implicit information connoted by the language, 
experiments 4 and 5 constituted an advancement over these studies by investigating 
whether comprehension of discourse describing metaphorical actions that are 
physically impossible to perform also requires the construction of a simulation.  
Finally, to confirm that deep comprehension indeed requires simulations as 
some of the supporters of embodied view proposed (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008), the 
role of sensorimotor grounding was investigated in more cognitively demanding 
tasks such as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (experiments one, two, four, and 
five). The answers to this question were obtained by asking participants to answer 
inference questions. A well-known classification of questions into textually explicit 
and textually implicit (Pearson and Johnson, 1978) was adapted to develop such 
questions. The textually explicit questions required from participants to judge if the 
sentence was correct with regard to text’s content on the basis of information that 
came directly from text. The textually implicit questions required from participants 
to judge if the sentence was correct on the basis of information that was provided in 
the text, but was not obvious and not directly derivable from the text. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  
Simulation of Positive Emotions and Discourse Comprehension 
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Abstract 
 
Recent research has suggested that emotional sentences are understood by 
constructing an emotion simulation of the events being described. The present study 
aims to investigate whether emotion simulation is also involved in “online” and 
“offline” comprehension of larger language segments such as discourse. 
Participants read a target text describing positive events and were put into different 
facial postures using the pen manipulation procedure. In Experiment 1 participants 
in the matching condition read a text while having a pen between their teeth 
(muscular activation of the smile being facilitated) and participants in the control 
condition read a text in a normal condition without a pen (muscular activation of the 
smile being possible, but not facilitated). In Experiment 2 participants in the 
mismatching condition read a text while having a pen between their lips (muscular 
activation of the smile being prevented) and participants in the control condition 
read a text in a normal condition without a pen. “Online” and “offline” processing 
of text were measured by collecting reading times, testing vividness of imagery, 
spatial presence, perceived reading ease, and asking to respond to questions 
checking explicit and implicit comprehension of discourse. The major result was that 
participants read faster and found it easier to read the target text describing positive 
emotional events while their bodily systems were prepared for processing of positive 
emotions rather than unprepared or prevented from positive emotional processing. 
At the same time, no reading time differences were observed between the participants 
of control and mismatching conditions, suggesting that interference of processing did 
not occur when the suggested mood of the text was incongruent with the mood 
induced by the pen manipulation. Finally, simulation of positive emotions did not 
have a significant impact on “offline” explicit and implicit discourse comprehension. 
This suggests that emotion simulation has an impact on “online” comprehension, but 
may not serve to influence “offline” discourse understanding. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
According to some studies, when people adopt certain facial expressions of 
emotion, they also report emotional feelings that are congruent with their expressions 
(e.g., Duncan & Laird, 1977; Laird & Crosby, 1974). Recent theories of embodied 
cognition suggest new ways of conceptualizing emotional processing. These theories 
propose that knowledge is grounded and demonstrate that emotional processing is 
also relevant to understanding such core cognitive processes as language 
comprehension. By “knowledge as grounded” is meant that language processing is 
achieved via partial simulations of original sensory, motor, and affective states of 
human body (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Barsalou, 1999b; Barsalou, 2008b; Damasio, 
1989; de Vega, 2008; Gibbs, 2011; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 1999, 2000; Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003; 
Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 1999, 2009). Thus, remembering an emotional 
event arises from partial simulation of modality-specific states which were initially 
stored during the original experience. Similarly, understanding information about the 
emotional event arises from simulation of that original experience (Niedenthal, 
2007). This means that body is inextricably linked to the mental process and appears 
central to the representation of meaning.  
Research demonstrates strong evidence in support of action (e.g., de Vega et 
al., 2004; Hauk et al., 2004; Santana & de Vega, 2013; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) and 
perceptual (e.g., Kaschak et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005) simulation in language 
comprehension. In contrast, the effect of emotion simulation on language processing 
has attracted scientific attention only recently. For example, Havas et al. (2007) 
tested the hypothesis whether reenactment of congruent or incongruent emotions 
would induce or inhibit sentence comprehension, respectively. In their study 
participants were asked to read sentences describing emotional or non-emotional 
events while being in a matching or mismatching emotional state. The results 
demonstrated that judgment times for sentences describing pleasant events were 
faster when participants were smiling. Similarly, judgment times for sentences 
describing unpleasant events were faster when participants were prevented from 
smiling. In another related study, Havas et al. (2010) provided further evidence to 
support the claim that emotional bodily feedback plays a casual role in language 
processing. Participants were injected botulinum toxin-A (BTX) to temporarily 
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paralyze a facial muscle responsible for frowning. Later, they were asked to read sad 
and angry sentences. The major result was that reading of sad and angry sentences 
was slowed after Botox injections. This finding is in line with simulation theory 
which predicts that being prevented from frown makes it more difficult to simulate 
sadness and anger. The reported data have led experimenters to conclude that 
emotional bodily states are implicated in such higher cognitive processes as sentence 
comprehension. 
However, there are still a few pending questions that need to be addressed. 
The first question is about examining the effect of emotion simulation on discourse 
processing. The existing empirical findings mainly focus on the role of emotion 
simulation during sentence comprehension and have one important limitation: in 
everyday life we seldom deal with phrases or sentences used outside the context. 
Instead, more commonly we are exposed to comprehension of discourse which 
encompasses such important cognitive functions and processes as memory, 
perception, and reasoning (Graesser et al., 1997). An increasing number of 
researchers have pointed that this question has a fundamental bearing on the 
generalisability of the findings regarding the role of simulation in language 
processing (see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, for discussion). 
The second question is that most contemporary research on embodied 
language processing has so far focused on testing how modality-specific simulations 
influence “online” reading comprehension rather than “offline” reading 
comprehension. However, language understanding includes both “online” reading 
(e.g., word decoding, lexical access, syntactic processing) and “offline” postreading 
processes (e.g., summarization, argumentation, drawing inferences) which invoke 
different mental representations, and accordingly test different aspects of language 
comprehension (Graesser et al., 1994; Zwaan & Radvanksy, 1998). In brief, although 
looking into overall process of comprehension was recurrently stressed (e.g, 
Goldman & Varma, 1995; Kintsch, 1988; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; van der Broek, 
Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1999; Zwaan & Singer, 2003), there is an apparent 
lack of studies about the potential effects of emotional bodily states on “offline” 
language comprehension. 
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to think that emotion simulation could 
facilitate “offline” language comprehension. First, according to Language and 
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Situated Simulation Theory (LASS) put forward by Barsalou et al. (2008) a 
simulation system represents deeper conceptual processing compared to a linguistic 
system. In particular, this theory suggests that at the onset of language processing the 
linguistic system gets activated immediately and serves to recognize the words and 
produce associated linguistic forms (e.g., “computer” is associated with “mouse”, 
“keyboard”, etc.). The associations between the words are sufficient for shallow 
comprehension tasks. Later, the different meanings of the given word are simulated 
in the modality-specific systems to allow the comprehender to disambiguate the 
meaning of the word and identify the most relevant perceptual, action, and 
introspective elements. At this stage, the comprehender engages in a deeper 
conceptual processing compared to the purely linguistic processing. Therefore, when 
linguistic processing dominates, people tend to build shallow meaningful 
representations derived from information explicitly provided in the text. Conversely, 
when simulation system dominates, people tend to build comprehensive mental 
representations from inferences (information that goes beyond words mentioned in 
the text) computed during processing of discourse. Second, research suggested that 
imagery plays important roles in better recall of information (e.g., Bower & 
Winzenz, 1970; Paivio, 1971) and that simulation affects both imagery and 
perception during conceptual processing (Barsalou et al., 1999). The strong case for 
the role of imagery in simulation is presented by the recent work of Wu and Barsalou 
(2009) which showed that people use mental images during simulation of occluded 
internal and external properties of nouns and noun phrases that refer to objects. For 
example, participants reported higher accessibility to such internal properties as 
“seeds” or “red” while being asked to list characteristics of “half watermelon” than 
“watermelon”. Third, the most recent work on early reading comprehension 
demonstrated that embodied interventions help children better remember parts of 
texts and answer inference questions (Glenberg, 2011; Glenberg et al., 2011; 
Glenberg, Jaworski, Rischal, & Levin, 2007). Finally, convincing arguments about 
the central role of simulation in offline language comprehension can be found in the 
research of Pecher et al. (2009). More precisely, in this study participants were 
instructed to read a list of sentences describing objects and then to perform surprise 
recognition memory task on the pictures. The researchers found that recognition 
performance was better if the picture matched the implied shape or orientation of the 
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object in an earlier sentence. An effect of match was found both when participants 
responded immediately after reading the sentences and when sentence reading and 
picture recognition were separated in time (45-min delay).  
To conclude, a growing body of research shows that comprehension of 
emotional sentences requires the involvement of bodily systems to simulate the 
situation described by the sentence. The present study extends this research in two 
ways. First, whereas most previous studies used sentence stimuli, this research 
focused on extended linguistic events (texts). Second, both online (self-paced reading 
times) and offline (verbatim and inference questions) measures of comprehension 
were taken. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses and overview of the experiments 
 
Experiment 1 assessed whether congruent emotional bodily states might 
potentially facilitate “online” and “offline” comprehension of discourse. It was 
expected that participants should read a text about happy relationship faster while 
being in the matching condition (i.e., muscular activation of smile being facilitated) 
rather than in the control condition (i.e., while reading naturally). With regard to 
“offline” processing, it was expected that participants who belong to a matching 
condition would retrieve both explicitly presented material and inferential material 
implied in the text better than participants in the control condition. 
Experiment 2 assessed whether incongruent emotional bodily states might 
potentially impair “online” and “offline” discourse processing. It was expected that 
participants should read a text about happy relationship slower while being in the 
mismatching condition (i.e., muscular activation of smile being prevented) rather 
than in the control condition (i.e., while reading naturally). Additionally, it was 
expected that participants in the mismatching condition would find it more difficult 
to read a text than participants in the control condition (this hypothesis was tested 
with the questionnaire items measuring perceived reading ease). These predictions 
are in line with a strong embodiment claim which suggests that if systems of the 
body are in inappropriate emotional states, then these states should interfere with 
language processing (see Glenberg, Havas, Becker, & Rinck, 2005, for discussion). 
Finally, it was hypothesized that participants in the mismatching condition would 
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integrate both explicitly presented material and inferential material implied in the 
text worse than participants in the control condition. 
To test these hypotheses, in both experiments participants were asked to read 
an emotionally neutral tutorial text about the protagonist’s life on a Faial Portuguese 
Island of the Azores. The text contained a lot of factual and descriptive information, 
and thus did not promote any kind of positive emotional processing. Reading times 
were collected and served as a study baseline for the rest of the experiment to control 
for individual differences in reading speed. Second, participants were timed on how 
much time they spent reading the target text that described emotionally positive 
events (i.e., romantic relationship of a couple). 
In Experiment 1 participants in the matching condition read the text while 
holding the pen sideways between the teeth to force a partial smile (Oberman, 
Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007), and, accordingly, boost “online” and 
“offline” discourse comprehension. Participants in the control condition read the text 
naturally without any manipulation with a pen.  
In Experiment 2 participants in the mismatching condition read the text while 
holding the pen straight between the lips, without touching the pen with their teeth, 
to prevent smile, and, accordingly, impair “online” and “offline” processing of 
discourse (Oberman et al., 2007; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Participants in the 
control condition read the text naturally without any manipulation with a pen. 
Pictorial information on how facial expressions have been manipulated in both 
experiments is given in Figure 3.1. 
After reading the target text, participants in both experiments were asked to 
fill in a paper-based questionnaire that assessed their mental imagery, spatial 
presence, perceived reading ease, and “offline” explicit and implicit comprehension 
of the events described in the target text. In the end of the experiment participants 
were interviewed what they thought about the pen manipulation procedure.  
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Figure 3.1. Different ways in which facial expressions relative to smiling and frown 
have been manipulated in Experiments 1 and 2. From left to right, the author 
demonstrates how participants read the text describing positive events while having a 
pen between their teeth (muscular activation of the smile being facilitated), having a 
pen between their lips (muscular activation of the smile being prevented), or in a 
normal condition without a pen (muscular activation of the smile or frown being 
possible, but not facilitated). 
 
3.3. Experiment 1 
 
An embodied approach to language processing suggests that understanding of 
emotional language requires the partial reenactment of emotional bodily states. 
Consequently, if bodily systems are prepared for processing of congruent emotions, 
then language comprehension should be facilitated. With regard to “online” 
processing, it was expected that comprehension would be facilitated when the 
suggested mood of the text is congruent with the emotional state induced by the pen 
manipulation. That is, participants should read a text about happy relationship faster 
while having a pen between their teeth (matching condition) than in a normal 
condition without a pen (control condition). With regard to “offline” processing, it 
was expected that details of emotion simulation would be retained after reading is 
completed. That is, participants who belong to a matching condition should retrieve 
both explicitly presented material and inferential material implied in the text better 
than participants from the control condition.  
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3.3.1. Method 
 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
 
A total of 40 Portuguese citizens (Mage = 26.50, SDage = 8.24) participated in 
the experiment: 16 participants were male (Mage = 28.75; SDage = 10.58), 23 were 
female (Mage = 24.78; SDage = 6.05), one participant did not indicate gender. 
Everyone who took part in the study received a copybook in exchange for 
participation. 
 
3.3.1.2. Design and materials 
 
The experiment was a single factor between-participants design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the two aforementioned facial posture conditions: 
pencil in the teeth (consistent with the valence of the narrative) and no pencil 
(control condition). 
The materials consisted of two texts (tutorial and target) and a questionnaire. 
The tutorial text was neutral and the target text described emotionally positive 
events. Both texts were constructed to have eight paragraphs of exactly the same 
size. That is, the size of paragraphs in the tutorial text matched the size of paragraphs 
in the target text (e.g., paragraph one in both texts had 464 characters including 
spaces). Importantly, each paragraph of the target text described an emotional 
episode. Approximate English translation of the complete versions of tutorial and 
target text is given in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, respectively. Portuguese original 
versions of tutorial and target texts are given in Annex C and Annex D, respectively. 
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Table 3.1 
Approximate English Translation of the Tutorial Text Used in Experiment 1 
1 
It was almost summer. To be more precise, it was the end of May. I didn’t 
even have to go there. I was only supposed to go to Faial to present my book. 
However, something strange happened at the market in Lisbon. While I was 
giving autographs to fans, I noticed a girl who was looking at me. Suddenly, 
she approached me and said, “I’d like to use an opportunity before you begin 
the presentation. My name is Maria”. 
2 
We start walking together. We made a deal that we would not go by the end 
of the road, but stop in the middle of the road and sit on the lava rock nearby, 
whose shape reminds visitors of human body. 
3 
Everyone can choose his own lava rock. Here the wind is not very strong as 
well as the noise of the sea. Sometimes the noise of the wind absorbs the 
noise of the sea, as a result of which you can see the sea, but cannot hear it. 
The wind and the sun are similar to flames of fire. 
4 
At night the weather gets slightly fresher. The earth, however, is still warm 
and is emitting lots of heat. If you step on it, you can feel how the warmth is 
reaching your knees, making you feel as if you were in the middle of a 
bonfire. You can feel the “breathing sun” only after walking a few seconds 
along the highway 21. 
5 
In the distance one can see the first lights of Madalena. Just a few lights, the 
first illumination of the principal village. The bar on the square is still opened 
as well as the restaurant with no one inside. At this season of the year one 
can meet a few tourists, fortunately, only a few tourists. 
6 
I sound as if I have never been a tourist. I am leaving, so why should I bother 
who comes here? An old habit wanting to know everything, even when you 
are far away. Wherever I go I wonder if locals do the same as tourists like to 
do. I really think that they don’t, that there are two different and parallel 
lives, and that what tourists do is unknown for those living in the same place. 
So wherever I go I never try to do what tourists usually do, since otherwise it 
would seem as if I had never been to that place. 
7 
It is getting very late. The day is starting to get heavy and I start getting tired. 
Why do I feel so? I have no idea what made me come here. Memories, 
memories are really strange, very strange. I always have a feeling that if I 
could get back and relive that memory, I would have discovered something 
different from what I remember now. 
8 
The features of present life. You add them when you cannot remember the 
memory. They change it to the extent that you end up remembering 
something different, something shaped by your life. Memories, memories, 
memories… 
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Table 3.2 
 
Approximate English Translation of the Target Text Used in Experiment 1  
1 
An 81-year-old Finnish man has married a 54 year-old Finnish woman he 
met online, proving that love conquers everything. Jan-Erik Enestam, who is 
best known for his book “Love comes with age”, says that “The Internet does 
not belong only to the youth. There are no rules against old people seeking 
love online,” said the happy retired lawyer who has been using internet for 
10 years already. 
2 
The bride’s parents, aged 76 and 72, were not very happy about their 
daughter’s choice for a husband because of the man’s poor eyesight and, of 
course, age. However, the happiness of their daughter and the constant smile 
on her face made them accept Jan-Erik to their family.  
3 
When asked why she has chosen Jan-Erik as a future husband, Mikko 
Koskinen said, “Well, his voice seemed to me very youthful and I found him 
an extremely kind man”.  
4 
“After 8 months in marriage, my 81 year-old husband still makes things 
which my previous four husbands never did to me. For instance, he always 
brings coffee into my bed, buys my favorite flowers, and sometimes even 
organizes romantic suppers with candles”, said Mikko with the wide smile 
on her face. 
5 
One day the couple decided to leave the snow-filled streets of Finnish capital 
for a vacation in Egypt to mark the first anniversary of their marriage. Since 
man’s wife was a realtor and had a very tight schedule, they both decided 
that the husband would fly first and the wife would meet him there the next 
day. And so it happened. 
6 
When the man’s plane landed in Cairo, the first thing he saw on leaving the 
plane were vast surges and clouds of red sand raising and rolling forward 
like giant waves. The temperature left an impression of being in a grill, 
especially for the man who spent all his life in snowy Finland. But despite 
the climate, man’s impressions of Egypt were all but positive. On the bus 
which drove the man to the hotel, Jan-Eric had an opportunity to enjoy the 
most beautiful sites he ever saw in his life: the shadows of Great Pyramids, 
the Valley of the Kings and the temple of Abu Simbel.  
7 
Having reached the hotel, he decided to send his wife a quick email. 
Unfortunately, while typing her address, he missed one letter, and his note 
was directed instead to an elderly preacher’s wife whose 67 year-old 
husband had passed away only the day before. When the grieving widow 
decided to check her email, she took one look at the monitor, let out a 
piercing scream and fell to the floor losing consciousness.  
8 
Having heard the sound, her family rushed into the room and saw this note 
on the screen: My Dearest Wife, Just got checked in. Everything is prepared 
for your arrival tomorrow. Keep in my mind it is unbearably hot down here.  
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3.3.1.2.1. Measures of “online” discourse comprehension 
 
Collection of reading times 
Reading times were collected for whole paragraphs as readers normally read 
the text. 
Completion of questionnaire 
Participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire that measured perceived 
reading ease, vividness of mental imagery, and feeling of spatial presence 
immediately after reading the text. The decision to measure the degree of mental 
imagery and feeling of presence was guided by previous research and theory that 
placed emphasis on the role of imagery and situated nature of concepts in language 
comprehension (Barsalou, 2008b; Barsalou et al., 2008; Spivey & Geng, 2001).  
 
 Perceived reading ease 
 
Perceived reading ease was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) 
completely disagree to (7) completely agree. The items used in the scale are 
presented in Table 3.3 (see Annex E for a Portuguese version). 
 
Table 3.3 
The Items Used to Measure Perceived Reading Ease in Experiment 1 
  Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
I did not find any difficulties understanding the details of 
the text 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I found the reading process of the text easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Vividness of mental imagery 
 
To test the vividness of mental imagery, VVIQ Scale of Marks (1973) was 
adapted, where participants were asked to rate their tendency to mental imagery 
while reading the target text on a 7-point semantic differential scale. A scale is 
presented in Table 3.4 (see Annex E for a Portuguese version of a scale). 
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Table 3.4  
A Scale of Vividness of Mental Imagery Used in Experiment 1 
Task: When I was reading the text, the image of the presentation in my mind was: 
 
 Spatial presence 
 
To test the feeling of presence, the subscale of Self Location of the Spatial 
Presence Scale (Vorderer et al., 2004) was applied. It is a seven-item instrument 
aimed at assessing participants’ feeling of self-location in a virtual world. 
Participants had to rate their illusory self-location on a 7-point scale, ranging from 
(1) completely disagree to (7) completely agree. A subscale is presented in Table 3.5 
(see Annex E for a Portuguese version of a subscale). 
 
Table 3.5  
A Subscale of Spatial Presence Used in Experiment 1 
Task: When I was reading the text, I had a feeling that: 
 Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
I was in the middle of the action described in the text rather 
than just merely observing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was part of the environment described in the text 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was actually there in the environment of the presentation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The objects in the presentation surrounded me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My true location shifted in the environment of the 
presentation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was physically present in the environment of the 
presentation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I actually took part in the environment of the presentation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
Vivid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Vague 
Clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unclear 
Indistinct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Distinct 
Sharp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dull 
Intense 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Weak 
Lifelike 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Lifeless 
Fuzzy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unambiguous 
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3.3.1.2.2. Measures of “offline” discourse comprehension 
 
To measure “offline” explicit and implicit comprehension of discourse, the 
types of questions used in standardized reading assessments were created (see 
Alderson, 2000; Hughes, 2003, for discussion). Importantly, “offline” 
comprehension questions were preceded by 43 questions that referred to “online” and 
control reading measures, and thus were not answered immediately after reading the 
text. 
 
 Explicit comprehension 
 
To measure explicit comprehension, participants were asked to answer to 10 
open-ended questions about information explicitly given in the target text. All the 
questions used in the experiment are presented in Table 3.6 (see Annex F for a 
Portuguese version). A performance indicator was the mean number of correct 
answers.  
 
Table 3.6 
The Questions Used to Test Explicit Comprehension of Discourse in Experiment 1 
1. What is the gap in age between a man and a woman? 
2. For how many years has the man been using the Internet? 
3. What health problem does the man have? 
4. From what country do the man and the woman come from? 
5. What is the profession of the woman? 
6. Whom did the man send an email? 
7. What was the profession of the man? 
8. How did the couple meet? 
9. Why did the couple decide to go to Cairo? 
10. What time of the year was in the city when the couple decided to go to Cairo? 
 
 Implicit comprehension 
 
To measure implicit comprehension, participants were asked to rate on a 7-
point scale from (1) completely disagree to (7) completely agree their level of 
agreement with 15 statements based on implicit guessing. The answers to implicit 
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questions are not as easy as to explicit questions, considering that they require from 
participants to make reasoned judgments to assess the validity of statements (Person 
& Johnson, 1980). For example, according to the text, the man gives flowers to his 
wife every day, and thus it can easily be inferred that a statement such as “The 
couple is in a romantic relationship” is true. The scores were averaged, creating a 
mean score of participants’ comprehension performance in each condition. In short, 
the higher the mean score, the better the implicit comprehension of participants. The 
statements used to assess implicit comprehension are given in Table 3.7 (see Annex 
F for a Portuguese version). 
 
Table 3.7 
The Statements Used to Assess Implicit Comprehension of Discourse in Experiment 1 
 Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
1. The husband is happy in marriage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The wife is happy in marriage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The husband is currently unemployed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The couple lives in the city with a population of 
more than 50.000 people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. The relationship of the couple is romantic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. The weather in Cairo was windy when the man 
arrived 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. The temperature in Cairo was above 30 º C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. While going in the bus to the hotel, the man saw 
many historical sites 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. The man mistyped the email address of his wife 
because of poor eyesight 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. The wife of the man was married before 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. The man was seeking love online for more than a 
year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. It was difficult for parents of the bride to give 
agreement for marriage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. The husband is a humorous type of man 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. The husband is fond of history 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. The couple is enjoying their happiness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3.3.1.2.3. Control variables 
 
Studies in social cognition demonstrated that transient moods (or incidental 
moods) can have a deep impact on information processing and social evaluation. In 
particular, negative moods were shown to elicit central, systematic, and step-by-step 
information processing, whereas positive moods were shown to trigger heuristic, 
peripheral, and shallow information processing (Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-
Sorolla, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Schwarz, 1990, 2002). Transient moods 
were also shown to be misattributed and (mis)interpreted as a reaction to the social 
target and to produce social judgments that are congruent in valence with the mood 
(i.e., mood as information hypothesis; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1990). In order to 
rule out the possibility that the pen procedure could produce a transient mood state 
that could interfere with the manipulation of embodiment, the perceived attention 
grabbing and reading satisfaction were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) 
completely disagree to (7) completely agree. Additionally, the social evaluation of 
the protagonist was assessed with a 7-point semantic differential scale (see Tables 
3.8-3.10 for the items used; see Annex G for a Portuguese version). Because all of 
the scales had high reliabilities (Chronbach’s alpha for each measure is reported in 
the section “Results”), the mean was calculated for each of the control measures and 
the subsequent statistical analyses were performed on the mean scores of participants 
in the two conditions. 
 
Table 3.8 
 
The Items Used to Assess the Perceived Attention Grabbing in Experiment 1 
 
 Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
1. The text is holding attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The text is engrossing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The text is intriguing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Table 3.9 
 
The Items Used to Assess Reading Satisfaction in Experiment 1 
 
 Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
1. My level of satisfaction with the text is high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I found the reading process of the text enjoyable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Having finished reading the text, I felt as if I could 
not stop smiling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. In the future I would eagerly read another story of 
such type 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Table 3.10 
 
The Items Used to Assess Social Evaluation of the Protagonist in Experiment 1 
 
  
enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unenthusiastic 
playful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unplayful 
youthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 elderly 
joyful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sorrowful 
cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 depressed 
passionate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 passionless 
lucky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unfortunate 
energetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 lethargetic 
optimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pessimistic 
lively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 dull 
blissful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unhappy 
flattering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unflattering 
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3.3.1.3. Procedure 
 
Participants were contacted directly by the experimenter at university campus 
and were asked to participate in the experiment aimed at assessing reading 
comprehension. Everyone was informed about the confidentiality and anonymity of 
the data, and the possibility to quit the study at any time. Participants were tested 
individually in a quiet sound insulated room. They sat in a comfortable chair and 
were told that the experiment would consist of three parts: reading of the tutorial text 
on a computer, reading of the target text on a computer, and filling in of the paper-
based text-related questionnaire. 
For the first part of study all participants were instructed to read an 
emotionally neutral text from a laptop computer screen (Model HP G62; screen 
resolution – 1366×768) under the pretext of having a tutorial session for the 
computer-based part of experiment. Everyone was informed that each paragraph of 
the text would be displayed separately on a computer screen and that moving to the 
next paragraph would require pressing the “Space” key. Participants were also told 
that their reading performance would be timed, and that they should press the 
“Space” key as quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy (Fazio, 1990). 
Reading times were collected using Stimuli Presentation Software (Version 0.50). 
For the second part of study participants were instructed to read the target text 
describing emotionally positive events and were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental groups. Participants in the matching condition read the text with the 
pen sideways between their teeth (i.e., inducing smile). Participants in the control 
condition read the text naturally without any manipulation with a pen. Reading 
procedure was identical to that of the tutorial text. When participants finished reading 
the target text, they were told to remove a pen from the mouth and were instructed to 
fill in the text-related paper-based questionnaire. Finally, in post-experimental 
interview participants were asked what they thought about the pen manipulation 
procedure to remove the data from those who would answer in the affirmative. This 
interview was important for the study as social psychology literature (e.g., Laird, 
1974) suggests that participants who are aware of emotion manipulation tend to 
regulate their responses more effectively, and thus can bias the results. 
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3.3.2. Results  
 
3.3.2.1. Control variables 
To rule out the possibility that the pen procedure could elicit any specific 
information processing (i.e., heuristic or systematic processing) or any misattribution 
of mood, an independent-samples t-test was conducted on attention grabbing 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .81), reading satisfaction (Chronbach’s alpha = .87), and social 
evaluation of the main character (Chronbach’s alpha = .80) to assess the difference in 
scores between participants of matching and control conditions. The results revealed 
that participants in the matching condition (M = 4.24; SD = 1.34) did not differ 
significantly in their responses from participants in the control condition (M = 4.31; 
SD = 1.14) regarding the attention grabbing measure, t (38) = -0.19, p ˃.10. 
Similarly, participants in the matching condition (M = 5.01; SD = 1.05) did not differ 
significantly in their responses from participants in the control condition (M = 5.00; 
SD = 1.70) regarding the reading satisfaction measure, t (38) = 0.03, p ˃.10. Finally, 
there were no significant differences in responding between the participants of the 
matching condition (M = 4.10; SD = 1.05) and control condition (M = 4.42; SD = 
0.82) with regard to social evaluation of the main character, t (38) = -1.08, p ˃.10. 
Follow-up analyses showed that there was no significant effect of gender on target 
text reading time after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (1, 36) = 
0.54, p ˃ .05. Similarly, by classifying age into the three groups (18-29, 30-49, 50+), 
it was revealed that there was no significant effect of age on target text reading time 
after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (2, 36) = 0.07, p ˃ .05. 
Finally, a post-experimental interview confirmed that none of the participants was 
aware of emotion manipulation. 
 
3.3.2.2. “Online” comprehension measures 
 
Target text reading time. An 8 (Paragraphs 1 to 8) within factor x 2 
(condition: matching vs. control) between factor mixed ANOVA, with tutorial 
reading time as a covariate, was conducted to analyze the reading times of the target 
text. Because tutorial and target texts were identical in size, tutorial reading time was 
chosen as a covariate in order to control for individual differences in reading speed. 
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The results showed that tutorial reading time (reported in milliseconds) was 
significantly related to the participant’s target text reading time, F (1, 37) = 400.92, p 
< .001, partial 2 = .92. There was also a significant effect of pen condition on target 
text reading time after controlling for the effect of the tutorial reading time, F (1, 37) 
= 21.97, p < .001, partial 2 = .37. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the 
matching condition read the target text faster (M = 14974.39; SE = 288. 68) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 16888.64; SE = 288.68), t (37) = -4.69, p < 
.001, r = .61. 
Finally, using a Pillai’s trace, it was revealed that there was a significant 
effect of pen condition on the speed with which participants read paragraphs of text, 
F (8, 30) = 3.31, p = .008. Planned contrasts demonstrated that participants in the 
matching condition processed the target text significantly faster than participants in 
the control condition while reading the paragraphs one, two, three, five, six, and 
seven (see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.11). For the mean differences and exact p-values, 
see Table 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean reading times in milliseconds (estimated marginal means) for eight 
paragraphs of the target text according to condition (matching vs. control) in 
Experiment 1. Note: asterisks refer to significant pairwise comparisons (p ˂ .05). 
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Table 3.11 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to Condition with 
Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 1 
Note: Means sharing letter “a” within the same paragraph differ significantly at p < 
.05. 
 
Perceived ease of reading (Chronbach’s alpha = .92). On average, 
participants in the matching condition (M = 5.78; SD = 1.41) and control condition 
(M = 5.90; SD = 1.32) found the text equally easy to read, t (38) = -0.28, p > .05. 
Feelings of presence (Chronbach’s alpha = .86). On average, participants felt 
equally present in the matching condition (M = 3.63; SD = 1.15) and control 
condition (M = 3.15; SD = 1.35), t (38) = 1.23, p > .05. 
Vividness of mental imagery (Chronbach’s alpha = .83). On average, 
participants did not significantly differ in their answers in the matching condition (M 
= 4.41; SD = 1.12) and control condition (M = 4.33. SD = 0.74), t (38) = 0.26, p > 
.05. 
Para. Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
Matching 19408.81a 484.60 18426.93 20390.70 
Control 21411.99a 484.60 20430.10 22393.87 
2 
Matching 12943.96a 328.08 12279.22 13608.71 
Control 14279.07a 328.08 13614.33 14943.81 
3 
Matching 8311.61a 392.62 7516.09 9107.13 
Control 9893.72a 392.62 9098.20 10689.24 
4 
Matching 14150.93 398.91 13342.66 14959.21 
Control 15285.54 398.91 14477.26 16093.81 
5 
Matching 13499.24a 546.57 12391.78 14606.70 
Control 16515.10a 546.57 15407.63 17622.56 
6 
Matching 23021.76a 675.59 21652.88 24390.63 
Control 26091.40a 675.59 24722.53 27460.28 
7 
Matching 18376.76a 600.86 17159.30 19594.22 
Control 20896.81a 600.86 19679.35 22114.27 
8 
Matching 10082.08 400.65 9270.30 10893.87 
Control 10735.51 400.65 9923.72 11547.29 
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Table 3.12 
Pairwise Comparisons of Mean Reading Times in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text 
According to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
Para. (I) Condition (J) Condition Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Matching Control -2003.18 685.52 .006 -3392.16 -614.19 Control Matching 2003.18 685.52 .006 614.19 3392.16 
2 Matching Control -1335.1 464.10 .007 -2275.47 -394.76 Control Matching 1335.11 464.10 .007 394.76 2275.47 
3 Matching Control -1582.11 555.40 .007 -2707.46 -456.76 Control Matching 1582.11 555.40 .007 456.76 2707.46 
4 Matching Control -1134.60 564.31 .052 -2278.00 8.79 Control Matching 1134.60 564.31 .052 -8.79 2278.00 
5 Matching Control -3015.85 773.19 .000 -4582.48 -1449.23 Control Matching 3015.85 773.19 .000 1449.23 4582.48 
6 Matching Control -3069.65 955.70 .003 -5006.07 -1133.22 Control Matching 3069.65 955.70 .003 1133.22 5006.07 
7 Matching Control -2520.05 849.98 .005 -4242.28 -797.82 Control Matching 2520.05 849.98 .005 797.82 4242.28 
8 Matching Control -653.43 566.76 .256 -1801.79 494.94 Control Matching 653.43 566.76 .256 -494.94 1801.79 
121 
 
3.3.2.3. “Offline” comprehension measures 
 
Explicit comprehension. An independent-samples t-test on the number of 
correct answers to open questions indicated that participants’ performance was not 
significantly different in the matching (M = 3.88; SD = 1.41) and control (M = 4.82; 
SD = 1.60) conditions, t (31) = -1.81, p > .05.  
 
Implicit comprehension (Cronbach's alpha = .75). On average, participants 
did not differ significantly in their answers to 15 implicit questions in the matching 
(M = 5.32; SD = 0.80) and control (M = 5.41; SD = 0.86) conditions, t (38) = - 0.36, 
p > .05.  
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
 
The present experiment assessed whether getting bodily systems into a 
congruent emotional state would facilitate “online” and “offline” understanding of 
discourse. The results showed that participants in the matching condition showed 
faster reading times relative to participants who performed the task in the control 
condition. This finding is consistent with previous studies on sentence 
comprehension that demonstrated better “online” processing of sentences when 
emotional state matched sentence valence (e.g., Glenberg et al., 2005; Havas et al., 
2007). It is important to note that the increased reading speeds in the matching 
condition were not accompanied by poorer comprehension in “offline” 
comprehension measures, and thus cannot be attributed to a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
At the same time, participants in both conditions showed equal performance on 
measures of “online” processing that involved the participants’ metacognitive 
judgments on their own comprehension processes (i.e., perceived ease of reading, 
vividness of mental imagery, spatial presence) and measures of “offline” discourse 
processing. Thus, it can be concluded that emotion simulation had an impact on 
“online”, but not “offline” discourse comprehension. 
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3.4. Experiment 2 
 
A strong embodiment stance suggests that if emotional bodily states are 
incongruent with emotional valence of the text, then these states should interfere with 
language processing (e.g., Glenberg et al., 2005). Experiment 2 was designed to test 
this prediction. More specifically, it assessed whether an incongruent emotional 
bodily state would impair “online” and “offline” discourse processing. 
 
3.4.1. Method 
 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
 
A total of 40 Portuguese citizens (Mage = 26.20, SDage = 7.43) participated in 
the experiment: 17 participants were male (Mage = 27.65; SDage = 9.73), 21 were 
female (Mage = 25.14; SDage = 5.11), two participants did not indicate gender. 
Everyone who took part in the study received a copybook in exchange for 
participation. 
 
3.4.1.2. Design and Materials 
 
Design and materials were strictly identical to those for Experiment 1. 
 
3.4.1.3. Procedure 
 
The procedure was identical to that for Experiment 1, with the exception that 
participants read the target text in either control (no manipulation with a pen) or 
mismatching (with the pen straight between the lips to facilitate muscular activation 
of frown) condition.  
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3.4.2. Results 
 
3.4.2.1. Control variables 
 
To rule out the possibility that the pen procedure could elicit any specific 
information processing (i.e., heuristic or systematic processing) or any misattribution 
of mood, an independent-samples t-test was conducted on attention grabbing 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .60), reading satisfaction (Chronbach’s alpha = .85) and social 
evaluation of the main character (Chronbach’s alpha = .79) to assess the difference in 
scores between the participants of control and mismatching conditions. The results 
revealed that participants in the control condition (M = 4.25; SD = 1.12) did not 
differ significantly in their responses from participants in the mismatching condition 
(M = 4.47; SD = 1.17) regarding the attention grabbing measure, t (38) = -0.60, p 
˃.10. Similarly, participants in the control condition (M = 5.13; SD = 1.51) did not 
differ significantly in their responses from participants in the mismatching condition 
(M = 4.47; SD = 1.17) regarding the reading satisfaction measure, t (38) = 0.84, p 
˃.10. Finally, there were no significant differences in responding between the 
participants of the control condition (M = 4.32; SD = 0.72) and mismatching 
condition (M = 4.34; SD = 1.09) with regard to social evaluation of the main 
character, t (38) = -0.07, p ˃.10. Follow-up analyses showed that there was no 
significant effect of gender on target text reading time after controlling for the effect 
of tutorial reading time, F (1, 35) = 0.09, p ˃ .05. Similarly, by classifying age into 
the three groups (18-29, 30-49, 50+) it was revealed that there wasn’t a significant 
effect of age on target text reading time after the controlling for the effect of tutorial 
reading time, F (2, 36) = 0.21, p ˃ .05. Finally, a post-experimental interview 
confirmed that none of the participants was aware of emotion manipulation.  
 
3.4.2.2. “Online” comprehension measures 
 
Target text reading time. An 8 (Paragraphs 1 to 8) within factor x 2 
(condition: control vs. mismatching) between factor mixed ANOVA, with tutorial 
reading time as a covariate, was conducted to analyze the reading times of the target 
text. The results showed that the covariate, tutorial reading time, was significantly 
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related to the participant’s target text reading time, F (1, 37) = 261.47, p < .001, 
partial 2 = .86. However, there was no effect of pen condition on target text reading 
time after controlling for the effect of the tutorial reading time, F (1, 37) = 0.34, p ˃ 
.05. Considering that the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is not significant, 
and therefore does not protect against inflated Type I error rates in subsequent 
analyses of data, planned contrasts are not reported (see Howell, 2006, for further 
discussion). Estimated marginal reading time means of participants from both 
conditions are provided in Table 3.13. 
 
Table 3.13 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for the Target Text According to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading 
Time as a Covariate in Experiment 2 
 
Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Mismatching 19001.67 464.79 18059.93 19943.42 
Control 18607.71 464.79 17665.97 19549.46 
 
 
Finally, using Pillai’s trace, it was revealed that there was no significant 
effect of pen condition on the speed with which participants read paragraphs of text, 
F (8, 30) = 1.21, p ˃ .05. Considering that the multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) is not significant, and therefore does not protect against inflated Type I 
error rates in follow-up a-priori comparisons, planned contrasts are not reported (see 
Bock, 1975, for further discussion). At the same time, a non-significant MANOVA 
does not allow to fully understand how comprehension proceeded throughout the 
text. Furthermore, it can be argued that a non-significant MANOVA may ignore 
nearly significant differences (for some of the dependant variables) which are 
theoretically interesting for the present research. To resolve this issue, MANOVA 
was followed with separate ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables. To control 
for the inflation of familywise error rate by conducting more tests on the same data, a 
Bonferroni correction was applied to the subsequent ANOVAs (see Harris, 1975, for 
further discussion). The results of univariate test statistics, however, revealed that 
participants did not significantly differ, nor approached significance in their reading 
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of each of the paragraphs of the target text (see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.14). For the 
mean differences and exact p-values, see Table 3.15. 
Perceived ease of reading (Cronbach's alpha = .94). On average, participants 
in the control condition found the text significantly easier to read (M = 5.78; SD = 
1.38) than participants in the mismatching condition (M = 4.05; SD = 2.20), t (38) = 
2.97, p ˂.001, r = .43. 
Feelings of presence (Cronbach's alpha = .97). On average, participants felt 
equally present in the control condition (M = 3.24; SD = 1.24) and mismatching 
condition (M = 3.88; SD = 1.53), t (38) = - 1.41, p > .05. 
Vividness of mental imagery (Cronbach's alpha = .80). On average, 
participants did not significantly differ in their answers in the control condition (M = 
4.24; SD = 0.63) and mismatching condition (M = 4.20; SD = 1.10), t (38) = 0.15, p > 
.05. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean reading times in milliseconds (estimated marginal means) for eight 
paragraphs of the target text according to condition (mismatching vs. control) in 
Experiment 2 
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Table 3.14 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to Condition with 
Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 2 
 
Para. Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Mismatching 23805.86 715.04 22357.06 25254.67 
Control 23469.12 715.04 22020.32 24917.94 
2 Mismatching 16851.09 643.92 15546.39 18155.78 
Control 15557.18 643.92 14252.49 16861.88 
3 Mismatching 11768.26 522.93 10708.71 12827.81 
Control 10707.17 522.93 9647.62 11766.71 
4 Mismatching 17431.98 577.12 16262.61 18601.35 
Control 16961.51 577.12 15792.15 18130.88 
5 Mismatching 18285.10 766.96 16731.08 19839.11 
Control 18338.45 766.96 16784.44 19892.47 
6 Mismatching 31548.36 1255.44 29004.59 34092.12 
Control 29026.20 1255.44 26482.43 31569.97 
7 Mismatching 21122.61 838.04 19424.58 22820.63 
Control 23082.11 838.04 21384.09 24780.13 
8 Mismatching 11200.13 568.47 10048.31 12351.95 
Control 11719.10 568.47 10568.14 12871.78 
Note: no significant differences in reading speed were found between the participants 
of mismatching and control conditions for all eight paragraphs of the target text 
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Table 3.15 
Pairwise Comparisons of Mean Reading Times in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text 
According to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 2 
 
  
 
Para. (I) Condition (J) Condition Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Mismatching Control 336.74 1033.38 .746 -1757.09 2430.57 
Control Mismatching -336.74 1033.38 .746 -2430.57 1757.09 
2 Mismatching Control 1293.91 930.59 .173 -591.65 3179.46 
Control Mismatching -1293.91 930.59 .173 -3179.46 591.65 
3 Mismatching Control 1061.09 755.74 .169 -470.17 2592.36 
Control Mismatching -1061.09 755.74 .169 -2592.36 470.17 
4 Mismatching Control 470.47 834.07 .576 -1219.51 2160.45 
Control Mismatching -470.47 834.07 .576 -2160.45 1219.51 
5 Mismatching Control -53.35 1108.42 .962 -2299.23 2192.52 
Control Mismatching 53.35 1108.42 .962 -2192.52 2299.23 
6 Mismatching Control 2522.16 1814.38 .173 -1154.12 6198.44 
Control Mismatching -2522.16 1814.38 .173 -6198.44 1154.12 
7 Mismatching Control -1959.51 1211.14 .114 -4413.50 494.49 
Control Mismatching 1959.51 1211.14 .114 -494.49 4413.50 
8 Mismatching Control -519.83 821.55 .531 -2184.45 1144.79 
Control Mismatching 519.83 821.55 .531 -1144.79 2184.45 
Note: Letter “a” refers to an adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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3.4.2.3. “Offline” comprehension measures 
 
Explicit comprehension. An independent-samples t-test on the number of 
correct answers to open questions indicated that participants’ performance was not 
significantly different in the control (M = 4.82; SD = 1.59) and mismatching (M = 
4.68; SD = 2.34) conditions, t (34) = 0.21, p > .05.  
Implicit comprehension. On average, participants did not significantly differ 
in their answers in the control (M = 5.40; SD = 0.89) and mismatching (M = 4.95; SD 
= 0.83) conditions, t (37.82) = 1.64, p > .05. 
 
3.4.3. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to assess whether incongruent emotional bodily 
states impair “online” and “offline” discourse processing. It was found that 
participants in the mismatching condition did not differ in their “online” and 
“offline” comprehension performance from the participants in the control condition. 
At the same time, in line with a strong embodiment claim, participants in the 
mismatching condition found the text more difficult to read than participants in the 
control condition, suggesting that it may still be premature to conclusively state that 
the interference of processing does not occur when the suggested mood of the text is 
incongruent with the mood induced by the pen manipulation. 
 
3.5. General discussion 
 
The present research was designed to test two major hypotheses derived from 
an embodied simulation account of language comprehension. Experiment 1 assessed 
the hypothesis whether congruent emotional states might potentially facilitate 
“online” and “offline” discourse comprehension. Experiment 2 assessed the 
hypothesis whether incongruent emotional states might potentially impair “online” 
and “offline” discourse comprehension. 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that manipulation of emotional bodily 
state through facial posture had an impact on “online” discourse comprehension. 
More specifically, the results revealed that participants whose bodily systems were 
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prepared for processing of congruent emotions (matching condition) read the target 
text faster than participants whose bodily systems were not prepared for processing 
of emotion-congruent information (control condition). The facilitation effect also 
appeared to be enduring, considering that participants in the matching condition read 
the target text significantly faster than participants in the control condition while 
reading paragraphs one, two, three, five, six, and seven. The reported findings are 
consistent with prior studies on sentence processing that demonstrated better 
“online” comprehension for sentences when pen condition matched sentence valence 
(e.g., Havas et al., 2007) and support the idea that embodiment also facilitates 
“online” comprehension at higher levels than sentences. 
The findings reported in Experiment 1 also showed that the effect of emotion 
manipulation on “online” processing was not uniform across paragraphs, given that 
congruency effects disappeared at the end of text reading. There are at least two (not 
necessarily mutually exclusive) possible interpretations for why this happened. First 
explanation is consistent with LASS Theory of conceptual processing (Barsalou et 
al., 2008) suggesting that different mixtures of the language and simulation systems 
might have underlied the comprehension task. Put different, it is possible that 
superficial linguistic processing was sufficient to support comprehension of certain 
events, and thus minimal grounding was required. Alternatively, participants’ 
performance could rely heavily on both language and simulation systems, and thus 
no reading time differences were detected. Another explanation is that participants’ 
musculature fatigued by the end of text reading, as a result of which pen 
manipulation procedure became unpleasant and interfered with comprehension of 
text for both matching and mismatching conditions (see Glenberg et al., 2005, for a 
discussion of the related data including a factor of experiment half).  
The results of Experiment 2 showed that the interference of discourse 
processing did not occur when the suggested mood of the text was incongruent with 
an emotional state induced by the pen manipulation. Such a conclusion is reached, 
given that that the findings of Experiment 2 do not show significant reading time 
differences between control and mismatching conditions. However, two issues call 
for caution. The first issue concerns the fact that participants in the mismatching 
condition found the text more difficult to read than participants in the control 
condition. The second issue is that the mean reading times for paragraphs one to six 
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in the control condition fell in between the mean reading times for the matching and 
mismatching conditions when two experiments are considered together (see Table 
3.5 and Table 3.7, for reading times means). Furthermore, greater differences in 
reading speed between matching and mismatching conditions relative to matching 
and control conditions demonstrate a trend that is consistent with an embodied 
scenario. Therefore, further research is needed before final conclusions can be 
reached with respect to interference of discourse processing for the mismatching 
condition. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that previous literature suggested that 
simulation affects both perception and imagery in conceptual processing (Barsalou et 
al., 1999), the results of the present study demonstrated that participants whose 
bodily systems were prepared for processing of congruent emotions (matching 
condition) did not significantly differ on the level of vividness of mental imagery and 
feeling of presence from participants in the control condition (Experiment 1). 
Similarly, no differences in responding on the above-mentioned scales were detected 
in Experiment 2 where control and mismatching groups were compared. There are at 
least two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) interpretations of the observed non-
significance. First, target items of the questionnaire used in the present study 
assessed imagery effects in comprehension of text in general not taking into account 
the fact that mental imagery could proceed as a spontaneous and climatic process in 
reading (see Long, Winograd, & Bridge, 1989, for discussion). Thus, in assessing 
mental imagery of large language segments such as discourse it might be more valid 
to ask questions testing vividness of mental imagery for specific events from text and 
the whole text. Second interpretation is in line with the most recent research on 
embodied language processing suggesting that participants differ on mental imagery 
only when performing the tasks typical of specific deeper cognitive processing 
(processing of visual or spatial information) than is usually needed in default 
language comprehension (see Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 
2010, for discussion). Because the target text of the present study did not promote 
any cues typical of specific deep cognitive processing, it might be reasonable that no 
significant effects were obtained for this measure.  
 Finally, in both experiments no differences were detected between the two 
groups for “offline” comprehension performance. There are two alternative 
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explanations of null effects. First straightforward interpretation is in line with work 
of Louwerse (2007) suggesting that deep comprehension does not necessarily require 
simulations. That is, embodied emotion representations may not serve to build a 
long-term memory representation of the events in discourse. Another explanation 
centers on the measures used in the present research. It is possible that such 
standardized reading assessments as open-ended questions used in the present self-
report paper and pencil questionnaire were too demanding for participants, and thus 
should rather be substituted by other measure. 
The study demonstrated a positive effect of congruent emotional states on 
discourse comprehension. At the same time, the observed results might be interpreted 
in a different way.  For instance, Bower's (1981) theory regarding emotion-cognition 
interactions makes a similar prediction about comprehension of language. In 
particular, this theory suggests that emotions are implicated in cognition through the 
activation of associated nodes that represent words referring to them (e.g., happy 
node with the words “smile”, “pleasant”, “positive”, etc.). Because these nodes get 
activated in the initial stage of comprehension, the corresponding words are 
processed easier throughout the text leading to faster overall reading rate. Under this 
account, bodily states affect cognition by activating associated nodes, but language 
comprehension comes from the manipulation of abstract arbitrary symbols. In 
contrast, simulation theory states that language comprehension is directly grounded 
in bodily states and does not depend on manipulation of abstract arbitrary symbols. 
This difference in interpretation between amodal and embodied approaches was 
investigated by proponents of simulation account of cognition. For example, Havas 
et al. (2007) used an experimental procedure in their study to rule out the possibility 
that the interaction effect between  manipulation of facial posture and sentence 
comprehension was accommodated by Bower’s affect priming theory (1981, 1991). 
More precisely, experimenters constructed pairs of words with two types of prime 
words (neutral or associated) in order to use the pen manipulation procedure in a 
lexical decision task. They hypothesized that if amodal explanation of obtained 
results was correct, then lexical decision would be faster for words preceded by 
associated primes rather than neutral primes. However, results of the experiment 
showed no significant effect of the pen manipulation procedure on the speed of 
responding in a lexical decision task. In brief, although we cannot fully rule out 
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Bower’s explanation of observed effects in our study, we have good reasons to think 
that emotion simulation was at least partially implicated in comprehension of 
discourse, given that the pen manipulation procedure we used was identical to that 
applied in the study of Havas et al. (2007). 
Another alternative explanation of present results is provided by 
subvocalization process (Daneman & Newson, 1992), which makes similar 
predictions as those proposed in present research with regards to “pen between the 
teeth condition”. The subvocalization is an activation of the phonology when reading 
silently, and thus it could be argued that opening the mouth during reading (matching 
condition) might facilitate a phonological activation of the written text, resulting in 
faster reading. This prediction is supported by work of Hardyck and Petrinovich 
(1970) who showed that larynx muscles are activated during silent reading and that 
sub-vocal speech helps comprehension. While such an explanation is theoretically 
possible, it is highly likely, however, that this is not the case because of the following 
reason. The subvocalization process would predict that reading of negatively 
valenced material would be faster in the “pen in the teeth” condition (mouth open) 
than in the “pen in the lips” condition (mouth closed). However, Havas et al. (2007) 
reported just the opposite using sentence stimuli. More concretely, the reading times 
for sentences describing unpleasant situations were faster while participants were in 
the “pen in the lips” condition than in the “pen in the teeth” condition. Conversely, 
the reading times for sentences describing pleasant situations were faster while 
participants were in the “pen in the teeth” condition than in the “pen in the lips” 
condition. Moreover, Havas et al. (2010) showed that involuntary movements of 
facial muscles responsible for frowning are used in simulation of unpleasant events. 
To conclude, the aim of the present research was to investigate whether 
simulation of positive emotions is implicated in “online” and “offline” discourse 
comprehension. The results demonstrated that emotional bodily states facilitate 
“online”, but not “offline” discourse comprehension. The reported findings 
contribute to a better understanding of how embodiment and language processing are 
interconnected and extend the previous literature by focusing on a more global 
discourse level. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Discourse Comprehension and Simulation of Spatial Dimension 
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Abstract 
 
Thus far, the previous two experiments provided evidence that emotion simulation is 
involved in comprehension of discourse that explicitly conveys emotional 
information. However, a number of studies from the domain of perception suggested 
that embodied representations get activated even when individuals process sentences 
that implicitly convey information relevant to comprehension. Therefore, the two 
major goals of the present study were to demonstrate that people mentally represent 
the perceptual information implied by a discourse description and that perceptual 
simulation facilitates both “online” and “offline” discourse processing. In the 
experiment reported in this chapter the effect of implied left spatial dimension on 
target text reading time and “offline” comprehension performance was investigated. 
Participants read a target text on a computer that implicitly suggested a left spatial 
dimension of an entity or a person in certain events while their body was turned 90 
degrees to the right (matching condition) or 90 degrees to the left (mismatching 
condition). Additionally, a control condition was included in which participants read 
the text on a computer without a manipulation of body direction. Discourse 
processing was measured by “online” (self-paced reading times, vividness of mental 
imagery, and spatial presence) and “offline” (sequence of events) comprehension 
measures. The major result was that participants in the matching condition reported 
higher degree of experienced mental imagery for entities or persons located in the 
left spatial dimension relative to participants in the control and mismatching 
conditions, but only when those (entities or events) directed the comprehenders’ 
attention to interaction between two people. No effects were found in other measures. 
This suggests that people simulate, at least partially, the spatial characteristics of 
different scenes involving objects or persons, but the effect of simulation processes 
on comprehension of discourse that implicitly conveys perceptual information, such 
as spatial dimension, is fragile and quite specific. 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
In the experiments 1 and 2 it was demonstrated that people construct an 
emotion simulation of the described event during comprehension of discourse that 
explicitly conveys emotionally positive information. However, according to 
Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) theory of Barsalou (1999a), simulations not only 
capture explicit information connoted by the language, but as well implicit 
information that goes beyond words mentioned in the text. More specifically, 
Barsalou’s (1999a) theory rejects an assumption that there is an arbitrary relationship 
between a symbol and a referent in the physical world, but suggests instead that the 
relationship between a symbol and its referent is analogous. That is, if an individual 
reads a sentence “Mike angrily put a laptop in his backpack”, then, apart from 
including explicit properties and affective sensations described by a sentence (e.g., 
laptop, backpack, angry state), the simulation of this sentence also includes an 
implicit property such as size (i.e., a laptop in the bag is closed, and thus is different 
in size from an opened laptop on a table). Thus, understanding this sentence requires 
from an individual to actually experience closing a laptop and putting it in a 
backpack. It is worth noting in this context that while embodied theories are capable 
of explaining how such inferential information as size is understood by the people, 
amodal theories are insufficient to account for such an implicit meaning (see 
Stanfield & Zwaan, 2002, for further discussion).  
Barsalou’s (1999a) theory has found convincing support in the area of 
sentence processing. For instance, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) made a hypothesis 
that if the relationship between a symbol and a referent is analogous and if any 
changes in the physical referent cause identical changes in the perceptual symbols 
that form a simulation, then changing the details of a simulation should affect a 
subsequent interpretation of the referent. Remarkably, this is just what the 
researchers found. More precisely, response times for a sentence such as “John put 
the pencil in the cup” were faster when the implied orientation (vertical in this case) 
matched the orientation of a pencil depicted in the picture. The reverse was found 
when the picture orientation mismatched that implied by the sentence. In recent 
years, research on how various implied features are employed by the comprehenders 
during sentence processing has burgeoned. As extensively reviewed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, there is now compelling evidence that people also mentally represent such 
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implied visuospatial properties as shape (Zwaan et al., 2002), motion (Zwaan et al., 
2004), visibility (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007), and perspective (Borghi et al., 2004).  
The current study was designed to extend the aforementioned research in two 
ways. First, it investigated whether language comprehension invokes information 
about the implied spatial dimension. Second, whereas most previous studies used 
sentence stimuli to test a hypothesis that implied perceptual features are implicated in 
language processing, the current study used extended linguistic events (texts). 
 
4.2. Experiment 3 
 
4.2.1. Hypotheses and study overview 
 
The current study tested whether the direction of literal body posture 
consistent with the position in space of a person or an entity implied by a discourse 
description facilitates “online” (hypothesis one) and “offline” (hypothesis two) 
language processing. Consider, for instance, a sentence “John stops the car and goes 
out to buy a sandwich”. According to PSS theory (Barsalou, 1999a), comprehension 
of a sentence like this involves the simulation that includes a left spatial dimension 
for the character, just as if one were to actually apply the brakes on a driver’s seat, 
open the door adjacent to a driver’s seat (on the left side) and leave a car through that 
door. This is so because to simulate applying the brakes and leaving the car, one 
must simulate a left location of the driver in the car (at least this is the case in 
countries where you drive on the right). In other words, reading about a driver 
walking out of a car should yield a mental representation identical to one that is 
evoked when one actually sees a driver walking out of a car. Thus, if language 
processing involves the activation of information describing the spatial dimension, 
then compatibility between a literal direction of a person’s body and the spatial 
dimension in which a person or entity is located implied by a verbal description 
should lead to facilitation of discourse comprehension. Therefore, with regards to 
“online” processing, it was expected that participants should be faster to read a text 
describing persons or entities located in a left spatial dimension when the direction of 
their body posture is consistent with the location of a person or an entity connoted by 
a sentence. With regard to “offline” processing, it was expected that the details of 
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spatial dimension simulation will be retained after reading is completed, and thus 
will influence the recall of information. 
To test these hypotheses, participants were first asked to read a neutral text 
about protagonist’s life on a Faial Portuguese Island of the Azores. Reading times 
were collected and served as a study baseline for the rest of the experiment to control 
for individual differences in reading speed. Second, participants were timed on how 
much time they spent reading the target text that described a man driving a car while 
thinking about a woman he used to love. Importantly, the text included descriptions 
of implied left locations in each paragraph of the text.  
Participants in the matching condition read the text on a computer while their 
body was turned 90 degrees to the right. Participants in the mismatching condition 
read the text on a computer while their body was turned 90 degrees to the left. 
Participants in the neutral (control) condition read the text normally without a 
manipulation of direction of body posture. Pictorial information on how participants 
read the text is given in Figure 4.1.  
After reading the target text, all participants were asked to fill in a paper-
based questionnaire that assessed their general mental imagery, mental imagery 
regarding specific events from text, spatial presence, and “offline” comprehension of 
the events described in the target text. In the end of the experiment participants were 
interviewed what they thought about manipulation with the body posture. 
 
Figure 4.1. Different ways in which the direction of body posture was manipulated in 
Experiment 3. From left to right, the author demonstrates how participants read the 
text while their body was turned 90 degrees to the right (matching condition), 90 
degrees to the left (mismatching condition), and when participants read the text 
naturally (neutral control condition) 
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4.2.2. Method 
 
4.2.2.1. Participants 
 
A total of 63 (60 right-handed and 3 left-handed), native Portuguese-speaking 
participants (Mage = 23.73, SDage = 7.45) from psychology and sociology classes at 
University of Algarve volunteered to participate in the experiment. 19 participants 
were male (Mage = 25.72; SDage = 9.37), 44 were female (Mage = 22.91; SDage = 6.46).  
 
4.2.2.2. Design and materials 
The experiment was a single factor between-participants design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the three aforementioned body direction 
conditions: body turned 90 degrees to the right (matching condition), body turned 90 
degrees to the left (mismatching condition) and body not turned either to the left or 
right (neutral condition).  
Materials consisted of two texts (tutorial and target) and a questionnaire. 
Tutorial text was emotionally neutral and target text, among other events, included a 
description of scenes in which entities or persons were located in the left spatial 
dimension. For example, implied left movements associated with a left spatial 
dimension included a description about the driver leaving a car, driving a car, etc. 
Implied left locations associated with a left spatial dimension included a heart, a 
wedding ring, etc. Thus, the left spatial dimension was only implied by the text and 
not named directly. Both texts were constructed to have seven paragraphs of exactly 
the same size. That is, the size of paragraphs in the tutorial text matched the size of 
paragraphs in the target text (e.g., paragraph one in both texts had 450 characters 
including spaces). Importantly, each paragraph of the target text described at least 
one implied left location or movement associated with a target location. Approximate 
English translation of the complete versions of tutorial and target text is given in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, respectively. Portuguese original versions of tutorial and 
target texts are given in Annex H and Annex I, respectively.  
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Table 4.1 
Approximate English Translation of the Tutorial Text Used in Experiment 3 
 
1 
It was almost summer. To be more precise, it was the end of May. I didn’t 
even have to go there. I was only supposed to go to Faial to present my book. 
However, something strange happened at the market in Lisbon. While I was 
giving autographs to fans, I noticed a girl who was looking at me. Suddenly, 
she approached me and said, “I’d like to use an opportunity before you begin 
the presentation. My name is Silvia”. 
2 
We start walking together. We made a deal that we would not go by the end 
of the road, but stop in the middle of the road and sit on the lava rock nearby, 
whose shape reminds visitors of human body. Everyone can choose his own 
lava rock. Here the wind is not very strong as well as the noise of the sea. 
Sometimes the noise of the wind absorbs the noise of the sea, as a result of 
which you can see the sea, but cannot hear it. The wind and the sun are 
similar to flames of fire. 
3 
At night the weather gets slightly fresher. The earth, however, is still warm 
and is emitting lots of heat. If you step on it, you can feel how the warmth is 
reaching your knees making you feel as if you were in the middle of a 
bonfire. There is more sun on Arcos highway than in any other place, it starts 
burning your body only after making a few steps. And everything is 
trembling, including the body. It’s a never-ending heat.  
4 
In the distance one can see the first lights of Madalena. Just a few lights, the 
first illumination of the principal village. The bar on the square is still opened 
as well as the restaurant with no one inside. At this season of the year, one 
can meet a few tourists, fortunately, only a few tourists. 
5 
I sound as if I have never been a tourist. I am leaving, so why should I bother 
who comes here? An old habit wanting to know everything, even when far 
away. Wherever I go I wonder if locals do the same as tourists like to do. I 
really think that they don’t, that there are two different and parallel lives: one 
of the tourist and the other of the local. 
6 
The day is starting to get heavy and I start getting tired. I have no idea what 
made me come here. Memories…There is nothing better than a memory of 
failed love, one can think of many different scenarios, creating an impression 
that everything is only ahead. Who knows what would have come out of 
failed love of it suddenly became a true love. 
7 
Features of present life. You add them when you cannot remember the 
memory. They change it to the extent that you end up remembering 
something different, something shaped by your life. Memories, memories, 
memories… 
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Table 4.2 
Approximate English Translation of the Target Text Used in Experiment 3 
1 
He looks at his wristwatch, it is 21.00. He leaves her behind with the pain he 
was forced to accept. The rush of freedom quickens his heart rate, feeds his 
wildest dreams of living a normal life. The thirty-four years of his entire 
existence, the existence that led up to this moment, will never be remembered 
again. He cannot rewind time back on his wristwatch to bring his wife back.  
2 
The heart, already torn into pieces, makes the blood flow with an incredible 
speed all over his body as he watches other cars passing by his car window. 
His deep blue eyes in the darkness of the moment are full of sorrow and 
tears. His whole body seems to be numb as if the discharged battery. But he 
knows he has to forget. If running long and hard erases the past, then he will 
succeed.  
3 
While driving his car, he is dreaming her. He is dreaming of the time they got 
married and exchanged wedding rings; he is dreaming of the time he was 
teaching her how to mount a horse; he is dreaming of the time he was 
unlocking the door of the house after a hard day and she was there, waiting 
for her man. Finally, he is dreaming of the smell of her skin, of the smell of 
her perfume, of the smell of her presence… Now it is all gone. The world 
seems to be grey, cold, and meaningless. 
4 
The horrible roar of the motor of the car makes it fly with an incredible 
speed, outrunning car after car. But soon he understands that in his desire to 
escape from the world he fails. He stops the car and turns back in his seat to 
see if he escaped from her, from the past, from himself… 
5 
He stares out of the window, shuddered at the night that obstructed his view. 
“Where am I?” he asks. But there is no one to answer; there is no one who 
can help him overcome the pain that is coming deep from the bottom of his 
broken heart. Pulling up all the strength, he takes the deep breath and goes 
out of the car. Already the air feels icy, and he can sense the chill of night 
approach. The sky grows with clouds; the wind is blowing into his face.  
6 
He takes out a cigarette from the pocket of his shirt and smokes. After the 
fatigue of hunger, the violent shaking, the overflowing humidity, the smell of 
the cigarette is the only consolation for him out there in the middle of 
nowhere. Suddenly, the rain comes down in hard sheets of water, and he 
understands he is absolutely miserable in this big world.  
7 
He wished he was dreaming. But it is not a dream. Despite the adrenalin 
pulsing through his heart, the fatigue, the bitter cold and lack of food, he still 
feels her presence. She is still there with him on the wedding ring of his 
hand, symbolically declaring her eternal love for him…  
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4.2.2.2.1. Measures of “online” discourse comprehension 
 
Collection of reading times. Reading times were collected for whole 
paragraphs as readers normally read the text. 
Completion of questionnaire. Participants were asked to fill in the 
questionnaire that measured their vividness of mental imagery and feeling of spatial 
presence. Additionally, three more measures testing for the vividness of imagery 
were included to build stronger theoretical conclusions. Recall that in the previous 
two experiments the scale of vividness of mental imagery of Marks (1973) did not 
reveal any significant differences in responding among the participants of matching, 
mismatching, and control conditions. However, it was hypothesized (see “General 
Discussion” section of Chapter 3) that no differences could be detected due to the 
fact that the scale of mental imagery of Marks (1973) is designed to test imagery 
effects in comprehension of text in general, thus not allowing to check how mental 
imagery unfolds as a climatic and spontaneous process in reading (see Long et al., 
1989, for discussion). Therefore, to address this ambiguity, participants’ mental 
imagery was assessed with seven additional items that tested their mental imagery 
with regard to specific events from the target text that contained a description of 
implied left locations or movements associated with a left spatial dimension. 
One issue is important in this context. Many embodied theories (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999a, Zwaan, 2004) have argued that simulation consists of many 
components of different experiences, such as, for instance, possible actions, 
visuospatial properties, background situations, interactions among people, 
interoceptive sensations, etc. Thus, these theories predict that a perceptual 
representation, for instance, for a “heart” would be created from a different series of 
perceptual symbols for different components of the referent (e.g., shape, size, spatial 
dimension). Similarly, a perceptual symbol, for instance, for a “driver” would be also 
created from a different series of perceptual symbols for different components of the 
referent (e.g., location, size, shape, action, spatial dimension). That is, an implied left 
spatial dimension for such target variables of this research as “heart” and “wedding 
ring” is the only perceptual symbol that these variables have in common. This 
suggests that a reported degree of experienced mental imagery for these variables 
may vary, considering that they include other perceptual symbols that may 
significantly alter the construction of an overall simulation for the concept. Clearly, it 
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is theoretically impossible to find concepts that share all perceptual symbols for 
different components of the referent implying the same spatial dimension. However, 
it is possible to classify such variables according to certain unified principles. For 
instance, a concept “heart” in the sentence “I could imagine a sound of a heart 
beating” is similar to a concept “wedding ring” in the sentence “I could imagine a 
wedding ring in his hand” in that they both describe a static left location of a concept 
(i.e., a heart is located near the center of the chest; a wedding ring is on the fourth 
finger of the left hand). Similarly, a concept “wedding ring” in the sentence “I could 
imagine how the couple exchanged wedding rings” is similar to a concept “mount a 
horse” in the sentence “I could imagine how a man taught a woman how to mount a 
horse” in that they both describe an interaction between two people in space and 
share a relevant spatial dimension of a person or entity (i.e., location on the left side). 
Therefore, to at least partially resolve this ambiguity, the items of the questionnaire 
were classified into three groups: items describing static locations in the left spatial 
space, items describing movements that involve one person in the left spatial space, 
and items describing movements that involve two persons in the left spatial space. 
 
 Vividness of mental imagery 
 
To test the vividness of mental imagery VVIQ Scale of Marks (1973) was 
adapted and participants were asked to rate their tendency to mental imagery while 
reading the target text on a 7-point semantic differential scale: vivid-vague, clear-
unclear, indistinct-distinct, sharp-dull, intense-weak, lifelike-lifeless, fuzzy-
unambiguous. The scale is presented in Table 3.4 of the previous chapter (p. 111). 
 
  Spatial presence 
 
To test the feeling of presence, the subscale of Self Location of the Spatial 
Presence Scale (Vorderer et al., 2004) was applied. It is a seven-item instrument 
aimed at assessing participants’ feeling of self-location in a virtual world. 
Participants had to rate their illusory self-location (e.g., “I felt like I was part of the 
environment in the presentation”, “I felt like I was actually there in the environment 
of the presentation”) on a 7-point scale, ranging from (1) completely disagree to (7) 
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completely agree. The subscale is presented in Table 3.5 of the previous chapter (p. 
111). 
 
 Vividness of mental imagery regarding static locations in the left spatial 
dimension 
 
Participants’ task was to rate their degree of mental imagery on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from (1) completely disagree to (7) completely agree. The items used 
in the questionnaire are presented in Table 4.3 (see Annex J for a Portuguese 
version). 
 
Table 4.3 
The Items Used to Measure Vividness of Mental Imagery Regarding Static Locations 
in the Left Spatial Dimension in Experiment 3 
  Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
I could imagine the beating of a man’s heart 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I could imagine the wedding ring on a man’s hand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Vividness of mental imagery regarding movements that involve one person in the 
left spatial dimension 
 
Participants’ task was to rate their degree of mental imagery on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from (1) completely disagree to (7) completely agree. The items used 
in the questionnaire are presented in Table 4.4 (see Annex J for a Portuguese 
version). 
 
Table 4.4 
The Items Used to Measure Vividness of Mental Imagery Regarding Static Locations 
in the Left Spatial Dimension in Experiment 3 
  Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
I could imagine a man driving fast 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I could imagine a man turning back in his driver’s seat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I could imagine a man going out of the car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Vividness of mental imagery regarding movements that involve two persons in 
the left spatial dimension 
 
Participants’ task was to rate their degree of mental imagery on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from (1) completely disagree to (7) completely agree. The items used 
in the questionnaire are presented in Table 4.5 (see Annex J for a Portuguese 
version). 
 
Table 4.5 
The Items Used to Measure Vividness of Mental Imagery Regarding Movements that 
Involve Two Persons in the Left Spatial Dimension in Experiment 3 
  Totally  
disagree 
Totally 
agree 
I could imagine a couple exchanging wedding rings on the 
ceremony 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I could imagine a man teaching his wife how to mount the 
horse 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4.2.2.2.2. Measures of “offline” discourse comprehension 
 
To measure “offline” comprehension of discourse, participants were asked to 
sequence statements from the text in proper chronological order. Sequencing refers 
to the identification of the components of a story, such as the beginning, middle, and 
end, and the primary goal of this task is to test the ability of the comprehenders to 
sequence major events from the text within the larger context. Therefore, the main 
rationale for including this task was to investigate whether perceptual simulations 
could potentially contribute to the recall of global messages of the text rather than 
details. Another reason to use this method of reading assessment is that open-ended 
and inference questions designed to test the effect of emotion simulation on 
comprehension (described in Chapter 3) were failures. In fact, the means for explicit 
comprehension were very low (30-40% correct) even in the control condition, 
suggesting that open and inference questions could be too demanding for 
participants. In brief, the substitution of previous measures of comprehension by the 
sequencing comprehension task was done with an idea to try easier comprehension 
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questions in detecting the effect of simulation on “offline” discourse comprehension. 
It is worth noting in this context that psychology literatures also stress the importance 
of considering the various response formats by which reading processing is assessed 
(see Fletcher, 2006, for review). The items used in the questionnaire are presented in 
Table 4.6 (for a Portuguese version see Annex J). 
 
Table 4.6 
The Statements Used in the Sequencing Task in Experiment 3 
1. The man is observing through the window of his car how other cars are passing 
by 
2. The man is dreaming of his wife 
3. The man walks out of a car 
4. The man takes a cigarette from the pocket of his T-shirt and starts smoking 
 
 
4.2.2.3. Procedure 
Participants were contacted directly by the experimenter at university. 
Everyone was informed about the confidentiality and anonymity of the data, and the 
possibility to quit the study at any time. Participants were tested individually in a 
quiet sound insulated room. They sat in a comfortable chair and were told that the 
experiment would consist of three parts: reading of the tutorial text on a computer, 
reading of the target text on a computer, and filling in of the paper-based text-related 
questionnaire. 
For the first part of study all participants were instructed to read a neutral text 
from a laptop computer screen (Model HP G62; screen resolution – 1366×768) under 
the pretext of having a tutorial session for the computer-based part of experiment. 
Everyone was informed that each paragraph of the text would be displayed 
separately on a computer screen and that moving to the next paragraph would require 
pressing the “Space” key. Participants were also told that their reading performance 
would be timed, and that they should press the “Space” key as quickly as possible 
while still maintaining accuracy (Fazio, 1990). Reading times were collected using 
Stimuli Presentation Software (Version 0.50). 
For the second part of study participants were instructed to read the target text 
that included a description of movements or locations in the left spatial dimension. 
Participants in the matching condition read the text on a computer while their body 
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was turned 90 degrees to the right. Participants in the mismatching condition read the 
text on a computer while their body was turned 90 degrees to the left. Participants in 
the neutral condition read the text normally without a manipulation of body direction.  
Reading procedure of the target text was identical to that of tutorial text. 
When participants finished reading the target text, they were instructed to adopt a 
normal sitting position and fill in the text-related paper-based questionnaire. Finally, 
in the post-experimental interview participants were asked what they thought about 
manipulation with the body posture. This interview was important for the study to 
check if participants who suspected the purpose of the body direction manipulation 
tended to regulate their responses more effectively. 
 
4.2.3. Results 
 
4.2.3.1. Preliminary analyses 
 
Preliminary analyses revealed that there was no significant effect of gender 
on target text reading time after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F 
(1, 60) = 0.002, p ˃ .05. Similarly, by classifying age into the three groups (18-29, 
30-49, 50+), it was revealed that there was no significant effect of age on target text 
reading time after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (2, 58) = 1.50, 
p ˃ .05. Finally, post-experimental interview confirmed that none of the participants 
was aware of emotion manipulation. 
 
4.2.3.2. “Online” comprehension measures 
 
Target text reading time. An 8 (Paragraphs 1 to 8) within factor x 3 
(condition: matching vs. mismatching vs. neutral) between factor mixed ANOVA, 
with tutorial reading time as a covariate, was conducted to analyze the reading times 
of the target text. Because tutorial and target texts were identical in size, tutorial 
reading time was chosen as a covariate in order to control for individual differences 
in reading time. Results showed that tutorial reading time (reported in milliseconds) 
was significantly related to the participant’s target text reading time, F (1, 59) = 
75,46, p < .001, partial 2 = .56. However, there was no significant effect of 
matching direction on target text reading time after controlling for the effect of the 
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tutorial reading time, F (2, 59) = 1.41, p = .252, partial 2 = .05. Considering that the 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is not significant, and therefore does not 
protect against inflated Type I error rates in subsequent analyses of data, planned 
contrasts are not reported (Howell, 2006). Estimated marginal reading time means of 
participants from all three conditions are provided in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for the Target Text According to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading 
Time as a Covariate in Experiment 3 
 
Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 21297.25 788.76 19718.96 22875.55 
Mismatching 22222.93 792.29 20637.57 23808.29 
Matching 23168.31 788.55 21590.42 24746.20 
 
 
Finally, using Pillai’s trace, it was revealed that there was no significant 
effect of matching direction on the speed with which participants read paragraphs of 
text, F (14, 108) = 0.74, p ˃ .05. Considering that the multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) is not significant, and therefore does not protect against 
inflated Type I error rates in follow-up a-priori comparisons, planned contrasts are 
not reported (Bock, 1975). At the same time, a non-significant MANOVA does not 
allow to fully understand how perceptual simulation unfolds during processing of 
discourse. To address this ambiguity, MANOVA was followed with separate 
ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables. To control for the inflation of 
familywise error rate, a Bonferroni correction was applied to the subsequent 
ANOVAs (Harris, 1975). The results of univariate test statistics, however, revealed 
that participants did not significantly differ, nor approached significance in their 
reading of each of the paragraphs of the target text (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.8). 
For the mean differences and exact p-values, see Table 4.9. 
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Figure 4.2. Mean reading times in milliseconds (estimated marginal means) for 
seven paragraphs of the target text according to condition (matching vs. control 
neutral vs. mismatching) in Experiment 3 
 
Feeling of presence (Cronbach's alpha = .91). On average, participants felt 
equally present in the matching condition (M = 3.86; SD = 1.44), mismatching 
condition (M = 3.22; SD = 1.38), and control condition (M = 3.31; SD = 1.64), F (2, 
60) = 1.14, p > .05. 
 
Vividness of mental imagery (Cronbach's alpha = .76). On average, 
participants did not significantly differ in their answers in the matching condition (M 
= 4.72; SD = 1.26), mismatching condition (M = 4.56. SD = 0.78), and control 
condition (M = 5.04. SD = 0.82), F (2, 60) = 1.27, p > .05. 
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Table 4.8 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to Condition with 
Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 3 
 
Para. Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
 
Neutral 25049.59 1318.74 22410.80 27688.39 
Mismatching 27351.98 1324.65 24701.38 30002.59 
Matching 28712.71 1318.41 26074.59 31350.83 
 
2 
Neutral 26906.79 1035.28 24835.21 28978.37 
Mismatching 28337.11 1039.91 26256.25 30417.96 
Matching 29286.83 1035.01 27215.78 31357.88 
3 
Neutral 22879.75 844.66 21189.58 24569.91 
Mismatching 23972.52 848.44 22274.80 25670.25 
Matching 22287.62 844.44 20597.89 23977.35 
 
4 
Neutral 16944.88 1569.91 13803.50 20086.27 
Mismatching 16306.76 1576.94 13151.32 19462.21 
Matching 20214.43 1569.51 17073.85 23355.02 
5 
 
Neutral 22654.25 2142.83 18366.45 26942.05 
Mismatching 22763.63 2152.43 18456.64 27070.62 
Matching 26167.58 2142.29 21880.88 30454.28 
 
6 
Neutral 19520.75 1204.93 17109.70 21931.81 
Mismatching 21705.14 1210.32 19283.29 24126.99 
Matching 20993.02 1204.62 18582.58 23403.46 
7 
Neutral 15124.74 724.21 13675.60 16573.89 
Mismatching 15123.36 727.46 13667.73 16578.10 
Matching 14515.99 724.03 13067.21 15964.76 
 
Vividness of mental imagery regarding static locations in the left spatial 
dimension. Because this scale had low reliability (Chronbach’s alpha ˂ .60), a 
MANOVA was conducted (Cortina, 1993). Using Pillai’s trace, there was no 
significant effect of the matching condition on the mental imagery regarding static 
locations in the left spatial dimension, V = 0.10, F (4, 120) = 1.58, p > .05. Due to 
non-significance of MANOVA, no follow-up analyses were performed. 
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Table 4.9 
 Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According 
to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 3 
Para. (I) Condition (J) Condition Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Difference
a 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Para.1 
Neutral Mismatching -2302.39 1875.12 .673 -6054.49 1449.71 Matching -3663.12 1861.88 .162 -7388.72 62.49 
Mismatching Neutral 2302.39 1875.12 .673 -1449.71 6054.49 Matching -1360.73 1874.41 1.000 -5111.40 2389.95 
Matching Neutral 3663.12 1861.88 .162 -62.49 7388.72 Mismatching 1360.73 1874.41 1.000 -2389.95 5111.40 
Para.2 
Neutral Mismatching -1430.32 1472.06 1.000 -4375.90 1515.26 Matching -2380.04 1461.66 .326 -5304.82 544.734 
Mismatching Neutral 1430.32 1472.06 1.000 -1515.26 4375.90 Matching -949.73 1471.50 1.000 -3894.19 1994.73 
Matching Neutral 2380.04 1461.66 .326 -544.74 5304.82 Mismatching 949.73 1471.50 1.000 -1994.73 3894.19 
Para.3 
Neutral Mismatching -1092.78 1201.02 1.000 -3496.01 1310.46 Matching 592.13 1192.54 1.000 -1794.14 2978.39 
Mismatching Neutral 1092.78 1201.02 1.000 -1310.46 3496.01 Matching 1684.90 1200.57 .497 -717.42 4087.23 
Matching Neutral -592.13 1192.54 1.000 -2978.39 1794.14 Mismatching -1684.90 1200.57 .497 -4087.23 717.42 
(continued) 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
 Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According 
to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 3 
Para.4 
Neutral Mismatching 638.12 2232.25 1.000 -3828.61 5104.85 Matching -3269.55 2216.49 .437 -7704.74 1165.64 
Mismatching Neutral -638.12 2232.25 1.000 -5104.85 3828.61 Matching -3907.67 2231.41 .255 -8372.70 557.37 
Matching Neutral 3269.55 2216.49 .437 -1165.64 7704.74 Mismatching 3907.67 2231.41 .255 -557.37 8372.71 
Para.5 
Neutral Mismatching -109.38 3046.89 1.000 -6206.12 5987.44 Matching -3513.33 3025.377 .751 -9567.09 2540.44 
Mismatching Neutral 109.38 3046.89 1.000 -5987.44 6206.20 Matching -3403.95 3045.74 .805 -9498.45 2690.55 
Matching Neutral 3513.33 3025.37 .751 -2540.44 9567.09 Mismatching 3403.95 3045.74 .805 -2690.55 9498.45 
Para.6 
Neutral Mismatching -2184.39 1713.29 .622 -5612.67 1243.89 Matching -1472.27 1701.19 1.000 -4876.34 1931.81 
Mismatching Neutral 2184.39 1713.29 .622 -1243.89 5612.67 Matching 712.12 1712.64 1.000 -2714.85 4139.10 
Matching Neutral 1472.27 1701.19 1.000 -1931.81 4876.34 Mismatching -712.12 1712.64 1.000 -4139.10 2714.85 
Para.7 
Neutral Mismatching 1.38 1029.76 1.000 -2059.16 2061.92 Matching 608.76 1022.49 1.000 -1437.24 2654.75 
Mismatching Neutral -1.38 1029.76 1.000 -2061.92 2059.16 Matching 607.38 1029.37 1.000 -1452.38 2667.14 
Matching Neutral -608.76 1022.49 1.000 -2654.75 1437.24 Mismatching -607.38 1029.37 1.000 -2667.14 1452.38 
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Vividness of mental imagery regarding movements that involve one 
person in the left spatial dimension. Because this scale had low reliability 
(Chronbach’s alpha ˂.60), a MANOVA was conducted (Cortina, 1993). Using 
Pillai’s trace, there was no significant effect of the matching condition on the mental 
imagery regarding movements that involve one person in the left spatial dimension, 
V = 0.15, F (8, 116) = 1.14, p > .05. Due to non-significance of MANOVA, no 
follow-up analyses were performed. 
 
Vividness of mental imagery regarding movements that involve two 
persons in the left spatial dimension. Because this scale had low reliability 
(Chronbach’s alpha ˂.60), a MANOVA was conducted (Cortina, 1993). Using 
Pillai’s trace, there was a significant effect of the experimental condition on the 
mental imagery regarding movements that involve two persons in the left spatial 
dimension, V = 0.17, F (4, 118) = 2.70, p = .034. Due to significance of MANOVA, 
some follow-up analyses were performed. More precisely, following the 
recommendation of Field (2009), the MANOVA was followed up with discriminant 
analysis to discover the relationships that exist between dependent variables as well 
as the relationship between the dependent variables and group membership. 
Discriminant analysis revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained 91,5 
% of the variance, canonical R² = .15, whereas the second explained only 8,5 %, 
canonical R² = .02. In combination these discriminant functions significantly 
differentiated the experimental conditions, Λ = 0.84, χ² (1) = 10.56, p = .032, but 
removing the first function indicated that the second function did not significantly 
differentiate the experimental conditions, Λ = 0.98, χ² (1) = 0.96, p = > .05. The 
correlations between outcomes and the discriminant functions revealed that the 
variable “mount a horse” loaded more highly on the first function (r = .82) than the 
second function (r = -.58); the variable “exchange wedding rings” loaded fairly 
evenly highly onto both functions (r = .69 for the first function and r = .73 for the 
second). The discriminant function plot (see Figure 4.3) showed that the first 
function discriminated the mismatching condition from the matching condition, and 
the second function differentiated the control condition from two experimental 
conditions in which the direction of the body posture was manipulated. It is 
interesting to note that the difference for the second variate (control vs. matching and 
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mismatching) is not as dramatic as for the first variate (mismatching vs. matching), 
suggesting that major differences in responding are to be found between participants 
of matching and mismatching conditions. Finally, graphical representation of the 
data for the two target variables of the scale (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5.) also shows a 
trend indicating that the vividness of mental imagery increases when participants 
process the text in the direction of body posture consistent with the position in space 
of a person or an entity implied by a text description. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Discriminant analysis on mental imagery regarding left movements that 
involve two persons in the left spatial dimension (conditions: neutral control vs. 
mismatching vs. matching) 
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Figure 4.4. Mean responses for the variable “exchange wedding rings” (control 
neutral vs. mismatching vs. matching).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean responses for the variable “mount a horse” (control neutral vs. 
mismatching vs. matching).  
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4.2.3.3. Measures of “offline” comprehension 
Arranging events from the text in the proper chronological order. A one-
way ANOVA was conducted on the number of statements listed in the proper 
chronological order. It was revealed that participants did not significantly differ in 
their answers in the matching condition (M = 2.00; SD = 1.15), mismatching 
condition (M = 1.76. SD = 1.04), and neutral condition (M = 1.62. SD = 1.20), F (2, 
58) = 0.57, p > .05. 
 
4.3. General discussion 
  
The experiment reported in this chapter of the thesis was designed to 
investigate whether the direction of literal body posture consistent with the position 
in space of a person or an entity implied by a discourse description facilitates 
“online” (hypothesis 1) and “offline” (hypothesis 2) language processing. The results 
of the experiment provided partial support for hypothesis 1 and no support for 
hypothesis 2. Specifically, those who read the text while their body was turned 90 
degrees to the right (matching condition) reported higher degree of vividness of 
mental imagery, but only with regard to scenes that described movements involving 
two persons in the left spatial dimension. The most important factor that presumably 
contributed to the discrepancy among various measures of mental imagery is the 
degree of integratability of the body direction into the simulation constructed of the 
content of discourse. Recall that PSS theory (Barsalou, 1999a) suggests that a 
relationship between a symbol and its referent is analogous, and thus to simulate the 
situation one has to actually imagine being a part of the environment of the 
presentation. For example, a comprehension of the part of discourse describing how 
the couple exchanged wedding rings in the church would lead to a construction of 
simulation that includes such perceptual symbols associated with a left spatial 
dimension as static location (i.e., wedding ring on the fourth finger of the left hand) 
and perspective (i.e., a bride in the church, according to a Catholic tradition, stays in 
front of the groom with her left shoulder facing a priest). Point is: a matching 
direction of body posture might have facilitated the construction of simulation with 
regards to perspective in the left spatial dimension, but not (or to a lesser extent) left 
static location, given that perspective seemed to demonstrate higher integratability 
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with the manipulation of body direction than static location (see Figure 4.5). 
Whereas it may be intuitive that such an explanation is correct, further exploration of 
this hypothesis is needed. 
  
Figure 4.6. From top to bottom, the author demonstrates the possible degree of 
integratability between the matching direction of body posture and comprehension of 
the two different (yet somehow similar) situations connoted by discourse. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the presence of effects in the above-mentioned measures of 
vividness of mental imagery should be regarded with caution. On the one hand, it is 
interesting to note that better performance of participants on measures of mental 
imagery in the congruent condition was not accompanied by poorer comprehension 
in other “online” and “offline” measures. On the other hand, the presence of null 
effects for other measures of “online” processing (reading times) and “offline” 
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processing (sequencing task) raises serious concerns that need to be addressed. In the 
remainder of the discussion the putative explanations of null effects for other 
comprehension measures are addressed. 
The null effects for reading times presumably reflect the high demands of 
processing the text in the untypical direction of body posture. That is, participants’ 
speed of reading could be affected by the difficulty they faced in adjusting the body 
to process the text while being turned 90 degrees to the left or right. At the same 
time, it is worth pointing out that the differences in reading times across conditions 
are not significant. In fact, the maximum difference that is observed between the 
mean reading times for neutral and matching conditions is less than two seconds. Of 
course, a skeptic might argue that the null effects for reading times in this study 
suggest that bodily states did not play any role in “online” discourse processing. 
However, if the body did not play any role in the processing of text, then 
manipulating the body should have no effect on the experienced degree of mental 
imagery, but it does.  
It is worth noting again why obtained effects on questionnaire of mental 
imagery, which is not a standardized language comprehension measure, are regarded 
as a support for the hypothesis that perceptual simulation was at least somewhat 
involved in discourse processing. First, research suggests that object words such as 
those used in present research (e.g., wedding ring) evoke a perceptual simulation of 
the denoted objects, and that the simulation gets activated automatically during 
comprehension and can be consciously inspected by mental imagery measures 
(Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008). Second, simulation affects both perception and 
imagery in conceptual processing, and thus measures of vividness of mental imagery 
manage to at least partially explain whether simulation took place in understanding 
of information (Wu & Barsalou, 2009). Concluding with a broader point, there is 
now evidence from eye-tracking studies that the same sensorimotor mechanisms are 
utilized for viewing, imagining, and remembering elements of the scene. This 
suggests that higher-level cognition is not separate from lower-level processing 
(Spivey & Geng, 2001).  
With regard to “offline” discourse comprehension measures, there are two 
alternative explanations of observed null effects. First straightforward explanation is 
that the direction of body posture had no effect on “offline” processing of text. Note 
that two previous experiments in the domain of emotional language processing 
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(Chapter 3) also did not show any effect of simulation on “offline” discourse 
comprehension. An alternative explanation might be that the effect of simulation on 
“offline” discourse comprehension can only be captured by more sensitive measures, 
such as reaction times, that proved to be useful in situations when less sensitive 
measures (e.g., questionnaire) did not demonstrate any effect of experimental 
manipulation on performance (Pachella, 1974). 
To sum up, this experiment was designed to investigate whether the direction 
of literal body posture consistent with the position in space of a person or an entity 
implied by a discourse description facilitates “online” and “offline” language 
processing. It was found that congruent direction of body posture benefited some 
measures of “online” comprehension, such as mental imagery regarding interaction 
between two people, but there was no effect of congruent body direction on “offline” 
language comprehension. This pattern of results suggests that there is considerable 
specificity in the simulations constructed during processing of discourse describing 
events that implicitly suggest a particular spatial dimension for an object or person. 
The primary contribution of this article is confirmation of a prediction made by a 
PSS theory (Barsalou, 1999a) on the analogous relationship between a symbol and its 
referent. More specifically, the obtained results showed that even implicit properties 
of simulations, such as spatial dimension, are at least partially involved in 
comprehension of large language segments such as discourse. Whereas there are 
clearly many questions in this experiment that must await further empirical 
investigation, the exploration of questions like these is useful as it provides a useful 
starting point to decide on appropriate experimental strategies in the future. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Discourse Comprehension and Simulation of Metaphorical Actions 
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Abstract 
 
The previous three experiments revealed that simulations may not only capture 
explicit information connoted by the language (Chapter 3), but as well implicit 
information (Chapter 4) that goes beyond words mentioned in the text. The two 
experiments reported in this chapter extend these findings by investigating whether 
comprehension of discourse describing metaphorical actions that are physically 
impossible to perform also requires the construction of a simulation. Two 
experiments were conducted to investigate whether action simulation influences 
“online” and “offline” comprehension at a more global discourse level. Participants 
read a text describing a protagonist making metaphorical forward movements while 
their body movement (Experiment 4) and body posture (Experiment 5) were 
manipulated to be either prepared or not prepared for processing of action-
congruent information. “Online” comprehension was measured by collecting 
reading times. “Offline” explicit and implicit processing of discourse were measured 
on accuracy to comprehension questions and the amount of time it took participants 
to recognize words from discourse as well as judge sentences as correct or incorrect 
with respect to the content of text. The results revealed that action simulation 
affected recognition (Experiments 4 and 5) and judgment times (Experiment 4) 
regarding “offline” explicit comprehension measures, and accuracy and judgment 
times regarding “offline” implicit comprehension measures (Experiments 4 and 5). 
The effect of matching action on “online” processing was fragile. These findings 
support the language and situated simulation theory, suggesting that simulation 
system affects to a greater extent comprehensive processing of information based on 
deduction and interpretation and to a lesser extent shallow processing based on 
information explicitly provided in the text.  
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Previous research in the domain of language processing demonstrated that 
comprehension of sentences describing concrete situations requires the construction 
of action simulation of the described event (e.g., de Vega, et al., 2004; Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). This evidence is supported by several recent 
findings from neuroscience which showed that processing of words describing 
certain objects or actions requires the activation of the same neural regions that are 
routinely activated when one actually perceives or performs actions with regard to 
the referent of the words (e.g., Boulenger, et al., 2006; Martin & Chao, 2001; 
Gernsbacher & Kaschak, 2003; Hauk, et al, 2004; Isenberg et al., 1999; Kan et al., 
2003; Pulvermüller, 1999, 2002; Tettamanti et al., 2005). 
More recent work in cognitive science suggested that comprehension of 
sentences describing abstract situations requires the involvement of action simulation 
to the same extent as comprehension of concrete sentences. For example, in one line 
of research Glenberg et al. (2008) demonstrated that comprehension of abstract 
sentences modulates action systems. Participants were asked to read sentences 
describing transfer and judge if a sentence was sensible by responding in the 
direction that either matched or mismatched the direction connoted by the sentence. 
The major result was that participants were faster to decide whether abstract 
sentences describing toward transfer (e.g., “Anna delegates the responsibilities to 
you”) and away transfer (e.g., “You delegate the responsibilities to Anna”) were 
sensible when they made a response in the direction (toward vs. away) that was 
consistent with the direction of movement implied by the sentence. As another 
example how comprehension of abstract concepts modulates action systems, Santana 
and de Vega (2011) asked participants to read metaphors (e.g., “His talent for politics 
made him rise to victory”) and abstract sentences similar in meaning to the 
metaphors (e.g., “His working capability made him succeed as a professional”), and 
then perform a hand motion (while reading the sentence verb) that either matched or 
mismatched the direction implied by the sentence. The results showed that 
responding was faster when there was a match between the direction of literal 
movement and that implied by the sentence. 
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Another line of research addresses how literal movement appropriate for the 
metaphorical phrases facilitates language comprehension. For instance, Wilson and 
Gibbs (2007) produced evidence on how engaging in real body action or merely 
imagining making a specific body movement improves comprehension of 
metaphorical phrases. More precisely, in this research participants learned to make 
various body movements or imagined making a particular body movement and then 
were presented with metaphorical phrases (e.g., grasp a concept) that either matched 
or mismatched a previous body action (e.g., grasping movement). The results 
revealed that phrase reading times were faster when the previous literal or imagined 
body movement was consistent with the action implied by the sentence. In a similar 
experiment, Gibbs et al. (2006) demonstrated that even watching someone make a 
congruent body movement induced comprehension of metaphorical phrases 
describing actions physically impossible to perform (e.g., watching someone make a 
stretching motion while processing the phrase “stretch for understanding”). For a 
more complete reviews and discussion of these and similar findings see Gibbs 
(2006), Gibbs and Perlman (2010), Ritchie (2008, 2009), and Semino (2010).  
The findings from the above-mentioned studies converge on the conclusion 
that understanding of phrases or sentences describing abstract movement calls on the 
same bodily and neural states that are used in control of literal action. The present 
research was designed to explore further the importance of action simulation in 
processing of language describing abstract metaphorical concepts. It extends Wilson 
and Gibbs’ (2007) work that has examined how body action influences metaphor 
comprehension and shares the view that simulation is necessary for comprehension. 
At the same time, the present research differs from Wilson and Gibbs’ (2007) 
research in several aspects. First, it was tested how action simulation affects 
comprehension of extended linguistic events such as discourse. Interest for this 
question is inspired by previous discussions on the paucity of research regarding the 
role of simulation during discourse comprehension (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008) as well 
as the importance of testing language comprehension at a more global discourse level 
(Graesser, et al., 1997; Sparks & Rapp, 2010). Second, whereas Wilson and Gibbs 
(2007) examined the influence of body action on “online” measures of 
comprehension (reading times), this research investigated how body action affects 
both “online” discourse processing and “offline” explicit and implicit discourse 
processing. The study of this question is motivated by previous research that stressed 
163 
 
the importance of testing overall process of comprehension that includes both 
“online” reading (e.g., word decoding, syntactic processing) and “offline” 
postreading (e.g., drawing conclusions, making inferences, etc.) processes (Goldman 
& Varma, 1995; Graesser, et al., 1994; Kintsch, 1988; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; van 
der Broek et al., 1999; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan & Singer, 2003).  
As discussed in previous chapter of this thesis, earlier findings support the 
prediction that simulation may affect “offline” discourse processing. For example, 
Pecher et al. (2009) instructed participants to read a list of sentences describing 
objects and then to perform recognition memory task on the pictures. It was found 
that recognition performance was better if the picture matched the implied shape or 
orientation of the object in an earlier sentence. Importantly, recognition task was 
better even when sentence reading and picture recognition were separated in time 
(45-min delay). As another evidence for this prediction, Glenberg et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that embodied interventions help children better remember parts of 
texts and answer inference questions. Finally, language and situated simulation 
theory (Barsalou et al., 2008) proposes that when simulation system dominates in a 
reading comprehension task, people tend to build comprehensive mental 
representations from inferences (information that goes beyond information 
mentioned explicitly) computed during processing of discourse. This in turn allows 
to predict that inferences generated “online” might potentially affect “offline” 
implicit comprehension of text. 
 
5.2. Hypotheses and study overview 
 
The embodied simulation account of cognition suggests that understanding of 
language describing metaphorical actions involves constructing a sensorimotor 
simulation of the described event. If such an account is correct, then shifting the 
body into an appropriate action state congruent with the discourse meaning should 
facilitate discourse processing. That is, participants whose bodily systems are 
prepared for processing of language implying congruent body movements 
(facilitation condition) should demonstrate better performance on measures of 
“online” processing and “offline” explicit and implicit processing relative to 
participants whose bodily systems are not prepared for such processing (control 
condition).  
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To test this prediction, in experiments 4 and 5 participants were asked to read 
a neutral tutorial text about a boy telling a story about his school life. Reading times 
were collected and served as a study baseline for the rest of the experiment to control 
for individual differences in reading speed. Second, participants were timed on how 
much time they spent reading the target text, an adapted  speech of President Lyndon 
Johnson on envisions of transforming America into a “Great Society” free of 
poverty, crime, and racism (Torricelli & Carrol, 1999). The text contained metaphors 
and metaphorical phrases implying forward movements. More concretely, in 
Experiment 1 participants in the advanced facilitation condition first exercised on a 
stationary bike and then read the text standing in front of the monitor while their lead 
leg was advanced for 40 centimeters from their follow leg. In Experiment 2 
participants in the basic facilitation condition read the text in the same way as 
participants from the advanced facilitation condition, with the exception that they did 
not exercise on a stationary bike prior to reading the text. Participants in the control 
condition both in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 read the text standing in front of 
the monitor with their feet together. After reading the text, participants in all 
conditions answered a set of filler questions and completed a comprehension test that 
included judgment and recognition tasks. Discourse comprehension in a judgment 
task was assessed by textually explicit and textually implicit sentences (see Pearson 
& Johnson, 1980, for a discussion). Participants’ task consisted in judging if a 
sentence is correct with regard to text’s content. In a recognition task participants 
were presented with words and had to decide if they belonged to a text. Performance 
indicators were text’s reading times, accuracy in recognition task, accuracy in 
judgment task, and response times. Pictorial information on how the motor system 
was manipulated is given in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1. Pictorial information on how motor system was manipulated in 
Experiments 4 and 5. From top to bottom, it is demonstrated that participants in the 
advanced facilitation condition from Experiment 4 first exercised on a stationary bike 
for a minute and then were requested to approach a computer placed on a rostrum, 
advance their lead leg for 40 centimeters from their follow leg and read paragraphs 
of the target text by pressing the “Space” key; participants in the basic facilitation 
condition from Experiment 5 read the text in the same way, with the exception that 
they did not exercise on the bike prior to text reading. 
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5.3. Experiment 4 
 
If understanding of discourse describing metaphorical forward movements 
requires the re-activation of modality-specific states that are involved in real action, 
then engaging in body movement and adopting a body posture appropriate to the 
metaphorical phrases should facilitate discourse processing. More broadly, it was 
expected that matching body movement and matching body posture would facilitate 
“online” processing and “offline” explicit and implicit discourse comprehension, 
compared to no action (control) condition.  
 
5.3.1. Method  
 
5.3.1.1. Participants and design 
 
The sample consisted of 38 right-handed, native Portuguese-speaking 
university students (Mage = 23.03, SDage = 5.53). Nine participants were male (Mage = 
26.33; SDage = 7.37), 27 were female (Mage = 22.07; SDage = 4.67), and two 
participants did not indicate gender. The experiment was a single factor between-
participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions: 
advanced facilitation or control condition. 
 
5.3.1.2. Materials 
 
Materials consisted of two texts (tutorial and target) and a comprehension 
task assessing response times at test. Both texts were constructed to have seven 
paragraphs of exactly the same size. A target text, a speech of President Lyndon 
Johnson on envisions of transforming America into a “Great Society” free of 
poverty, crime, and racism was adjusted to meet research requirements. More 
precisely, adjustments to the original text were as follows: the size of the text was 
reduced to seven paragraphs and twelve metaphors and metaphorical phrases 
implying forward movements were embedded into it. Metaphorical phrases 
representing forward movements were mentioned in each paragraph of the target 
text. See Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 for an approximate English translation of the 
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tutorial and target texts used in these experiments. Original Portuguese version of 
tutorial and target texts is given in Annex K and Annex L, respectively. Importantly, 
the previous measures of “online” and “offline” discourse comprehension 
administered through questionnaire (e.g., vividness of mental imagery, spatial 
presence, open questions, etc.) were not used as they proved ineffective to detect the 
effect of simulation on discourse comprehension in the previous three experiments. 
 
Table 5.1 
Approximate English Translation of the Tutorial Text Used In Experiment 4 
1 
Everyone calls me Skin and Bones since the first year of school. I am skinny 
and my face looks waxy, but I never spent a day without eating. Yes, I look 
hungry and my bones stick trough the skin; in this regard I took after my 
uncle Nuno who one day was capable of eating two kilos of cod, four 
potatoes with two liters of wine, and a kilo of bread. Everyone thought he 
would burst from eating that much. Well, what I want to explain is that my 
thinness has nothing to do with hunger. 
2 
Every day I eat two plates of soup with bread for lunch and supper. Before 
leaving for school my mom would always give me a sandwich for others not 
to think that life was bad in our house. At the same time, I still got a 
nickname Skin and Bones. After this nickname I was given the other ones 
like Walking Stick and Scare Crow, but none of them resisted the popularity 
of the first one. 
3 
I don’t remember who gave it to me and now this no longer interests me. I 
am sure that I became a target of school bullies because of that nickname. A 
bunch of bullies teased me and invented punishments if I was expressing 
disagreement. Eventually I got accustomed to those jokes and pretended that 
I found their teasing funny. But only I know what I felt there inside when 
they were laughing at me. Today no one bullied me despite the fact that there 
are ten guys in the corridor of the Secretary. They are nervous, talking with 
each other in search of pretext to play a joke on someone. But today I am not 
their target. 
4 
I am certain that it’s my last school day. I pulled all my strength together 
being sure that a new life is soon to start; the better the grade of the diploma. 
The easier it will be to reach my dreams. I got the best grades in the class. 
The books seemed open to me and heard the voices whispering me the 
material of the disciplines. I took revenge, I am sure that no one will pass by 
me. 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
Approximate English Translation of the Tutorial Text Used in Experiment 4 
 
5 
It is possible that I will meet some of those bullies in my career as a white-
collar worker and that they will regret for all those bad things they did to me. 
I feel that I will win all the challenges of my profession. Things already 
started changing around me; I no longer have the old red clothing that I felt 
so ashamed to wear. Today I put on the new suit my father bought in the 
market. 
6 
All the nights I lived through will never come back. I recall the last one when 
I was preparing for the bookkeeping exam: my father was resoling the shoe 
at the entrance door to prepare for the concert he was about to give the 
following night. I could not ask him to postpone his work, considering that 
there was no money in the house and that he was earning money for our 
lunch. I wide opened the eyes to absorb all the information I still had to 
study. 
7 
I hid in the room with a candle with an intention to alienate me from the 
noise. I focused my eyes on books’ pages and covered my ears with hands so 
that nothing could distract me. But the beating of the hammer was still 
vibrating through my blood. 
 
Table 5.2 
Approximate English Translation of the Target Text Used in Experiment 4 
1 
By protecting the life of our nation and reserving the liberties of our citizens 
we pursue our own happiness. Our success in that pursuit is the test of our 
success as a nation. Your imagination, your initiative, and your creativity 
will help us build a society where the progress is the servant of our needs. 
For in your time we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich 
society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society. 
2 
If we have a false sense of independence, in the journey to the better 
tomorrow our ships can collide and crash. But if we find commitment to new 
priorities, to new strategies, and new ways of thinking that ensure that hope 
will be kept alive, we will break the wall of hesitation and safely navigate 
our vessel to the better future. 
3 
So I want to talk to you today about the places where we begin to build this 
Great Society: in our cities and in our classrooms. Many of you will live to 
see the day, perhaps fifty years from now, when our population and city land 
will double, and when we will altogether make a giant step in the direction of 
building homes, highways, and facilities equal to all those built since this 
country was first settled. So in the next 40 years we will be building the 
bridge to pave the path to this Great Society. 
  (continued) 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Approximate English Translation of the Target Text Used in Experiment 4 
 
4 
Our society will never be great until our cities are great. On the wings of 
time we are quickly approaching an era when imagination and innovation 
become the biggest priorities. Use your imagination and hope as weapons of 
our progress to the Great Society. As riders in the race do not stop short as 
they reach the goal, so do you. Go forward, stretch your arms to grasp any 
single idea that will lead us to the better tomorrow. 
5 
Our society will never be great until more than one quarter of our society 
have not finished high school. Each year more than 10,000 high school 
graduates with proven ability do not enter college because they cannot afford 
it. And if we cannot educate today’s youth, we cannot follow the future with 
confidence.  
6 
I face it, we still have many problems in our schools, but at the same time we 
moved from the road of discord to the road of agreement. While walking on 
this road we have to go beyond the curricula which are outdated and move 
along the stream of future to find new ways to stimulate the love of learning 
and the capacity for creation. 
7 
These are the two of the central issues of the Great Society. We need to 
assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all over the 
world in order to walk into the better future together and open a new chapter 
in the history of our great nation.  
 
5.3.1.2.1. Measures of “online” discourse comprehension 
 
Collection of reading times. Reading times were collected for whole paragraphs as 
readers normally read the text. 
 
5.3.1.2.2. Measures of “offline” discourse comprehension 
 
Judgment task 
 
Regarding explicit comprehension, participants were asked to indicate if a 
sentence, presented on a computer monitor, was correct on the basis of information 
that comes directly from the text (see Table 5.3). For instance, a sentence “Many 
students do not enter university because of financial problems” is correct as there is a 
mention in the text that many high school graduates do not enter college because 
they cannot afford it. Importantly, participants were presented with the sentences that 
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paraphrased main ideas from the target text. Paraphrasing was chosen in light of 
previous research suggesting that people tend to rely on semantic representation of 
ideas described in the language rather than specific linguistic form (Bransford & 
Franks, 1971). Regarding implicit comprehension, participants were asked to 
indicate if a sentence, presented on a computer monitor, was correct on the basis of 
implicit guessing (see Table 5.3). In other words, a response for such type of 
assessment is provided in the text, but is not obvious as requires reading beyond the 
lines to find an answer. For instance, it can be inferred that a sentence 
“Modernization is an important aspect of Great Society” is correct from the fact that 
in the speech the speaker stresses the importance of building homes, highways, and 
facilities as means of future prosperity of the country. Finally, two filler sentences 
were included (see Table 5.3). These sentences were incorrect with respect to the 
content of the text. For a Portuguese version of sentences see Annex M. 
 
Table 5.3 
List of Sentences Used in a Judgment Task for Experiment 4 
Measure Sentence 
Explicit 
comprehension 
The places where one should seek to construct Great 
Society are schools and classrooms 
 Many students do not enter university because of financial 
problems) 
Implicit 
comprehension 
Modernization is an important aspect of Great Society 
Youth is the hope of the country 
Incorrect control 
sentences 
In 50 years the population of the cities will be twice 
smaller 
Money is an essential aspect of Great Society 
 
Recognition task 
 
In this task participants had to indicate if a word, presented on a computer 
monitor, was mentioned in the text. Seventeen stimulus words were used: six 
represented target words (parts of metaphorical phrases) from the text implying 
forward body movements, such as advance, follow, pursue, lead, approach, move; 
and six represented control words from the text that do not imply any movement, 
such as help, society, start, great, ensure, can. (see Annex M for a list of stimuli in 
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Portuguese). Because of the worry that previous body action or body posture 
appropriate for the words denoting forward movements may merely remind 
participants of the words they are asked to recognize rather than help simulate 
actions described in the text, it was decided to include five false alarm words that 
implied forward movements, but were not mentioned in the text, such as run, go, 
march, cross, move. If manipulation with the motor system helped simulate actions 
described in the text, then participants should not significantly differ in their 
responses for the above-mentioned false-alarm words.  
 
5.3.1.3. Procedure 
 
Experiment 4 took part in a quiet sound insulated room. Participants were 
tested individually and were informed about the confidentiality and anonymity of the 
data, and the possibility to quit the study at any time. First, all participants were 
instructed to read a neutral text from a laptop computer screen (Model HP G62; 
screen resolution – 1366×768) placed on a height adjustable rostrum under the 
pretext of having a tutorial session for the computer-based part of experiment. 
Everyone was informed that each paragraph of the text would be displayed 
separately on a computer screen and that moving to the next paragraph would require 
pressing the “Space” key. Participants were also told that their reading performance 
would be timed, and that they should press the “Space” key as quickly as possible 
while still maintaining accuracy (Fazio, 1990). Reading times were collected using 
Stimuli Presentation Software (Version 0.50). Second, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the experimental groups and asked to read the target text on the 
same laptop computer. Reading procedure was identical to that of a tutorial text. 
Participants in the control condition read the text while standing erect with the two 
feet together. Participants in the advanced facilitation condition first exercised on a 
stationary bike for a minute (resistance on pedals was set to a minimum) and then 
read the text while standing erect with their lead leg advanced forward (40 
centimeters from the follow leg). To find out which leg was lead, before the 
experiment a researcher asked participants what their dominant hand (right- or left-
handed) was. Additionally, to ascertain that the dominant hand was consistent with 
the lead leg, participants were also requested to go over the hurdle to see what leg 
would go over first. This technique was kindly suggested by an athletics instructor. 
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Remarkably, for all participants the dominant hand was consistent with the lead leg. 
Third, participants in all conditions were instructed to start the comprehension test 
that included a total of 33 trials. Importantly, participants in both conditions (control 
and advanced facilitation) performed the task while standing with the two feet 
together. First 10 trials represented filler variables and they were included to allow 
participants to practice the response format. Next, participants performed a judgment 
task that included three pairs of sentences: two sentences summarized major events 
from the text mentioned explicitly; two sentences summarized major ideas implied in 
the text; and two sentences represented control variables as they were incorrect with 
respect to the content of the text. Participants had to indicate if a sentence presented 
on the computer screen was correct with regard to the content of the target text. 
Participants responded by pressing the a-key with their left index finger if the 
sentence was incorrect or the l-key with their right index finger if the sentence was 
correct. Additionally, participants were told that their responses would be timed, and 
that they should respond as quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy 
(Fazio, 1990). Once the decision was made by pressing one of the assigned buttons 
on the keyboard, the word would disappear and the next trial began after a 3 second 
delay. Finally, participants performed a recognition task that included a total of 17 
variables. Variables were randomized and presented in triads: a variable from the text 
implying forward movement, a variable from the text that does not imply any 
movement, and a variable representing forward movement not mentioned in the text. 
Participants’ task was to indicate if a word was mentioned in the text. Participants 
responded by pressing the a-key with their left index if the word was not mentioned 
in the text or the l-key if the word was mentioned in the text. In the end, participants 
were asked whether they suspected that the bike exercise and lead leg manipulation 
were designed to influence their comprehension of discourse.  
 
5.3.2. Results  
 
5.3.2.1. Coding of Variables and Preliminary analyses 
 
Accuracy rate was calculated on the number of correct answers to target 
variables by coding incorrect response as “0” and correct response as “1”. 
Preliminary analyses showed that there was no significant effect of gender on target 
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text reading time after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (1, 30) = 
1.16, p ˃ .05. Similarly, by classifying age into the three groups (18-29, 30-49, 50+), 
it was revealed that there was no significant effect of age on target text reading time 
after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (1, 35) = 0.06, p ˃ .05. 
Finally, post-experimental interview confirmed that none of the participants 
suspected the purpose of bike exercise and lead leg manipulation. 
 
5.3.2.2. Measures of “online” discourse comprehension 
 
Target text reading time. An 8 (Paragraphs 1 to 8) within factor x 2 
(condition: control vs. advanced facilitation) between factor mixed ANOVA, with 
tutorial reading time as a covariate, was conducted to analyze the reading times of 
the target text. Because tutorial and target texts were identical in size, tutorial reading 
time was chosen as a covariate in order to control for individual differences in 
reading time. Results showed that tutorial reading time (reported in milliseconds) 
was significantly related to the participant’s target text reading time, F (1, 35) = 
111.63, p < .001, partial 2 = .76. However, there was no effect of experimental 
condition on target text reading time after controlling for the effect of the tutorial 
reading time,  F (1, 35) = 0.26, p =.872, partial 2 = .001. Considering that the one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is not significant, and therefore does not protect 
against inflated Type I error rates in subsequent analyses of data, planned contrasts 
are not reported (Howell, 2006). Estimated marginal reading time means of 
participants from both conditions are provided in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for the Target Text According to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading 
Time as a Covariate in Experiment 4 
 
Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 21844.10 741.90 20338.86 23351.14 
AV 22011.08 703.83 20582.24 23439.92 
Note: Abbreviation “AF” refers to “Advanced Facilitation” 
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Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that there was a significant effect of 
matching action on the speed with which participants read paragraphs of text, F (1, 
35) = 111.63, p = .018, partial 2 = .38. Follow-up analyses comparing pairs of 
conditions (Figure 5.2 and Table 5.5) revealed that participants in the advanced 
facilitation condition read the target text significantly faster while reading a 
paragraph 5 (p = .046) and marginally faster while reading a paragraph 3 (p = .066). 
No significant differences in reading speeds were found for other paragraphs. For the 
mean differences and exact p-values, see Table 5.6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Mean reading times in milliseconds (estimated marginal means) for 
seven paragraphs of the target text according to condition (control vs. advanced 
facilitation) in Experiment 4. Note: an asterisk refers to significant pairwise 
comparisons (p ˂ .05). 
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Table 5.5 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to Condition with 
Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 4 
Para. Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Control 26463.49 1211.75 24003.50 28923.48 
AF 28833.15 1149.56 26499.41 31166.88 
2 
Control 20324.57 901.38 18494.68 22154.46 
AF 22035.43 855.12 20299.45 23771.41 
3 
Control 30919.02b 995.13 28898.81 32939.23 
AF 28314.51b 944.05 26397.99 30231.04 
4 
Control 24598.74 1604.44 21341.55 27855.93 
AF 26470.32 1522.10 23380.30 29560.34 
5 
Control 19363.93a 774.52 17791.56 20936.29 
AF 17154.79a 734.77 15663.13 18646.45 
6 
Control  17313.69 989.42 15305.06 19322.32 
AF 17944.44 938.64 16038.90 19849.98 
7 
Control 13931.55 689.41 12531.97 15331.12 
AF 13324.91 654.03 11997.16 14652.65 
Note: “AF” refers to “Advanced Facilitation”. Items marked with (a) differ 
significantly (p ˂.05) and items marked with (b) are marginally significant (p = .066).  
 
Table 5.6  
Pairwise Comparisons Based on Estimated Marginal Means with 95 % Confidence 
Interval for Difference for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to 
Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 4 
 
Para. (I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval  
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Control AF -2369.65 1670.39 .165 -5760.73 1021.42 
AF Control 2369.65 1670.39 .165 -1021.42 5760.73 
2 Control AF -1710.86 1242.54 .177 -4233.35 811.63 
AF Control 1710.86 1242.54 .177 -811.63 4233.35 
3 Control AF 2604.50 1371.77 .066 -180.34 5389.35 
AF Control -2604.50 1371.77 .066 -5389.35 180.34 
4 Control AF -1871.58 2211.71 .403 -6361.59 2618.43 
AF Control 1871.58 2211.71 .403 -2618.43 6361.59 
5 Control AF 2209.14* 1067.67 .046 41.65 4376.63 
AF Control -2209.14* 1067.67 .046 -4376.63 -41.65 
6 Control AF -630.76 1363.91 .647 -3399.64 2138.12 
AF Control 630.76 1363.91 .647 -2138.12 3399.64 
7 Control AF 606.64 950.34 .527 -1322.66 2535.94 
AF Control -606.64 950.34 .527 -2535.94 1322.66 
Note: Abbreviation “AF” refers to “Advanced Facilitation”. 
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5.3.2.3. Measures of “offline” discourse comprehension 
 
Judgment task 
 
Explicit comprehension 
 
An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses to 
sentences checking explicit comprehension of events from text revealed that 
participants in the control condition (M = 0.83; SD = 0.38) did not differ significantly 
in their answers from participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 0.95; 
SD = 0.22), t (26.754) = -1.13, p >.05. Similarly, analysis of reaction times revealed 
that participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 3786.58; SD = 925.81) 
did not differ significantly in their answers from participants in the control condition 
(M = 4113.49; SD = 887.86), t (32) = 1.04, p >.05 (see Figure 5.3).  
 
Implicit comprehension 
 
An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses to 
sentences checking implicit comprehension of events from text revealed that 
participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 0.85; SD = 0.29) provided 
significantly more correct answers than participants in the control condition (M = 
0.61; SD = 0.40), t (30.246) = -2.08, p = .023 (one-tailed), r = .35. Moreover, 
analysis of reaction times revealed that participants in the advanced facilitation 
condition (M = 2311.44; SD = 604.35) were significantly faster to decide whether 
sentences were correct relative to participants in the control condition (M = 2880.28; 
SD = 895.63), t (31) = 2.18, p = .035 (one-tailed), r = .36 (see Figure 5.3).  
 
Control measure 
 
An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses to incorrect 
sentences with regard to the content of the text revealed that participants in the 
control condition (M = 0.58; SD = 0.42) did not differ significantly in their answers 
from participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 0.58; SD = 0.34), t (36) 
= 0.7, p >.05. Similarly, analysis of reaction times revealed that participants in the 
177 
 
advanced facilitation condition (M = 4371.84; SD = 1537.49) did not differ 
significantly in their responses from participants in the control condition (M = 
5026.03; SD = 3325.08), t (28) = 0.72, p >.05 (see Figure 5.3).  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Judgment times (reported in milliseconds) of participants in the control 
and advanced facilitation conditions (Experiment 4). The star corresponds to 
significant pairwise comparisons (p ˂ .05).  
 
Recognition task 
 
Explicit comprehension 
 
Words from the text implying forward movements (parts of metaphorical 
phrases).An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses revealed 
that participants in the control condition (M = 0.64; SD = 0.22) did not differ 
significantly in their answers from participants in the advanced facilitation condition 
(M = 0.71; SD = 0.16), t (36) = -1.13, p > .05. However, analysis of reaction times to 
correct responses demonstrated that participants in the advanced facilitation 
condition (M = 1257.40; SD = 336.39) were faster to recognize words from the text 
implying forward movements relative to participants in the control condition (M = 
1571.75; SD = 555.01), t (27,418) = 2.14, p = .024 (one-tailed), r = .38 (see Figure 
5.4). 
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Words from the text that do not imply any movements. An independent-
samples t-test on the number of correct responses revealed that participants in the 
control condition (M = 0.69; SD = 0.29) did not differ significantly in their answers 
from participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 0.78; SD = 0.29), t (36) 
= -0.86, p >.05. Similarly, analysis of reaction times to correct responses revealed 
that participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 1332.89; SD = 290.97) 
did not differ significantly in their responses from participants in the control 
condition (M = 1473.94; SD = 301.39), t (34) = 1.43, p > .05 (see Figure 5.4). 
 
Words of movement not mentioned in the text (false alarm words). An 
independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses revealed that 
participants in the control condition (M = 0.66; SD = 0.24) did not differ significantly 
in their answers from participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 0.59; 
SD = 0.23), t (36) = 0.87, p >.05. Moreover, analysis of reaction times to correct 
responses revealed that participants in the advanced facilitation condition (M = 
1393.66; SD = 388.13) did not differ significantly in their responses from 
participants in the control condition (M = 1554.81; SD = 418.83), t (35) = 1.22, p > 
.05 (see Figure 5.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Recognition times (reported in milliseconds) of participants in the control 
and advanced facilitation conditions (Experiment 4). The star corresponds to 
significant pairwise comparisons (p ˂ .05).  
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5.3.3. Discussion 
 
In summary, Experiment 4 assessed whether matching body movement and 
matching body posture could facilitate discourse processing. Consistent with 
simulation theory, participants whose motor system was manipulated to be congruent 
with the discourse meaning (a) showed higher accuracy in their responses with 
regard to implicit comprehension measure in a judgment task and (b) responded 
faster with regard to explicit comprehension measure in a recognition task and 
implicit comprehension measure in a judgment task. Additionally, there was a fragile 
effect of matching action on the speed with which participants read some paragraphs 
of text. Contrary to hypothesis, explicit comprehension was not strongly influenced 
by manipulation of the motor state. More precisely, results revealed that explicit 
comprehension performance of participants in the advanced facilitation condition did 
not differ significantly from explicit comprehension performance of participants in 
the control condition regarding both accuracy and response times in a judgment task. 
That is, reported findings seem to suggest that simulation system contributed more to 
implicit comprehension of discourse based on deduction and interpretation and less 
(or equally with linguistic system) to shallow explicit comprehension.  
 
5.4. Experiment 5  
 
Experiment 5 investigated whether mere adoption of body posture appropriate 
for the metaphorical phrases would facilitate discourse processing to the same extent 
as engaging in literal movement prior to text reading (as reported in Experiment 4). 
Such a prediction is in harmony with previous experimental findings that showed the 
activation of motor cortex during motor imagery, motor preparation, motor 
performance (Deceti et al., 1994) and passive observation of various video sequences 
about action (e.g., Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). 
 
5.4.1. Method 
 
5.4.1.1. Participants and design 
 
The sample consisted of 37 (36 right-handed, one left-handed), native 
Portuguese-speaking university students (Mage = 22.86, SDage = 5.59). 14 participants 
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were male (Mage = 24.43; SDage = 6.50), 21 were female (Mage = 21.71; SDage = 4.97), 
and two participants did not indicate gender. The experiment was a single factor 
between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
conditions: basic facilitation or control condition. 
 
5.4.1.2. Materials and procedure 
 
The materials were strictly identical to those for Experiment 4. The procedure 
was nearly identical to that in Experiment 4, with the exception that participants in 
the basic facilitation condition did not exercise on a bike prior to text reading. 
 
5.4.2. Results 
 
5.4.2.1. Coding of Variables and Preliminary analyses 
 
Accuracy rate was calculated on the number of correct answers to target 
variables by coding incorrect response as “0” and correct response as “1”. 
Preliminary analyses showed that there was a significant effect of gender on target 
text reading time after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (1, 32) = 
4.86, p =.035. At the same time, follow-up analysis investigating the effect of gender 
on the speed with which participants read paragraphs of text revealed that this effect 
was non-significant, F (7, 26) = 1.49, p = .21, thus suggesting that gender variable 
did not significantly alter the direction or strength of the relationship between a 
predictor and an outcome. Similarly, by classifying age into the three groups (18-29, 
30-49, 50+), it was revealed that there was no significant effect of age on target text 
reading time after controlling for the effect of tutorial reading time, F (1, 34) = 0.48, 
p ˃ .05. Finally, post-experimental interview confirmed that none of the participants 
suspected the purpose of lead leg manipulation. 
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5.4.2.2. Measures of “online” discourse comprehension 
 
Target text reading time 
 
An 8 (Paragraphs 1 to 8) within factor x 2 (condition: control vs. basic 
facilitation) between factor mixed ANOVA, with tutorial reading time as a covariate, 
was conducted to analyze the reading times of the target text. Because tutorial and 
target texts were identical in size, tutorial reading time was chosen as a covariate in 
order to control for individual differences in reading time. Results showed that 
tutorial reading time (reported in milliseconds) was significantly related to the 
participant’s target text reading time, F (1, 34) = 75.05, p < .001, partial 2 = .69. 
However, there was no effect of matching action on target text reading time after 
controlling for the effect of the tutorial reading time, F (1, 34) = 0.69, p =.686, partial 
2 = .005. Considering that the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is not 
significant, and therefore does not protect against inflated Type I error rates in 
subsequent analyses of data, planned contrasts are not reported (Howell, 2006). 
Estimated marginal reading time means of participants from both conditions are 
provided in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for the Target Text According to Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading 
Time as a Covariate in Experiment 5 
 
Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 20477.07 685.52 19083.93 21870.21 
Basic Facilitation 20887.43 705.18 19454.32 22320.53 
 
 
Using Pillai’s trace, it was revealed that there was also no effect of matching 
action on the speed with which participants read paragraphs of text, F (6, 29) = 0.66, 
p = .68, 2 = 121. Considering that the multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
is not significant, and therefore does not protect against inflated Type I error rates in 
follow-up a-priori comparisons, planned contrasts are not reported (Bock, 1975) At 
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the same time, a non-significant MANOVA does not allow to fully understand how 
comprehension proceeded throughout the text. Therefore, MANOVA was followed 
with separate ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables. To control for the 
inflation of familywise error rate, a Bonferroni correction was applied to the 
subsequent ANOVAs (Harris, 1975). The results of univariate test statistics, 
however, revealed that participants did not significantly differ, nor approached 
significance in their reading of each of the paragraphs of the target text (see Figure 
5.5 and Table 5.8). For the mean differences and exact p-values, see Table 5.9. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Mean reading times in milliseconds (estimated marginal means) for 
seven paragraphs of the target text according to condition (control vs. advanced 
facilitation) in Experiment 5.  
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Table 5.8 
Estimated Marginal Reading Time Means in Milliseconds and their 95% Confidence 
Intervals for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to Condition with 
Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 5 
Para. Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Control 24599.18 1134.37 22293.86 26904.50 
BF 25650.20 1166.91 23278.75 28021.64 
2 Control 18912.07 778.68 17329.61 20494.54 
BF 19498.15 801.02 17870.29 21126.01 
3 Control 28939.02 840.11 27231.70 30646.34 
BF 29009.01 864.21 27252.72 30765.30 
4 BF  23193.14 1574.82 19992.72 26393.57 
BF 25098.09 1619.99 21805.86 28390.31 
5 Control 18023.10 703.24 16593.95 19452.26 
BF 16938.87 723.41 15468.72 18409.02 
6 BF 16567.42 1011.47 14511.87 18622.98 
BF 16958.44 1040.48 14843.92 19072.96 
7 Control 13105.54 789.05 11502.00 14709.07 
BF 13059.23 811.68 11409.70 14708.76 
Note: Abbreviation “BF” refers to “Basic Facilitation” 
 
Table 5.9  
Pairwise Comparisons Based on Estimated Marginal Means with 95 % Confidence 
Intervals for Difference for Each Paragraph of the Target Text According to 
Condition with Tutorial Mean Reading Time as a Covariate in Experiment 5 
Note: Abbreviation “BF” refers to “Basic Facilitation”. A letter “a” refers to 
adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
  
Para. (I) condition (J) condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.a 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Control BF -1051.02 1664.53 .532 -4433.75 2331.72 
BF Control 1051.02 1664.53 .532 -2331.72 4433.75 
2 Control BF -586.08 1142.60 .611 -2908.13 1735.97 
BF Control 586.08 1142.60 .611 -1735.97 2908.13 
3 Control BF -69.99 1232.75 .955 -2575.24 2435.26 
BF Control 69.99 1232.75 .955 -2435.26 2575.24 
4 Control BF -1904.94 2310.83 .415 -6601.11 2791.23 
BF Control 1904.94 2310.83 .415 -2791.23 6601.11 
5 Control BF 1084.23 1031.91 .301 -1012.86 3181.32 
BF Control -1084.23 1031.91 .301 -3181.32 1012.86 
6 Control BF -391.02 1484.19 .794 -3407.26 2625.22 
BF Control 391.02 1484.19 .794 -2625.22 3407.26 
7 Control BF 46.31 1157.82 .968 -2306.65 2399.27 
BF Control -46.31 1157.82 .968 -2399.27 2306.65 
184 
 
5.4.2.3. Measures of “offline” discourse comprehension 
 
Judgment task 
 
Explicit comprehension 
 
An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses to 
sentences checking explicit comprehension of events from text revealed that 
participants in the control condition (M = 0.84; SD = 0.37) did not differ significantly 
in their answers from participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 0.92; SD = 
0.19), t (35) = -0.76, p >.05. However, analysis of reaction times revealed that 
participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 3316.02; SD = 460.92) were 
faster to decide whether sentences were correct relative to participants in the control 
condition (M = 4113.50; SD = 887.87), t (20,16) = 3.14, p = .003 (one-tailed), r = .59 
(see Figure 5.6). 
 
Implicit comprehension 
 
An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses to 
sentences checking implicit comprehension of events from text revealed that 
participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 0.89; SD = 0.27) provided 
significantly more correct answers comparing to participants in the control condition 
(M = 0.61; SD = 0.40), t (29.91) = -2.41, p = .011 (one-tailed), r = .40. Moreover, 
analysis of reaction times revealed that participants in the basic facilitation condition 
(M = 2389.05; SD = 556.78) were significantly faster to decide whether sentences 
were correct relative to participants in the control condition (M = 2880.28; SD = 
895.63), t (29) = 1.87, p = .036 (one-tailed), r = .33 (see Figure 5.6). 
 
Control measure 
 
An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses to incorrect 
sentences with regard to the content of the text revealed that participants in the 
control condition (M = 0.58; SD = 0.43) did not differ significantly in their answers 
from participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 0.78; SD = 0.26), t (34) = -
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1.65, p >.05. Similarly, analysis of reaction times revealed that participants in the 
basic facilitation condition (M = 4290.14; SD = 1048.72) did not differ significantly 
in their responses from participants in the control condition (M = 5026.04; SD = 
3325.08), t (13,74) = 0.77, p >.05 (see Figure 5.6).  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Judgment times (reported in milliseconds) of participants in the control 
and basic facilitation conditions (Experiment 5). The stars correspond to significant 
pairwise comparisons (p ˂ .05).  
 
Recognition task 
 
Explicit comprehension 
 
Words from the text implying forward movements (parts of metaphorical 
phrases). An independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses revealed 
that participants in the control condition (M = 0.64; SD = 0.21) did not differ 
significantly in their answers from participants in the basic facilitation condition (M 
= 0.60; SD = 0.24), t (35) = 0.52, p >.05. However, analysis of reaction times to 
correct responses demonstrated that participants in the basic facilitation condition (M 
= 1278.08; SD = 418.90) were faster to recognize words from the text implying 
forward movements relative to participants in the control condition (M = 1571.75; 
SD = 555.01), t (35) = 1.79, p = .041 (one-tailed), r = .29 (see Figure 5.7).  
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Words from the text that do not imply any movement. An independent-
samples t-test on the number of correct responses revealed that participants in the 
control condition (M = 0.71; SD = 0.29) did not differ significantly in their answers 
from participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 0.79; SD = 0.22), t (35) = -
0.91, p >.05. Similarly, analysis of reaction times to correct responses revealed that 
participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 1342.13; SD = 373.81) did not 
differ significantly in their responses relative to participants in the control condition 
(M = 1442.17; SD = 321.96), t (34) = 0.86, p >.05 (see Figure 5.7). 
 
Words of movement not mentioned in the text (false alarm words). An 
independent-samples t-test on the number of correct responses revealed that 
participants in the control condition (M = 0.65; SD = 0.23) did not differ significantly 
in their answers from participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 0.60; SD = 
0.26), t (35) = 0.66, p >.05. Similarly, analysis of reaction times to incorrect 
responses revealed that participants in the basic facilitation condition (M = 1421.23; 
SD = 350.06) did not differ significantly in their responses relative to participants in 
the control condition (M = 1519.21; SD = 435.60), t (35) = 0.75, p >.05 (see Figure 
5.7). 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Recognition times (reported in milliseconds) of participants in the control 
and basic facilitation conditions (Experiment 5). The star corresponds to significant 
pairwise comparisons (p ˂ .05).  
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5.4.3. Discussion 
 
The present experiment was designed to test whether mere preparation of the 
body for movement would affect discourse processing. The findings of this 
experiment consistently replicate the findings of Experiment 4 in showing the effect 
of matching action state on implicit discourse comprehension regarding both 
accuracy and response times, and explicit comprehension regarding response times in 
a recognition task. Similarly, like in Experiment 4, a matching action state did not 
have any effect on accuracy with regard to explicit comprehension measure in both 
recognition and judgment tasks. The differences between two studies are as follows. 
First, there was no effect of matching state on target text reading time, compared to 
Experiment 4. Second, there was a significant effect of matching action state on the 
speed with which participants judged explicit sentences as correct or incorrect with 
respect to text’s content, compared to Experiment 4. These results reinforce the idea 
that matching action state had more influence on implicit comprehension than on 
explicit comprehension. 
 
5.5. General discussion 
 
In two experiments the role of action simulation in comprehension of 
discourse was investigated. After reading a text that described a protagonist making 
metaphorical forward movements, participants were faster in their judgment times 
with regard to implicit comprehension questions (Experiment 4 and 5) and explicit 
comprehension questions (Experiment 5) when their bodily systems were prepared 
for processing of action-congruent information. Also, participants whose bodily 
systems were manipulated to be congruent with the discourse meaning were faster to 
recognize target words related to metaphorical phrases of movement from the text. 
Finally, the effect of matching action state on “online” target text reading time 
(“online” processing) was fragile, being found only for paragraphs 3 and 6 in 
Experiment 4. The effect of action body systems on implicit discourse processing 
was by far the strongest among all effects reported in this paper, given that 
participants differed significantly not only on response times, but as well on the 
number of correct answers (accuracy) they provided to measures testing implicit 
188 
 
comprehension of events from discourse. These findings support the hypothesis that 
understanding of language involves constructing a sensorimotor simulation of the 
described event and add to the growing body of evidence that action simulation is 
involved in comprehension (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Taylor & Zwaan, 
2008; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). However, current research 
advances beyond the previous findings by demonstrating that matching action state 
appears to affect comprehension not only at lexical (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004) and 
sentential levels (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), but as well at the level of 
discourse.  
The reported results are consistent with converging evidence from 
neuroscience on neural substrates of discourse comprehension and share the view 
that action states can affect processing at a more global discourse level. For example, 
Speer, Reynolds, Swallow, and Zacks (2009) used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and asked participants to read four narratives from the book One 
Boy’s Day (Barker & Wright, 1951) which described the everyday activities (e.g., 
waking up, playing before school, class work, music lesson) of a 7-year-old boy 
Raymond. Later, readers’ comprehension was tested on the following events: 
characters and goals, interactions with objects, space, and time. Among other 
findings, it was revealed that adjacent and overlapping regions in bilateral posterior 
superior temporal cortex (Brodmann’s area, BA, 22/39) increased in activation when 
participants observed goal-directed, intentional actions, relative to non-goal-directed 
actions. Within this framework, similar guiding for action simulation might have 
occurred for present study, given that metaphorical phrases in our text described 
goal-directed actions that needed to be taken to build a Great Society which a 
protagonist of the story describes.  
It is interesting to note that the strongest results in the present research were 
obtained for measures checking implicit comprehension of discourse. More 
concretely, it was found that participants in the advanced and basic facilitation 
conditions (Experiments 4 and 5) differed both on accuracy and response times from 
participants in the control conditions. Impressively, these differences on accuracy 
and response times represented a medium-sized effect in both experiments (all r > 
.30), providing support for the conclusion that the influence of action simulation is 
strong for comprehension of information that involves deduction and interpretation.  
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One possible explanation for why individuals rely to a lesser extent on 
simulation while answering explicit questions is offered by Barsalou et al.’s (2008) 
language and situated simulation (LASS) theory. The LASS theory proposes that 
language understanding relies both on linguistic processing and situated simulation. 
Linguistic system is responsible for processing of linguistic forms and simulation 
system is responsible for generation of linguistic meanings. Consequently, when 
linguistic processing dominates, people tend to build shallow meaningful 
representations derived from linguistic forms rather than linguistic meanings. 
Conversely, when simulation system dominates, people tend to build comprehensive 
mental representations from inferences (information that goes beyond information 
mentioned explicitly) computed during processing of discourse. Finally, this theory 
postulates that the type of processing relies heavily on task conditions. More 
concretely, in shallow processing tasks comprehension may primarily depend on 
linguistic processing rather than on simulation, and in deeper processing tasks 
comprehension may rely more on simulation than on linguistic processing. 
Moreover, under many conditions in deeper processing tasks comprehension may 
rely heavily on both systems – linguistic and simulation.  
Clearly, if linguistic system only processes linguistic forms and word 
associations (not linguistic meanings), then it can hardly explain how comprehenders 
recognize implicit facts. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that present results 
regarding implicit comprehension of discourse are compatible with the hypothesis 
that the LASS theory advocates: simulation system prevails under the conditions 
when individuals compute a wide variety of inferences, and thus process information 
deeply.  
Regarding the results on explicit comprehension measure, reported findings 
should be regarded with caution. On the one hand, it is worth noting that there was 
an effect of matching action state on recognition (Experiments 4 and 5) and judgment 
times (Experiment 5), and thus it cannot be easily concluded that simulation system 
did not underlie explicit discourse comprehension. On the other hand, the absence of 
any effect on accuracy (Experiments 4 and 5) for both recognition and judgment 
tasks as well as the absence of any effect on judgment times (Experiment 4) suggests 
that the effect of matching action state on explicit information was fragile. Thus, the 
LASS theory might presumably account for the current results in suggesting that 
explicit understanding of discourse relied heavily on different mixtures of linguistic 
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and simulation systems. Nevertheless, definite answers to how much action 
simulation affects explicit discourse processing must await further empirical 
investigation.  
In summary, two experiments presented here were designed to test whether 
simulation of metaphorical actions facilitates discourse comprehension. It was found 
that engaging in literal action and merely preparing the body for action has a strong 
influence on offline discourse comprehension. Moreover, our findings lend support 
for LASS theory of conceptual processing (Barsalou et al., 2008) in showing that 
simulation system is more powerful in discourse comprehension when individuals 
process implicit information rather than explicit information. Finally, the reported 
findings contribute to a better understanding how simulation affects more global 
discourse level of processing and extend the previous literature on effects of 
simulation on memory (e.g., Pecher, Zanolie, & Zeelenberg, 2007; Pecher et al., 
2009) and metaphor comprehension (e.g., Wilson & Gibbs, 2007).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
Conclusions 
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Abstract 
 
This part of the thesis presents a summary of the main part of the text as well as 
deduction made on the basis of reported findings. Additionally, limitations of 
research are discussed as well as implications of the work for future research. 
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6.1. Summary of results 
 
A key suggestion of symbolic theories is that language comprehension arises 
from manipulation of amodal symbols that redescribe perceptual, motor, and 
emotional states. This suggestion seems at odds with our ability to interact with the 
environment. For example, it is difficult to think that sensory systems of the body are 
not involved in language processing when one describes his last visit to a coffee shop 
like Starbucks or Tim Hortons with the following words: aromatic, delectable, 
luscious, scrumptious, fragrant, warm, cozy, comforting, entrancing, piquant, or 
sensual. In contrast to symbolic theories, an embodied approach to language 
comprehension holds that amodal symbols become meaningful only via our 
perception and interaction with objects, and situations these objects denote 
(Glenberg, 2010). Thus, language processing involves neural and bodily systems 
used in real world perceptual, action, and emotional experiences. Under this 
conceptualization, understanding a sentence such as “The waitress looks amused 
when she passes a cup of freshly ground coffee and a scone to a middle-aged man” 
requires the retrieval of perceptual information to simulate the objects and agents 
described in the sentence (e.g, coffee, middle-aged man), olfactory perceptual 
information to simulate the smell of a warm scone and freshly ground coffee, motor 
information to simulate how the waitress passes the coffee to a man, and emotional 
information to simulate the amused state of the waitress. 
In this thesis the discussion of the importance of sensorimotor activation that 
occurs during language comprehension began with a review of empirical studies 
from research on processing of language describing concrete and abstract concepts. It 
was found that the data from all these studies converge on the conclusion that 
embodied representations are necessary for comprehension. At the same time, it was 
noted that significant issues in the domain of language processing still remain to be 
addressed. Chief among them are the following two questions. The first question is 
whether embodiment affects comprehension of extended linguistic events such as 
discourse. Interest for this question is inspired by previous discussions on the paucity 
of research regarding the role of modality-specific simulations during discourse 
understanding (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008) as well as the importance of testing language 
comprehension on a more global discourse level (Graesser et al., 1997; Sparks & 
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Rapp, 2010). The second question is whether embodied representations serve to 
affect “offline” discourse processing. 
After reviewing empirical and theoretical evidence in support of embodied 
cognition as well as discussing the usefulness of modality-specific simulations for 
language comprehension, the aforementioned two questions were empirically 
investigated in five experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the influence of 
emotional state (positive, neutral control, negative) on “online” (reading time, 
imagery vividness, perceived reading ease, feelings of presence) and “offline” 
(verbatim and inference questions) measures of discourse comprehension. Those 
participants whose facial postures were manipulated to be congruent (“pen in the 
teeth” matching condition) with the positive valence of the text generally showed 
faster reading times and higher perceived reading ease relative to those whose facial 
postures were incongruent (“pen in the lips” mismatching condition) or neutral 
(without a manipulation). No other measures showed an effect of emotional state. 
These results are consistent with previous findings where sentence stimuli were used 
(e.g., Havas et al., 2007) and support embodied theories of cognition in which 
abstract symbols are grounded in sensorimotor systems (Barsalou, 1999a; Glenberg, 
1997; Zwaan, 2004). Perhaps most importantly, the reported findings indicate that a 
matching emotional state appears to affect “online” comprehension not only at 
lexical and sentential levels, but as well at the level of discourse. 
Whereas Experiment 2 assessed whether modality-specific simulations 
capture explicit information connoted by the language, Experiment 3 assessed 
whether modality-specific simulations capture implicit information that goes beyond 
words mentioned in the text. Participants were recruited to read a narrative text 
describing scenes that implicitly suggested a particular position in space of a person 
or an entity while their body was turned 90 degrees to the right (matching condition) 
or 90 degrees to the left (mismatching condition), or in a normal condition without a 
manipulation of body direction (neutral condition). Participants’ comprehension was 
assessed with “online” (reading times, vividness of mental imagery, vividness of 
specific mental, imagery, spatial presence) and “offline” (sequencing task) 
comprehension measures. The results showed that those who read the text in the 
matching condition reported higher degree of vividness of mental imagery, but only 
with regard to scenes that described movements involving two persons in the left 
spatial dimension. No other measures showed an effect of congruent body direction 
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on discourse processing. Therefore, it can be concluded that even implicit properties 
of simulations, such as spatial dimension or location, are at least somewhat involved 
in processing of large language segments such as discourse. 
Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 were conducted to demonstrate that engaging in 
real action (by exercising on a stationary bike) or merely preparing the motor system 
for action (by reading the text with the lead leg advanced forward) affects how 
individuals comprehend discourse describing metaphorical movements. Participants 
read a text describing forward metaphorical movements (e.g., pursue a better future) 
while their bodily systems were either prepared (facilitation condition) or not 
prepared (control) for processing of action-congruent information. Participants’ 
understanding of discourse was assessed with “online” (reading times) and “offline” 
(accuracy, recognition times, judgment times) comprehension measures. It was found 
that action simulation affected “offline” implicit comprehension of discourse more 
than “offline” explicit comprehension. “Online” discourse comprehension did not 
seem to be considerably affected by action simulation. The reported findings are 
consistent with language and situated simulation theory (Barsalou et al., 2008) which 
predicts that simulation system affects to a greater extent comprehensive processing 
of information based on deduction and interpretation, and to a lesser extent shallow 
processing based on information explicitly provided in the text. These findings 
advance beyond Experiments 1 to 3 by demonstrating that modality-specific 
simulations are involved even in comprehension of discourse describing 
metaphorical actions that are physically impossible to perform. 
In sum, the reported findings support embodied cognition suggesting that 
sensorimotor and affective states are implicated, at least partially, in “online” and 
“offline” discourse processing. Clearly, the experiments reported in this thesis do not 
provide evidence that no amodal representations get activated during language 
processing, but they do provide evidence that sensorimotor grounding is necessary 
for comprehension of large language segments such as discourse. 
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6.2. Limitations of research 
 
Clearly, the evidence presented in experiments 1 to 5 supports the view that 
language needs to be grounded, at least partially, to become meaningful. However, 
the great body of evidence in support of the important role of interrelations between 
words in a language (e.g., Lund, Burgess, & Atchley, 1995; Burgess & Lund, 1997; 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Landauer et al., 1998) is also found to be convincing. 
How do we reconcile these approaches? Unfortunately, this appears to be impossible 
as the problem regarding the activation of symbolic and embodied representations 
during language comprehension is to be found in a methodological approach. 
Specifically, it is fair to say that most of the symbolic psycholinguistic experiments 
considered the contribution of amodal symbols to comprehension to the exclusion of 
potential embodied representations. Similarly, the experiments reported in this thesis 
were designed to demonstrate the activation of embodied representations during 
discourse comprehension rather than disprove the activation of symbolic 
representations. Therefore, the findings of this thesis do not validate the claim that 
language is entirely embodied. So much evidence exists now in support of both 
linguistic co-occurrence and simulation during language processing that it seems 
reasonable to assume that comprehension arises from combination of both embodied 
and symbolic aspects of cognition rather than from one source alone 
Nonetheless, the provided empirical evidence suggesting that modality-
specific simulations can affect “online” and “offline” processing of large language 
segments such as discourse does not allow for simulations as a by-product of 
language comprehension. Similarly, the provided evidence on comprehension of 
abstract metaphorical movements (Chapter 5) does suggest that the problem of 
abstract concepts can be accommodated by an embodied approach. It is true that the 
results of Experiments 4 and 5 do not provide an explanation how all abstract 
concepts are grounded. However, the success of projects like these might be useful as 
psychologists continue to tackle the problem of abstraction and offer new approaches 
to comprehension of concepts that are not highly imageable. Finally, the reviewed 
evidence (Chapter 2) on the importance of situated action for cognition (see a study 
of Glenberg & Robertson, 2000) also makes it hard to believe that the role of 
embodiment in language processing is epiphenomenal. 
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The most general conclusion that can be made in this context is that future 
research should seek to define the limitations of the power of sensory-motor 
grounding and amodal symbols in language comprehension. More concretely, the 
current state of affairs in the field suggests that new research questions could be 
raised. These include at what point in comprehension and under what conditions 
language and simulation systems get activated, and under what circumstances (nature 
of linguistic or non-linguistic stimuli, easiness of the text, etc.) symbolic or embodied 
representations prevail in comprehension tasks.  
 
6.3. Avenues for future research 
 
The findings reported in this research offer a few possibilities to advance 
progressively a future research program in the domain of “embodied” language 
processing by modifications of the methods being used and introduction of new 
ideas.  
First, regarding the role of emotion simulation in understanding of discourse, 
it was demonstrated that comprehenders simulate positive events during “online” 
discourse comprehension. However, it would be very interesting to find out if 
comprehension of discourse describing sad or angry events also requires the 
resources of simulation system. To assess this prediction, a similar experiment as 
described in Chapter 3 could be run, but with a negative text condition. If a strong 
embodiment hypothesis is correct, then participants who read and process the text in 
the “pen in the lips” (simulating frown) condition should demonstrate faster reading 
speeds relative to participants who read and process the text in the “pen in the teeth” 
(simulating smile) condition or neutral (control) condition without a pen. This 
methodology will allow to test whether the results using extended language segments 
(texts) would dissociate from the results on sentence processing gathered from a 
negative text condition (see experiments of Havas et al., 2007). 
Second, with regard to the role of perceptual simulation in comprehension of 
discourse events that implicitly suggest a particular spatial dimension to an entity or 
a person, self-paced reading times could be substituted with other “online” measures 
of comprehension that could provide additional clarity for the effect of congruent 
direction on measures of mental imagery reported in Chapter 4. Such “online” 
measures could include collection of reading times immediately after each sentence 
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of the text (see Graesser et al., 1997, for a discussion of “online” measures that 
interrupt the comprehension process) or, perhaps more promising, recording gaze 
durations. If one chooses to record gaze durations, the manipulation of body 
direction is no longer needed, and thus helps resolve the issue of integratability of the 
body direction into the simulation constructed of the content of discourse (see 
Section 4.3). More specifically, if people mentally represent implied perceptual 
features, then their eye movements should be used to coordinate elements of 
situational model with elements of visual scene. That is, if people read a sentence 
like “He stopped a car and went out to smoke a cigarette”, then their eye movements 
should “follow” the direction of movement (i.e., leaving a car suggests a horizontal 
left direction of eye movements) of the person described in the story. Similarly, if 
people read a sentence like “The wedding ring on his finger reminded him of his 
wife”, then their eye movements should be directed to the fourth finger of the left 
hand (i.e., looking or imagining looking at your wedding ring suggests a vertical left 
direction of eye movements).  
In fact, there are good reasons to think that this methodology could 
potentially be quite useful. For instance, using the eye-tracking device, Spivey and 
Geng (2001) found that participants’ eye movements were congruent with the 
direction of movements (e.g., left vs. right) described in the stories like the ones 
presented below. Importantly, however, Spivey and Geng’s (2001) stories explicitly 
suggested a particular location to an object, but not implicitly. 
 
LEFT STORY – Imagine a train extending outward to the left. It is 
pointed to the right, and you are facing the side of the engine. It is not 
moving. Five cars down is a cargo holder with pink graffiti sprayed on its 
side. Another six cars down is a flat car. The train begins to move. Further 
down the train you see the caboose coming around a corner. 
RIGHT STORY – Imaging a fishing boat floating in the ocean. It’s 
facing leftward from your perspective. At the back of the boat is a fisherman 
with a fishing pole. The pole extends about 10 feet to the right beyond the 
edge of the boat. And from the end of the pole, the fishing line extends 
another 50 feet off to the right before finally dipping into the water. 
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 Alternatively, by using sentence stimuli, a simulation of locations could be 
investigated by using an experimental procedure similar to that offered by Stanfield 
and Zwaan (2001). In their experiment, participants were presented with sentences 
describing objects or animals in particular orientations. After reading the sentence, 
participants were presented with a picture of the object or animal that the sentence 
described. The task consisted in judging whether the object (animal) was mentioned 
in the sentence. The major result was that response latencies were faster when the 
orientation of an object on the picture matched that implied by a sentence 
description. In brief, a similar research method could be applied to test a hypothesis 
that people mentally represent a location in which a person or an entity is present. 
More specifically, verification times for a picture of a man by the driver’s door of the 
car should be shorter than verification times for a picture of a man by the passenger’s 
door of the car after reading the sentence “John stopped the car and went to the bar”. 
Conversely, verification times for a picture of a man by the passenger’s door of the 
car should be shorter than verification times for a picture of a man by the passenger’s 
door of the car after reading the sentence “Bob asked John to stop and went to the 
bar”. 
Another question that warrants research concerns “offline” discourse 
comprehension. The results of experiments 1 to 3 demonstrate no effect of simulation 
on “offline” processing. At the same time, the results of experiments 4 and 5 provide 
strong support for involvement of embodied representations in “offline” 
understanding of discourse. Importantly, however, the methods of assessing 
discourse comprehension in these experiments were quite different. Whereas in 
experiments 1 to 3 standardized reading assessments were used (e.g., open questions, 
inference questions, etc.), in experiments 4 and 5 response times were collected to 
detect an effect of simulation on “offline” discourse comprehension. Therefore, one 
way to reconcile these findings is to use the same comprehension measure, such as 
response times at test, in all three experiments. It is worth pointing out in this context 
that the use of different comprehension methods in the current research was 
justifiable and theoretically sound, given the observed non-significance in 
standardized measures of “offline” comprehension. Explorations like these are 
critical to understand what comprehension measures are most suitable and sensitive 
in future prospective experimental studies. 
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A promising area for future research is in investigating under what conditions 
simulation system prevails in comprehension of text. The findings reported in 
Experiment 4 and 5 made a novel contribution to the literature by showing that 
simulation system affects to a greater extent comprehensive processing of 
information based on deduction and interpretation, and to a lesser extent shallow 
processing based on information explicitly provided in the text. Importantly, these 
results were obtained using textually explicit and implicit statements (see Pearson & 
Johnson, 1980) and the following comprehension measures: recognition times, 
judgments times, and accuracy. While these findings support the LASS theory of 
conceptual processing (Barsalou et al., 2008), they are still limited to specific domain 
(in this case action simulation), and thus does not allow to advocate generalizable 
consequences of embodiment during comprehension of explicit and implicit 
information with regard to other domains, such as perception or emotion. In brief, to 
progress on this issue, similar explicit and implicit statements, either correct or 
incorrect with regard to text’s content, should be used in other experiments reported 
in this thesis (or similar to the ones that have been reported). 
Finally, a related, though distinct, promising area for future research is in 
investigating whether embodiment manipulations may help in learning a new foreign 
language. As an example of one such manipulation, consider the “Moved by 
Reading” technique proposed by Glenberg and associates (see Glenberg, 2011, for 
discussion). A key suggestion of this technique is that emerging readers have to learn 
how to index words and phrases to their embodied experiences. Having children 
manipulate toys on the computer to correspond to what they are reading, Glenberg, 
Willford, Gibson, Goldberg, and Zhu (2011) showed that physical and imaginative 
manipulation of the toys benefits both short-term- and long-term reading 
comprehension of children. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a similar 
manipulation strategy might also facilitate foreign language learning. More 
specifically, this technique can be tested on Erasmus Mundus students who start 
learning Portuguese by asking them to read phrases or short sentences and act out the 
meaning of the phrase (sentence) using objects or actually performing different 
actions described by the sentence (see also Wilson & Gibbs, 2007, for a discussion). 
In a week, participants’ memory for the phrases or individual words can be tested 
and compared with the memory for the phrases of participants who did not undergo a 
manipulation. Of course, such an experiment has one important limitation: embodied 
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manipulations may be used with regard to concrete, but not abstract concepts. At the 
same time, considering that the supporters of embodied view of cognition have 
partially tackled the problem of abstraction and are likely to progress on this issue in 
the future, such an experiment could be quite useful to foster further research activity 
in this new field. 
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Annex A 
 
Summary of Empirical Studies on Contribution of Perceptual, Action, and Emotion 
Systems to Language Comprehension 
***Contribution of Perceptual Systems*** 
Fincher-Kiefer (2001) 
Independent variables Study 1: 
 Type of memory load (low vs. high imagery 
sentences) 
 Sentence type (constant vs. inconsistent) 
 Study 2: 
 Type of memory load (four or six item letter string vs. 
box matrix containing three or five dots) 
 Sentence type (constant vs. inconsistent) 
Dependant variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Situation model generation 
 Text comprehension 
Data collection  Recall protocols 
 Reading times 
Major result Visual memory load impaired text comprehension, and 
thus it can be concluded that perceptual simulations are 
implicated in processing of language 
 
Pecher, Dantzig, Zwaan, and Zeelenberg (2009) 
Independent variables  Sentences implying orientation or shape 
 Picture condition (match vs. mismatch with the 
sentence meaning) 
 Sentence presentation (immediately vs. long delay) 
Dependant variables  Online and offline sentence processing 
Data collection  Delayed picture recognition task 
Major result Recognition performance was better if the picture 
matched the implied shape or orientation of the object in 
an earlier sentence both when participants responded 
immediately after reading the sentences and when 
sentence reading and picture recognition were separated 
in time (45-min delay). 
 
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, and McRae (2003) 
Independent variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Orientation of visual stimuli (horizontal vs. vertical) 
 Verb image schema (horizontal vs. vertical) 
Dependant variables Study 1: 
 Performance on a visual discrimination task 
Study 2: 
 Performance on a memory task 
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Data collection  Reaction times 
Major result Spatial orientation of the verb’s image schema impaired 
performance of a visual discrimination task, but 
facilitated performance on a visual memory task. This 
suggests that comprehension of verbs is closely tied to 
visuospatial simulations of experience in the modality-
specific systems 
 
Spivey and Geng (2001) 
Independent variables Study 1: 
 Direction of scene description (upward, downward, 
leftward, rightward, control) 
Study 2: 
 Position of objects on a screen (upward, downward, 
leftward, rightward) 
 Color of the object 
 Direction of tilt of the object 
Dependent variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Position of eye movements 
Data collection  Eye-tracking 
Major result Participants’ eye movements were consistent with the 
position of objects and direction implied by scene 
descriptions. This suggests that the same bodily systems 
used in control of perceptual-motor mechanisms were 
used while participants were viewing, imagining, and 
remembering elements of the described scene and picture 
location 
 
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) 
Independent variables  Sentences implying orientation 
 Picture orientation condition (match vs. mismatch 
with the orientation implied by the sentence) 
Dependent variables  Sentence comprehension 
Data collection  Reaction times 
Major result Sentence processing was facilitated when picture stimuli 
matched orientation implied by the sentence 
 
Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and Aveyard (2004) 
Independent variables  Sentences implying motion 
 Visual motion condition (match vs. mismatch with 
the motion implied by the sentence) 
Dependent variables  Sentence comprehension 
Data collection  Reaction times 
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Major result Sentence processing was facilitated when the motion of 
the picture sequence matched the movement direction 
implied by the sentence 
 
Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) 
Independent variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Sentences implying shape 
 Picture shape condition (match vs. mismatch with the 
shape implied by the sentence) 
Dependent variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Sentence comprehension 
Data collection  Reaction times 
 Naming task 
Major result Sentence processing was facilitated when the shape of 
picture stimulus matched the shape of an animal or object 
implied by the sentence 
 
Yaxley and Zwaan (2007) 
Independent variables  Sentences implying visibility 
 Occlusive medium (clean vs. fogged goggles) 
Dependent variables Sentence comprehension 
Data collection  Reaction times 
Major result Sentence processing was facilitated when depicted visual 
resolution matched the resolution implied by the sentence 
 
***Contribution of Action Systems*** 
 
Bergen and Wheeler (2005) 
Independent variables Study 1: 
 Implied sentence direction (toward vs. away) 
 Response direction (toward vs. away) 
 Type of sentence (describing literal motion vs. 
abstract motion 
Study 2: 
 Implied sentence shape (fist vs. palm) 
 Handshape response (fist vs. palm 
Dependent variables  Study 1 and 2: 
 Sentence comprehension 
Data collection  Reaction times 
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Major result Compatibility effect between actual hand movement and 
the movement implied by the sentence facilitated 
sentence comprehension. However, this effect was 
observed only for sentences describing literal motion 
rather than abstract. Details of the handshapes required to 
perform appropriate action were routinely involved in 
action simulation. Finally, action simulation was 
implicated in sentence processing even when language 
described action that did not involve the comprehender 
(third-person) 
 
Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) 
Independent variables Study 1: 
 Perspective (inside vs. outside) 
 Part location (inside vs. outside 
Study 2: 
 Perspective (inside vs. outside) 
 Part location (inside vs. outside 
 Distance (near vs. far) 
Study 3: 
 Condition (movement vs. no-movement) 
 Response direction (“yes-is-up” vs. “yes-is-down”) 
 Part location (up vs. down) 
Dependent variables Study 1-3: 
 Retrieval of perceptual and motoric information 
during language comprehension 
Data collection  Correct response 
 Reaction times 
Major result Results from studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that participants 
are faster to verify inside parts of objects following the 
inside perspective sentence and faster to verify outside 
parts following the outside perspective sentence. Results 
from study 3 revealed that there were increased response 
times when literal response location matched  implied 
part location, suggesting that action information is 
accessed to the same extent in processing of language as 
spatial information. 
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Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) 
Independent variables Study 1 and 2A: 
 Implied sentence direction (toward vs. away) 
 Response direction (toward vs. away) 
 Sentence type (imperative vs. concrete transfer vs. 
abstract transfer) 
Study 2B: 
 Implied sentence direction (toward vs. away) 
 Response format (left index finger over the “yes” 
button either near to or far from the body and right 
index finger over the “no” button either near to or far 
from the body ) 
 Sentence type (imperative vs. concrete transfer vs. 
abstract transfer) 
Dependent variables Study 1 and 2A: 
 Sentence comprehension 
Study 2B: 
 Motor resonance 
Data collection  Proportion of correct judgments 
 Reaction times 
Major result Findings from Experiments 1 and 2A demonstrated a 
significant interaction effect between implied sentence 
direction and response direction (compatibility facilitated 
comprehension) and implied sentence direction and 
sentence type (sentences describing “away” movements 
were read faster than sentences describing “toward” 
movements in imperative and concrete transfer sentences; 
the inverse effect was observed for abstract transfer 
sentences). Experiment 2B showed no significant effect 
of the spatial location of response buttons on 
comprehension suggesting that the observed effects could 
only be accommodated by simulation theory 
 
Tseng and Bergen (2005) 
Independent variables  Type of sign (semantic vs. metaphorical) 
 Sign direction (backward vs. forward) 
 Response direction (backward vs. forward) 
Dependent variables  Retrieval of motoric information during language 
comprehension 
Data collection  Response times 
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Results Results revealed that making a decision about the form of 
a word led to activation of motor mechanisms. More 
precisely, Fluent signers of American Sign Language 
(ASL) were faster to indicate whether the two signs 
presented on the screen were the same or different when 
the direction of literal response matched the direction 
implied by literal and metaphorical motion signs. Authors 
interpreted this result as evidence for the fact that mere 
phonological processing of a lexical item with motion 
meaning engages the motor system 
Wilson and Gibbs (2007) 
Independent variables Study 1: 
 Type of literal movement (matching vs. mismatching 
vs. no-movement) 
 Implied metaphorical movement (matching vs. 
mismatching vs. no-movement) 
Study 2: 
 Type of imagined movement matching vs. 
mismatching vs. no-movement) 
 Implied metaphorical movement (matching vs. 
mismatching vs. no-movement) 
Dependent variables  Comprehension of metaphors 
Data collection  Reaction times 
Major results Results of both studies indicated that performing an 
action facilitated comprehension of metaphorical phrases 
related to those actions to the same extent as merely 
imagining performing an action 
 
Zwaan and Taylor (2006) 
Independent variables Study1: 
 Response rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
 Visual rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
 List (the mapping of a color change to response 
direction) 
Study 2: 
 Response rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
 Implied sentence rotation direction (clockwise vs. 
counterclockwise) 
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 Study 3: 
 Visual rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
 Implied sentence rotation direction (clockwise vs. 
counterclockwise) 
Study 4: 
 Sentence region 
 Response rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
 Implied sentence rotation direction (clockwise vs. 
counterclockwise) 
 Visual rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
Study 5: 
 Illusionary rotation (half experiment clockwise and 
half experiment counterclockwise) 
 Sentence region 
 Response rotation (clockwise vs. counterclockwise) 
 Implied sentence rotation direction (clockwise vs. 
counterclockwise) 
Dependent variables Study 1: 
 Manual rotation 
Study 2 and 3: 
 Sentence processing 
Study 4 and 5: 
 Modulation of motor resonance in sentence 
processing  
Data collection Reaction times 
Major result Studies 1-3 provided evidence that language 
comprehension arises from simulating action experience. 
In particular, it was found that language processing was 
facilitated when manual rotation direction was consistent 
with the rotation direction described in the sentence. 
Studies 4 and 5 showed a limitation of compatibility 
effect between a sentence and a stimulus: motor 
resonance was significant for verb region of the sentence, 
but not for other parts of the sentence. 
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***Contribution of Emotion Systems*** 
 
Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) 
Independent variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Sentence valence (positive vs. negative) 
 Pen condition (pen-in-lips vs. pen-in-teeth) 
Study 3: 
 Type of prime word (neutral vs. associated) 
 Type of target (word vs. nonword) 
 Pen condition (pen-in-lips vs. pen-in-teeth) 
Dependent variables Study 1 and 2: 
 Sentence comprehension 
Study 3: 
 Lexical account 
Major result Study 1 and 2 demonstrated that judgment times for 
sentences describing pleasant events were faster when 
participants were smiling. Similarly, judgment times for 
sentences describing unpleasant events were faster when 
participants were frowning. Findings in Experiment 3 
showed that the same pen manipulation procedure as in 
Studies 1 and 2 failed to influence the response speed in a 
lexical decision task suggesting that alternative amodal 
theories could not easily account for obtained results 
(e.g., Bower, 1981) 
 
Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, and Davidson (2010) 
Independent variables  Type of sentence (happy vs. sad vs. angry) 
 Session: preinjection, postinjection 
Dependent variables  Sentence comprehension 
  Reading times 
 Residual reading times 
 Comprehension-accuracy rates 
Major result Reading of angry and sad sentences was impaired after 
Botox injections. This finding is consistent with a 
simulation account suggesting that being prevented from 
frown makes it more difficult to simulate anger and 
sadness 
 
Note: The information necessary to identify and retrieve each source can be found in 
the reference list 
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Theory Overview 
Perceptual 
Symbol Theory 
(Barsalou, 1999a) 
*1* 
 
Language processing is embodied. First, during comprehension 
of the word, simulator for the word is extracted from original 
perceptual states. Second, simulator for the word becomes 
integrated with simulator for the concept it refers to (e.g., tree, 
trunk, and leaves). Third, the cognitive system utilizes the 
simulator of the concept that refers to the target word in order 
to derive meaning.  
 
 
Major empirical studies where theory was tested: 
 Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2004) 
 Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, and Barsalou (2008) 
 Solomon and Barsalou (2004) 
 Wu and Barsalou (2009) 
 
Indexical 
Hypothesis 
(Glenberg & 
Robertson, 1999, 
2000) 
*1* 
 
Language processing is embodied. First, words or phrases are 
indexed to corresponding perceptual symbols. Second, possible 
interactions with objects are simulated. These interactions are 
defined by relations among objects, bodily abilities 
(affordances), individual’s goals for action, and experiences. 
Coherence is achieved by combining affordances guided by 
sentence syntax, experiences, and goals. 
 
Major empirical studies where theory was tested: 
 Glenberg, Gutierrez, Levin, Japuntich, and Kaschak (2004) 
 Glenberg and Robertson (2000) 
 Glenberg, Robertson,  Jansen, and Johnson-Glenberg 
(1999) 
 Kaschak and Glenberg (2000) 
 Marley, Levin, and Glenberg (2007) 
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Immersed 
Experienced 
Framework 
(Zwaan, 2004) 
*1* 
 
Language processing is embodied. There are three component 
processes of comprehension: activation, construal, and 
integration. During activation target words activate various 
experiences with referents (functional webs) in different 
visuospatial configurations. During construal functional webs 
are integrated in simulation of events implied by language. 
Integration refers to experientially-based transitions (e.g., 
visual, emotional) from one construal to another.  
 
Major empirical studies where theory was tested: 
 Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) 
 Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and Aveyard (2004) 
 Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) 
 
Action-based 
Language 
(Glenberg & 
Gallese, 2011) 
*1* 
 
 
Language processing is embodied and relies mainly on motor 
system. Comprehension is tantamount to predicting 
sensorimotor and affective effects of the performed action. 
Goal-directed mechanisms of action control (controller and 
predictor modules) which are involved in controlling of simple 
movements in motor cortex and more complex coordinated 
motor acts in pre-motor cortex are responsible for language 
comprehension. 
 
Major empirical studies where theory was tested: 
 Not found 
Symbol 
Interdependency 
Hypothesis 
(Louwerse, 2007, 
2008) 
*2* 
 
Language processing is both embodied and symbolic. Symbolic 
comprehension relies on interdependencies between the words 
and embodied comprehension relies on perceptual simulation 
that bridges the word with its referent in outside world. 
Symbolic system effectively does its job in most 
comprehension tasks as it represents shallow processing. 
However, when a comprehender engages in cognitive 
processing deeper than usual (e.g., visuospatial scenes), 
embodiment helps symbolic system to derive meaning. 
 
Major empirical studies where theory was tested: 
 Louwerse (2008) 
 Louwerse and Connell (2011) 
 Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) 
(continued) 
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Language and 
Situated 
Simulation 
Theory 
(Barsalou, 
Santos, Simmons, 
& Wilson, 2008) 
*2* 
Language processing relies on symbolic systems, statistical 
representations, and simulation systems. The first system to be 
activated is symbolic. It represents shallow processing. When 
the resources of this system are not sufficient to derive 
meaning, simulation system which represents deep processing 
comes into play. Importantly, though the stress is being made 
on the fact that multiple systems represent knowledge, 
embodied account of meaning is considered to be the most 
relevant for cognition in this theory. 
 
Major empirical studies where theory was tested: 
 Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, and Barsalou, (2011) 
 Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, and Barsalou (2008) 
 
 
Note: Items marked as (*1*) refer to strong embodied theories and items marked 
with (*2*) refer to moderate embodied theories 
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Complete Version of Tutorial Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Emotion 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 3) 
Desta vez não é propriamente Verão, é Primavera avançada de fim de Maio. 
Nem sequer devia ir lá, devia ir apenas ao Faial apresentar o livro que te dediquei. 
Mas depois aconteceu aquela coisa estranha na Feira do Livro em Lisboa. Sentei-me 
à mesa de apresentação e na primeira fila estava uma rapariga a olhar para mim. Eu 
também olhei para ela e então ela levantou-se, aproximou-se de mim e disse, 
“Aproveito antes que comece a sua apresentação. Chamo-me Maria.” 
Pomo-nos a caminhar juntos. Façamos um acordo, não vamos até lá abaixo, 
paramos a meio do caminho, sentamo-nos no chão sobre a lava negra que tem tantas 
formas estranhas e, às vezes, encontram-se algumas que se adaptam bem a um corpo 
humano, que quase parecem ter sido modeladas precisamente num corpo. 
Todos podem escolher a sua. Aqui o vento não é muito forte e nem sequer o 
ruído do mar. Às vezes, o vento leva-o mesmo embora e então vê-se o mar mas não 
se ouve. O vente com o sol parece fogo. 
Depois, à noite, refresca um pouco, mas levando tempo, e lentamente, porque 
a terra afogueada durante tantas horas emite o seu calor ainda por muito tempo. E 
assim, ao caminhar sobre ela, podemos senti-ló a subir pelas pernas, chegar até aos 
joelhos, exatamente como uma brisa de fogo. O sol na estrada 21 queima só de 
caminhar por alguns instantes. 
Ao longe vêem-se as primeiras luzes de Madalena. Somente algumas luzes, 
visto que é a vila principal, apenas o suficiente para poder dizer que há iluminação. O 
bar da praça ainda está aberto, bem como um restaurante onde já não deve estar 
ninguém. Nesta estação tem início o pouco turismo da ilha que durará alguns meses, 
felizmente ainda pouca coisa. 
Pois, como se eu também não fosse uma turista. Mas estou a ir-me embora, o 
que me importa a mim quem chega? A história do costume, querer saber de tudo 
incontaminando, mesmo à distância. Pergunto-me sempre estas coisas onde quer que 
vá, se os habitantes locais também fazem o que os turistas geralmente gostam de 
fazer, porque eu acho mesmo que não, que no mesmo lugar existem duas vidas 
diferentes e paralelas, e o que o turista geralmente faz é algo desconhecido para 
quem vive no mesmo lugar. E onde quer que vá tento nunca fazer o que os turistas 
fazem porque de outro modo parecer-me-ia nunca aí ter estado. 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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Annex C (continued) 
Complete Version of Tutorial Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Emotion 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 3) 
 
Está a fazer-se muito tarde. Este dia está a começar a tornar-se pesado e 
começo a sentir o cansaço. Por que? Sabe-se lá o que me deu para vir aqui. As 
recordações, as recordações são verdadeiramente estranhas, muito estranhas. Tem-se 
sempre a sensação de recordar de uma maneira, mas se pudéssemos realmente voltar 
atrás, reviver aquela recordação, então descobri-la-íamos sem dúvida completamente 
diferente de como a recordámos durante tanto tempo.  
Os acrescentos do presente, os que metes lá dentro mesmo quando não 
recordas a recordação. São eles que a mudam, e assim acabas por te recordar de algo 
diferente, alterado por tua vida. Recordações, recordações, recordações... 
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Annex D 
Complete Version of Target Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Emotion 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 3) 
Um finlandês de oitenta e um anos casou-se com uma mulher finlandesa de 
cinquenta e quatro que conheceu na Internet, demonstrando que o amor vence todos 
os obstáculos. Jan-Erik Enestam, mais conhecido pelo seu livro «O Amor chega com 
a idade», afirma que «a Internet não pertence apenas aos jovens. Não existem 
quaisquer regras que impeçam as pessoas idosas de procurar o amor online,» afirma 
o feliz advogado reformado que usa a Internet há já cerca de dez anos.  
Os pais da noiva, de setenta e seis e setenta e dois anos, não ficaram muito 
contentes com a escolha da filha, porque o homem tem problemas de visão e, claro, 
por causa da sua idade. No entanto, a felicidade da filha e o sorriso constante na face 
desta, fizeram com que aceitassem Jan-Erik na família.  
Quando lhe perguntaram porque motivo escolhera Jan-Erik para seu futuro 
marido, Mikko Koskinen disse: «Bem, a sua voz pareceu-me muito jovem e descobri 
que era um homem extremamente afectuoso».  
«Após oito meses de casamento, o meu marido de oitenta e um anos ainda 
tem gestos para comigo que os meus quatro maridos anteriores nunca tiveram. Por 
exemplo, traz-me sempre café à cama, oferece-me as minhas flores favoritas e por 
vezes chega até a preparar jantares românticos à luz da vela», disse Mikko, com um 
enorme sorriso estampado no rosto.  
Um dia, o casal decidiu trocar as ruas cheias de neve da capital finlandesa por 
umas férias no Egipto, de forma a assinalar o primeiro aniversário do seu casamento. 
Como a mulher era vendedora imobiliária e tinha um horário muito sobrecarregado, 
decidiram que o marido voaria primeiro e que a mulher se juntaria a ele no dia 
seguinte. E assim sucedeu.  
Quando o avião do homem aterrou no Cairo a primeira coisa que ele viu ao 
desembarcar foram enormes vagas e nuvens de areia vermelha subindo e rolando em 
frente como ondas gigantes. A temperatura dava-lhe a impressão de estar num 
grelhador, particularmente para um homem que passara toda a sua vida na gelada 
Finlândia. Todavia, apesar do clima, as impressões do homem sobre o Egipto foram 
todas positivas. No autocarro que o levou ao hotel, Jan-Eric teve a oportunidade de 
apreciar os locais mais belos que alguma vez vira na sua vida: as sombras das 
Grandes Pirâmides, o Vale dos Reis e o templo de Abu Simbel.  
Ao chegar ao hotel, decidiu enviar à mulher um email sucinto. Infelizmente, 
ao escrever o endereço dela, falhou um letra e, ao invés de seguir para a mulher, o 
recado foi parar à caixa de correio de uma idosa, esposa de um padre, cujo marido de 
sessenta e sete anos falecera precisamente no dia anterior. Quando a viúva enlutada 
decidiu verificar o seu email, deu uma vista de olhos ao monitor, soltou um grito 
estridente e caiu ao chão sem sentidos.  
(continued) 
  
234 
 
Annex D (continued) 
 
Complete Version of Target Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Emotion 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 3) 
 
 
Ao ouvirem o barulho, a família correu para o quarto e viu o seguinte recado no ecrã: 
Minha Querida Esposa, 
Acabo de fazer o check-in. Está tudo preparado para a tua chegada amanhã.  
Tem em conta que aqui faz um calor terrível.  
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Annex E 
 
Questionnaire Items Used in Experiment 3 to assess “Online” Discourse 
Comprehension 
 
 Perceived reading ease 
 
Indique o grau em que concorda com as seguintes afirmações registando a sua resposta 
numa escala crescente de 1 (Discordo muito) a 7 (Concordo muito). 
  Discordo 
 muito 
Concordo 
muito 
Eu não tive qualquer dificuldade em compreender os 
detalhes do texto 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Achei o processo de leitura do texto fácil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Vividness of mental imagery 
 
Quando eu estava a ler o texto, a imagem da apresentação do discurso na minha mente 
era: 
Vívida 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Vaga 
Clara 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nada clara 
Indistinta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Distinta 
Nítida 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Embaciada 
Intensa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fraca 
Natural 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inerte 
Desfocada 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Clara 
 
 Spatial presence 
 
Quando eu estava a ler o texto, tinha a sensação que: 
   Discordo 
muito 
Concordo 
muito 
 Eu estava no centro da acção descrito no texto e não era 
um mero observador 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Eu fazia parte do ambiente descrito no texto 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Eu estava realmente lá no meio da apresentação 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Os objetos na apresentação estavam em meu torno 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 A minha verdadeira localização deslocou-se no meio da 
apresentação 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Eu estava fisicamente presente no meio da apresentação 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Eu realmente fiz parte do ambiente da apresentação 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Annex F 
 
Questionnaire Items Used in Experiment 3 to assess “Offline” Discourse 
Comprehension 
 The Questions Used to Test Explicit Comprehension of Discourse in Experiment 
1 
1. Qual é a diferença de idade entre o homem e a mulher? 
2. Por quantos anos o homem estava a usar a Internet? 
3. Qual é o problema de saúde que o homem tem? 
4. De que país o homem e a mulher se originam? 
5. Qual é a profissão da mulher? 
6. Para quem o homem enviou o e-mail? 
7. Qual era a profissão do homem? 
8. Como é que o casal se conheceu? 
9. Por que razão o casal decidiu ir para o Cairo? 
10. Que época do ano era na cidade onde o casal vivia quando eles decidiram ir para 
o Cairo? 
 
 The Statements Used to Assess Implicit Comprehension of Discourse in 
Experiment 1 
 Discordo 
muito 
Concordo 
muito 
1. O marido está feliz no casamento 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. A mulher está feliz no casamento 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. O marido está actualmente desempregado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. O casal vive na cidade com a população superior a 
50.000 pessoas 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. O relacionamento do casal é romântico 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. O tempo no Cairo estava ventoso,  quando o 
homem chegou 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. A temperatura no Cairo eatava acima de 30 º C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Enquanto ia de autocarro para o hotel, o homem 
podia ver muitos sítios históricos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. O homem digitou incorretamente o endereço de e-
mail da sua esposa por causa da baixa visão 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. A esposa do homem era casado antes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Annex F (continued) 
 
11. O homem estava à procura do amor online há 
mais de um ano 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Foi difícil para os pais da noiva darem o seu 
consentimento para o casamento 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. O marido é um tipo de homem bem humoroso 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. O marido gosta de história 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. O casal está a desfrutar da sua felicidade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Annex G 
 
List of Control Variables Used in Experiments 1 and 2 
 
 
 The Items Used to Assess the Perceived Attention Grabbing in Experiment 1 
Indique o grau em que concorda com as seguintes afirmações registando a sua resposta 
numa escala crescente de 1 (Discordo muito) a 7 (Concordo muito). 
 Discordo 
muito 
Concordo 
muito 
1. O texto está a prender a atenção 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. O texto é cativante 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. O texto é intrigante 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 The Items Used to Assess Reading Satisfaction in Experiment 1 
Indique o grau em que concorda com as seguintes afirmações registando a sua resposta 
numa escala crescente de 1 (Discordo muito) a 7 (Concordo muito). 
 Discordo 
muito 
Concord 
muito 
1. O meu nível de satisfação com o texto é alto 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Achei o processo de leitura do texto agradável 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ao terminar a leitura do texto, senti-me como se 
não conseguisse parar de sorrir 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. No futuro, eu gostaria de ler, ansiosamente,  uma 
outra história deste tipo 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 The Items Used to Assess Social Evaluation of the Protagonist in Experiment 1 
Quando eu estava a ler o texto, eu imaginava o homem a ser: 
 
  
Entusiasta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nada entusiasta 
Brincalhão 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nada brincalhão 
Jovem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Idoso 
Alegre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Triste 
Lisonjeiro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nada lisonjeiro 
Animado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Deprimido 
Apaixonado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Desapaixonado 
Afortunado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Infeliz 
Dinâmico 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Passivo 
Otimista 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pessimista 
Animado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Apático 
Bem-aventurado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Infeliz 
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Annex H 
 
Complete Version of Tutorial Text in Portuguese used in Experiment on Simulation 
of Spatial Dimension and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 4) 
Desta vez não é propriamente Verão, é Primavera avançada de fim de Maio. 
Nem sequer devia ir lá, devia ir apenas ao Faial apresentar o livro que te dediquei. 
Mas depois aconteceu aquela coisa estranha na Feira do Livro. Sentei-me à mesa de 
apresentação e, na primeira fila, estava uma rapariga a olhar para mim. Eu também 
olhei para ela e então ela levantou-se, aproximou-se de mim e disse, “Aproveito 
antes que comece a apresentação. Chamo-me Silvia.” 
Pomo-nos a caminhar juntos. Façamos um acordo, não vamos até lá abaixo, 
paramos a meio do caminho, sentamo-nos no chão sobre a lava negra que tem tantas 
formas estranhas e, às vezes, encontram-se algumas que se adaptam bem a um corpo 
humano, que quase parecem ter sido modeladas precisamente num corpo. Todos 
podem escolher a sua. Aqui o vento não é demasiado forte, e nem sequer o ruído do 
mar. Às vezes, o vento leva-o mesmo embora, e então vê-se o mar mas não se ouve. 
O vente com o sol parece fogo... 
Depois, à noite, refresca um pouco, mas levando tempo, e lentamente, porque 
a terra afogueada durante tantas horas emite o seu calor ainda por muito tempo. E 
assim, ao caminhar sobre ela, podemos senti-ló a subir pelas pernas, chegar até aos 
joelhos, exactamente como uma brisa de fogo. O sol na estrada de Arcos, é mais sol 
do que em qualquer outro lugar, quiema só de caminhar por alguns instantes. E tudo 
treme, até um corpo. Faz um calor sem tréguas. 
Ao longe vêem-se as primeiras luzes de Manna. Somente algumas luzes, visto 
que é a vila principal, apenas o suficiente para poder dizer que há iluminação. O bar 
da praça ainda está aberto. Nesta estação tem início o pouco turismo da ilha que 
durará alguns meses, felizmente ainda pouca coisa. 
Pois, como se eu também não fosse uma turista. Mas estou a ir-me embora, o 
que me importa a mim quem chega? A história do costume, querer saber de tudo 
incontaminado, mesmo à distância. Pergunto-me sempre estas coisas onde quer que 
vá, se os habitantes locais também fazem o que os turistas geralmente gostam de 
fazer, porque eu acho mesmo que não, que no mesmo lugar existem duas vidas 
diferentes e paralelas: de turista e de habitante. 
Este dia está a começar a tornar-se pesado e começo a sentir o cansaço. Sabe-
se lá o que me deu para vir aqui. As recordações... Não é nada melhor do que a 
recordação de um amor falhado, podem-se fazer quantos apêndices quisermos, é 
como se estivesse tudo ainda por fazer. Sabe-se lá o que seria de um amor falhado se 
subitamente se tornasse um amor verdadeiro... 
Os acrescentos do presente, os que metes lá dentro mesmo quando não 
recordas a recordação. São eles que a mudam, e assim acabas por te recordar de algo 
diferente, alterado por tua vida. Se realmente é assim, é como se não tivéssemos 
passado. O passado que se transforma, ganha um novo aspecto. 
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Annex I 
 
Complete Version of Target Text in Portuguese used in Experiment on Simulation of 
Spatial Dimension and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 4) 
Ele olha para o seu relógio de pulso, são 21H00.  
Deixa-a para trás com a dor que foi forçado a aceitar. A vertigem da liberdade 
acelera-lhe o ritmo cardíaco, alimenta os seus sonhos mais ousados de ter uma vida 
normal. Os trinta e quatro anos de toda a sua existência, a existência que o trouxe até 
este momento, não voltarão mais a ser recordados. Não pode fazer o tempo andar 
para trás no seu relógio de pulso de maneira a trazer a mulher de volta. 
O coração, já estilhaçado em pedaços, faz o sangue fluir com uma velocidade 
incrível por todo o seu corpo, à medida que observa pela janela da sua viatura outros 
carros passarem pelo seu. Na escuridão do momento, os seus olhos, de um azul 
profundo, estão repletos de mágoa e de lágrimas. Todo o seu corpo parece 
anestesiado, como se fosse uma bateria descarregada. Mas ele sabe que tem de 
esquecer. Se a condução veloz e durante muito tempo fizer com que se apague o 
passado, então ele será bem sucedido.  
À medida que vai guiando, sonha com ela. Sonha com a altura em que se 
casaram e trocaram alianças; sonha com o tempo em que a ensinou a montar a 
cavalo; sonha com o tempo em que, ao abrir a porta da casa após um árduo dia de 
trabalho, ela lá estava, à espera do seu homem. Finalmente, sonha com o cheiro da 
pele dela, o cheiro do seu perfume, o cheiro da sua presença… Agora, tudo isso 
desapareceu. O mundo parece cinzento, frio e destituído de sentido. 
O horrível rugido do motor do carro fá-lo voar a uma velocidade incrível, 
ultrapassando viaturas umas atrás das outras. Mas depressa percebe que falha no 
desejo de escapar ao mundo. Pára o carro, vira-se para trás no assento com o intuito 
de verificar se escapou dela, do passado, de si mesmo. 
Olha para fora da janela, tremendo perante a noite que lhe obstrui a visão. 
«Onde estou?» - questiona-se. Mas não há ninguém para responder; não há ninguém 
que o possa ajudar a ultrapassar a dor que lhe chega do fundo do seu coração partido. 
Reunindo todas as suas forças, respira fundo e sai do carro. Já se sente o ar gelado e 
ele consegue pressentir o frio da noite a aproximar-se. O céu enche-se de nuvens; o 
vento sopra na sua face.  
Retira um cigarro do bolso da camisa e fuma. Após a fadiga da fome, após as 
tremuras violentas, o após o excesso de humidade, o cheiro do cigarro é a única 
consolação que lhe resta, perdido que está no meio de nenhures. Subitamente, 
começa a chover, numa grande bátega de água, e ele compreende que neste mundo 
enorme não passa de um ser completamente miserável.  
Deseja que tudo não passe de um sonho. Mas não é um sonho. Apesar da 
adrenalina que pulsa pelo seu coração, a fadiga, o frio intenso e a falta de comida, 
ainda sente a presença dela. Ela continua consigo na aliança de casamento na sua 
mão, declarando simbolicamente o seu amor eterno por ele… 
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Annex J 
 
Questionnaire Items Used in Experiment 3 to Assess “Online” and “Offline” 
Discourse Comprehension 
 
 The Items Used to Measure Vividness of Mental Imagery Regarding Static 
Locations in the Left Spatial Dimension in Experiment 3 
Quando eu estava a ler o texto, eu podia: 
  Discordo 
muito 
Concordo 
muito 
Imaginar a batida de coração do homem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Imaginar a aliança na mão dele 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 The Items Used to Measure Vividness of Mental Imagery Regarding Static 
Locations in the Left Spatial Dimension in Experiment 3 
Quando eu estava a ler o texto, eu podia: 
  Discordo 
muito 
Concordo 
muito 
Imaginar o homem a conduzir rápido 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Imaginar o homem a voltar no seu banco de motorista 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Imaginar o homem a sair do carro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 The Items Used to Measure Vividness of Mental Imagery Regarding Movements 
that Involve Two Persons in the Left Spatial Dimension in Experiment 3 
Quando eu estava a ler o texto, eu podia: 
  Discordo 
muito 
Concordo 
muito 
Imaginar o casal a trocar alianças na cerimónia de 
casamento 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Imaginar o homem a ensinar a sua esposa como se 
monta o cavalo 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 The Statements Used in the Sequencing Task in Experiment 3 (“offline” 
comprehension”) 
Coloque os eventos do texto na ordem correta 
1. O homem observa pela janela da sua viatura outros carros passarem pelo seu 
2. O homem sonha com a sua mulher 
3. O homem sai do carro 
4. O homem retira um cigarro do bolso da camisa e fuma 
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Annex K 
 
Complete Version of Tutorial Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Action 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 5) 
Desde o primeiro ano da escola que todos me tratam por Fomenicas. Sou 
magro e a minha cara parece de cera, mas nunca passei um dia sem comer. Sim, 
tenho cara de fome e os ossos cobrem-se quase só de pele; nisso saio ao meu tio 
Nuno, que num dia, ao almoço, foi capaz, de comer dois quilos de bacalhau e quatro 
de batatas com  dois litros de vinho, e um pão de quilo. Todo o mundo julgou que ele 
iria rebentar com uma pançada daquelas. Bom, o que quero explicar é que a minha 
magreza não tem nada a ver com a fome.  
Como todos os dias ao almoço dois pratos de sopa com pão e ao jantar mais 
dois. Para a escola, a minha mãe arranjava-me sempre um papo-seco com linguiça, 
não julgassem os outros que a gente passava mal em minha casa. Pois, mesmo assim, 
puseram-me a alcunha de Fomenicas. Depois dessa arranjaram-me outras, como 
Guita e Magriço, mas cada uma não resistiu à força da primeira. 
Não me lembro quem ma pôs, nem agora isso interesa para o caso. Tenho a 
certeza que devo à alcunha o tornar-me alvo das brincadeiras da escola. A malta fazia 
luxo em meter-se comigo, dar-me chulipas e inventar castigos para mim se eu 
refilava ou mostrava má cara. Acabei por me habituar e fingir que também entrava na 
paródia. Mas só eu sei o que sentia cá por dentro. Hoje ainda ninguém me fez mal, 
apesar de estarem dez rapazes no corredor da secretaria. Vejo-os nervosos, 
conversando uns com os outros à procura de qualquer pretexto para gracejarem. Mas 
hoje nem eu lhes sirvo.  
Tenho a certeza de que vivo hoje o meu último dia de escola. Preparei-me 
para o exame final com todas as minhas forças, na certeza de que uma vida nova vai 
começar para mim; quanto melhor for a nota do diploma, mais facilmente poderei 
alcançar o meu sonho destes anos. Prestei as melhores provas de todo o curso. Os 
livros pareciam abertos à minnha frente e havia vozes que me sopravam toda a 
matéria das disciplinas. Tirei a minha grande desforra; estou certo de que nenhum 
outro me passará à frente. 
É possível que ainda encontre algum deles na minha carreira de empregado 
de esritório, e esse há-de arrepender-se de todo o mal que me fez ou aplaudiu. Sinto 
que vou vencer todas as batalhas da minha profissão. À minha volta as coisas já 
começaram a modificar-se; não me lembro agora da roupa velha de que tanto me 
envergonhava. Hoje estreei o fato que o meu pai comprou no mercado.  
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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Annex K (continued) 
 
Complete Version of Tutorial Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Action 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 5) 
 
 
As noites que passei já não voltam. Recordo-me da última em que preparava 
o exame de escrituração: o meu pai, na casa de entrada, batia a sola para um conserto 
que devia entregar pela manhã. Não podia suplicar-lhe que adiasse o trabalho, pois 
não havia dinheiro em casa e ele ganhava para o nosso almoço. Arregalei os olhos, 
para com eles absolver tudo o que devia ainda estudar. 
Encafuara-me no quarto com uma vela a iluminar-me, procurando alhear-me 
de todos os ruídos, de olhos bem atentos às páginas do livro e de mãos encostadas 
aos ouvidos para que nada pudesse distrair-me. Mas o bater do martelo andava 
decorado pelo meu sangue...  
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Annex L 
 
Complete Version of Target Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Action 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 5) 
Ao protegermos a vida da nação e ao resguardarmos as liberdades dos 
cidadãos, perseguimos a nossa própria felicidade. O sucesso nesse objectivo 
corresponde ao nosso sucesso enquanto nação. A vossa imaginação, a vossa 
iniciativa e a vossa criatividade ajudar-nos-ão a construir uma sociedade onde o 
progresso está ao serviço das nossas necessidades. E isto porque, no vosso tempo, 
temos a oportunidade de avançar não só em direcção a uma sociedade próspera e 
ponderosa, mas também em direcção à Grande Sociedade.  
Temos uma falsa sensação de independência; no caminho para um amanhã 
melhor os nossos navios podem colidir e afundar-se. No entanto, se nos 
comprometermos com novas prioridades, com novas estratégias e formas novas de 
pensamento que assegurem que a esperança se mantenha viva, quebraremos a 
muralha da hesitação e em segurança navegaremos o nosso barco para um futuro 
melhor. 
Assim, quero hoje falar-vos sobre os lugares onde começamos a construir esta 
Grande Sociedade; as nossas cidades, as nossas salas de aula. Muitos de nós viverão 
para ver chegar o dia, talvez daqui a cinquenta anos, em que a nossa população e área 
das cidades dobrará; o dia em que todos juntos daremos um passo de gigante para 
construirmos casas, auto-estradas e infra-estruturas equivalentes em número a todas 
as que foram erigidas desde a criação do nosso país. Portanto, nos próximos quarenta 
anos, construiremos a ponte que pavimentará o caminho para esta Grande Sociedade.  
A nossa sociedade nunca será grandiosa enquanto as nossas cidades não 
forem grandiosas. Nas asas do tempo, aproximamo-nos rapidamente de uma era em 
que a imaginação e a inovação se tornam as maiores prioridades. Usem a vossa 
imaginação e a vossa esperança como armas do nosso progresso para a Grande 
Sociedade. Do mesmo modo que os atletas numa corrida não param enquanto não 
chegam à meta, também vós assim devem agir. Avancem, abram os braços a 
qualquer ideia que nos possa conduzir a um futuro melhor. 
A nossa sociedade nunca poderá ser grandiosa enquanto mais de um quarto 
da mesma não tiver completado o ensino secundário. A cada ano, mais de 10.000 
alunos finalistas do ensino secundário, com habilitações demonstradas, não entram 
na universidade porque não têm dinheiro para isso. E, se não conseguimos educar a 
juventude de hoje, não poderemos perseguir o futuro com confiança. 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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Annex L (continued) 
 
Complete Version of Target Text in Portuguese used in Experiments on Action 
Simulation and Discourse Comprehension (Chapter 5) 
 
É obvio que ainda temos muitos problemas nas nossas escolas, mas em 
simultâneo passámos do caminho da discórdia para o do acordo. Ao avançarmos 
neste caminho, temos de ir além dos currículos, que estão desactualizados, e 
caminhar lado a lado com as correntes do futuro, de forma a encontrar novas 
maneiras de estimular o gosto pela aprendizagem e a capacidade da criação.  
Estão são os dois aspectos centrais da Grande Sociedade. Devemos reunir o 
melhor do pensamento e o mais amplo do conhecimento de todo o mundo de forma a 
caminharmos para um futuro melhor juntos e a abrirmos um novo capítulo na história 
da nossa grande nação.  
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Annex M 
 
List of Stimuli Used in  Judgment and Recognition Tasks in Experiments 4 and 5 
 
 List of Sentences Used in a Judgment Task for Experiments 4 and 5 
TAREFA: O objectivo desta tarefa é identificar se as frases apresentadas são verdadeiras ou 
falsas de acordo com o texto que acabou de ler. Pretende-se que seja um exercício rápido. Irá 
surgir no ecrã a palavra 'PREPARE-SE' e, após 3 segundos, aparecerá uma frase. 
Rapidamente, carregue na Tecla 'A' se verificar que a frase é falsa de acordo com o texto e 
na Tecla 'L' se verificar que a frase é verdadeira de acordo com o texto. Após a sua selecção, 
aparecerá novamente a palavra 'PREPARE-SE', e após 3 segundos, uma nova frase para 
análise. 
Measure Sentence 
Explicit 
comprehension 
Os lugares para começar a construer a Grande Sociedade 
são as escolas e as salas de aula 
 Muitos alunos não entram na universidade devido a 
problemas financeiros 
Implicit 
comprehension 
A modernização é um aspect importante de Grande 
Sociedade 
A juventude é a esperança do país 
Incorrect control 
sentences 
Em 50 anos quer a população quer a area das cidades 
passarão a metade 
Dinheiro é um aspect essencial de Grande Sociedade 
 
 List of Words Used in a Recognition Task 
TAREFA: O objectivo desta tarefa é identificar as palavras que encontrou no texto 
'GRANDE SOCIEDADE' durante a leitura efectuada. Pretende-se que seja um exercício 
rápido. Irá surgir no ecrã a palavra 'PREPARE-SE' e, após 3 segundos, aparecerá uma 
segunda palavra. Rapidamente, carregue na Tecla 'A' se verificar que esta palavra não 
pertence ao texto e na Tecla 'L' se associar a palavra ao mesmo. Após a sua selecção, 
aparecerá novamente a palavra 'PREPARE-SE', e após 3 segundos, uma nova palavra para 
análise. 
Type Words 
Words from the text 
implying movement 
Perseguir (x2), avancar, aproximar-se, caminhar, conduzir 
Words from the text not 
implying movement 
Ajudar, sociedade, começar, grande, assegurar, poder 
Words of movement 
not from text 
Corer, ir, marchar, atravessar, deslocar 
 
